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ABSTRACT 
 
The Flavii Apiones, owners of a large estate in Byzantine Egypt (fourth to seventh 
centuries), appear to become quite wealthy, yet the means by which they acquired that wealth is 
not always clear. Peter Sarris has argued that profit was derived from a category of land called the 
autourgia, mentioned only occasionally in the extant papyri. The autourgia, he asserts, generated the 
great bulk of the surplus, which could then be sold on the open market. In contrast to Sarris, 
Todd Hickey argues that the estate was autarkic, focusing his argument on viticulture, the 
agricultural sector most likely to have been exploited commercially. He finds that the Apion estate 
was barely self-sufficient in wine. On Hickey’s view, estate income was predominantly from lease 
revenue. Yet receipts and expenditures in the extant accounts documenting collections made by 
the estate on leased land often balance in grain and only show a small profit in cash. Given the 
extent of the Apions’ wealth and the affluence of their senatorial peers, Hickey concedes that 
“…the Apions would have needed significantly more wealth than their estate at Oxyrhynchus could 
possibly have generated. The source of such income remains to be discovered.”1  
The main aim of this dissertation, then, is to examine and evaluate the potential sources of 
wealth the Apions could have exploited. It offers a critique of Sarris’ description of how the estates 
made their money, his framing of the relationship between the estate and the state as pitted against 
one another for control over the wealth-generating land of Egypt, and his view of the estate as 
large, expanding, and bipartite. In its place is posited a model that accords with Hickey’s picture of 
the estate as largely autarkic in its production, and with Jean Gascou’s model of Byzantine estates 
                                                
1 Hickey 2012, 155. 
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in which aristocratic elites and imperial authority negotiated and cooperated with one another. 
The argument made here suggests that the Apions acquired their wealth in large part by collecting 
taxes for the state through tax farming agreements. Such a view aligns with the most important 
aspect of Gascou’s model, that Byzantine estates performed a semi-public tax collection function.2 I 
argue that the tax farming apparatus employed by the Apion estate operated on two tiers. Through 
the lower tier they were able to draw money upwards from peasant cultivators and through the 
upper tier they could secure access to collection rights from the state. At the lower tier of the 
system, the estates additionally levied fees on collectors they employed. These fees extracted some 
of the wealth their collectors generated through market speculation when transmuting their small 
denomination collections into gold. Evidence supporting this model can be found in a number of 
extant papyri, and historical analogues can be found in classical Athens, Ptolemaic Egypt, 
Republican Rome, and Early Modern France.  
                                                
2 Gascou 1985. 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Mom, Dad, Timmy, Chris, and Heather, 
and all our families everywhere 
  
 
 
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Thanks are due first to my advisor, Maryline Parca, for introducing me to the discipline of 
papyrology, for her constant guidance and careful feedback, and for pointing me in interesting and 
productive directions through many drafts and revisions. I am also grateful to my committee 
members, in particular Jim Keenan, whose comments on early drafts greatly improved the final 
dissertation. Thanks to my professors at the University of Illinois, especially Antony Augoustakis, 
David Sansone, Ariana Traill, and Angeliki Tzanetou, who all shaped me as a reader and a thinker, 
and who spend so much time and effort making their graduate students good. Special mention has 
to go to committee member and professor Kirk Sanders, whose boundless enthusiasm and energy 
in everything he does will always inspire me. Thanks also to my friends Loula Strolonga, Dan 
Abosso, Amy Oh, Amy Norgard, Aine McVey, Sebastian Anderson, Jessie Wells, and most of all 
Ingrid Albrecht, who are owed my best memories of graduate school (and my twenties). Last and 
most important, thanks to my parents, Tim and Judy, and siblings, Timmy, Chris, and Heather, 
for their love and encouragement as far back as I can remember and farther.  
 
 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1	  
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF SCHOLARSHIP ...................................................... 1	  
1.2 THE WEALTH OF THE APIONS ......................................................................................... 11	  
1.3 CENTRAL QUESTION ......................................................................................................... 12	  
1.4 SOURCES ............................................................................................................................... 14	  
CHAPTER 2 RECONSIDERING THE AUTOURGIA  .............................................................. 16	  
2.1 IDENTIFYING AUTOURGIA IN THE PAPYRI ................................................................... 19	  
2.2 LABOR AND LEASING ARRANGEMENTS ....................................................................... 25	  
2.3 EXPANDING ESTATES ......................................................................................................... 31	  
2.4 PRODUCTION ON THE ESTATES .................................................................................... 36	  
2.5 RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF THE AUTOURGIA ..................................................... 42	  
2.6 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 48	  
CHAPTER 3 BENEFITS FROM LOWER LEVEL COLLECTIONS .......................................... 49	  
3.1 THE ACCOUNTS OF THE PRONOETAI ............................................................................ 50	  
3.2 KANKELLOS AND METRON ARTABAS .............................................................................. 57	  
3.3 ADAERATIO ............................................................................................................................ 63	  
3.4 WHERE DOES THE EXTRA 15% COME FROM? ............................................................. 68	  
3.5 THE ARCHIVE OF PAPNOUTHIS AND DOROTHEOS ................................................. 70	  
3.6 SCALE ...................................................................................................................................... 75	  
3.7 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 79	  
CHAPTER 4 TAX COLLECTION ON TWO TIERS .................................................................. 81	  
4.1 TESTING THE MODEL ........................................................................................................ 85	  
4.2 THE SYSTEM OF COLLECTION ON THE LOWER TIER .............................................. 86	  
4.3 THE SYSTEM OF COLLECTION ON THE UPPER TIER ................................................ 90	  
4.4 A SUMMARY OF THE TWO TIERS WORKING IN CONCERT ................................. 101	  
4.5 IMPLICATIONS OF A TWO-TIERED RENT SYSTEM ................................................... 102	  
4.6 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 111	  
CHAPTER 5 APION TAX FARMING IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ............................ 114	  
5.1 CONSOLIDATION AND THE FORMATION OF COLLECTION SYNDICATES ..... 115	  
5.2 OPERATING ON MANY TIERS ........................................................................................ 122	  
5.3 SPECULATION AND TAX FARMING ............................................................................. 124	  
 
 
vii 
5.4 STATE BUREAUCRACY AND TAX FARMING: PTOLEMAIC EGYPT ...................... 127	  
5.5 THE FRENCH TAX FARMING SYSTEM ......................................................................... 129	  
5.6 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 143	  
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................... 146	  
6.1 THE AUTOURGIA ............................................................................................................... 147	  
6.2 COLLECTION ON TWO TIERS ....................................................................................... 148	  
6.3 COMPARISONS .................................................................................................................. 150	  
6.4 LIMITATIONS AND HAZARDS ....................................................................................... 150	  
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS ............................................................. 152	  
APPENDIX B ESTATE STRUCTURE ....................................................................................... 153	  
Figure 1: Epoikion and ktema ....................................................................................................... 153	  
Figure 2: Prostasia, area overseen by a pronoetes ........................................................................... 153	  
Figure 3: Estate Structure Traditionally ...................................................................................... 154	  
Figure 4: Estate Structure According to Sarris ........................................................................... 154	  
APPENDIX C PAPYRI REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT .......................................................... 155	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................... 156	  
 
 
  
 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF SCHOLARSHIP 
The historiography of large estates3 in Byzantine Egypt begins in earnest with E. R. Hardy’s 
monograph on the Apion oikos.4 He describes a proto-feudal institution in which semi-servile 
tenants were tied to land increasingly concentrated into the hands of aristocratic elites. The 
appearance in the papyri of registered farmers (enapographoi georgoi, equated with the coloni 
adscripticii of the law codes), private prisons, and private military (bucellarii) and police forces 
(riparii) associated with estates is taken to signify both a loss of freedom for the peasantry and a 
usurpation of state authority by the aristocratic elite.5 Autopragia, the collection and rendering of 
an estate’s taxes by the estate itself (or a village’s taxes by the village itself), was further taken as 
emblematic of the increased self-sufficiency and usurpation of authority on the part of the estates.6 
By retrojecting onto Byzantine Egypt contemporary ideas about the economic fruits owed to the 
dissolution of the English manorial economy, Hardy reasoned that the inverse had occurred in 
Byzantine Egypt: the emergence of something akin to an autarkic manorial economy led to 
economic decline.7 In sum, Hardy saw the estates asserting for themselves rights which had been 
the province of the imperial government, most notably security and taxation. This led on the one 
hand to increased oppression of the peasant class, and on the other hand to greater isolation of 
                                                
3 The term “estate” should not be understood here to mean a single, large holding. In the Egyptian context, the term 
usually refers to the patchwork collection of holdings owned by a single household. 
4 Gelzer 1909, Rouillard 1928, and H.I. Bell's P.Lond. editions and 1917 article laid much of the groundwork for 
Hardy, but Hardy's dissertation (and then 1931 book) was the first monograph examining the evidence in depth. 
5 Hardy 1931, 54–72. 
6 Hardy 1931, 54–58. 
7 Sarris 2006, 133. 
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rural areas from city economies. That is, the large estates led to both social and economic decline 
in the Byzantine period. Much of the subsequent scholarship has disputed both notions.  
Johnson and West reject the idea of an economic decline in Byzantine Egypt largely 
because of the increased use of irrigation machinery in the period. More irrigation, they argue, 
would mean more arable land, and therefore more produce than ever before.8 Johnson and West 
seek an explanation for the effects of the estates on the agrarian economy other than Hardy’s view 
of economic decline. They find such an explanation in the land reforms of the fourth century 
which diminished the significance of the designation of crown land to the point that it 
disappeared from the record by the end of the century.9 This one-time crown land fell to the 
peasants who had merely worked it before, making them de facto owners.10 Johnson and West see 
some large estates emerging as land was becoming newly available for capital investment, but they 
suggest that historians attribute an outsized role to large estates owing to more extensive surviving 
documentation and study. Instead, they argue, autonomous villages formed from the free peasant 
landowners provided a new economic foundation following the land reforms. They note imperial 
legislation aimed at curbing the growth of large estates, and take the later absence of such laws 
under Justinian as evidence that the “evil was ended.”11 Similarly they see the emergent problem of 
patronage, wherein members of the imperial bureaucracy exchanged protection for control over 
property, as having been successfully dealt with by imperial legislation.12 The absence of these laws 
                                                
8 Johnson and West 1949, 7–13. 
9 Diocletian imposed a tax system based on the surface area of land. While he did not alter the categories of land, the 
distinctions became essentially irrelevant, disappearing from the sources by the end of the fourth century. See Johnson 
and West 1949, 19. 
10 Johnson and West 1949, 18–23. 
11 Johnson and West 1949, 18, n. 23. 
12 Johnson and West 1949, 22. On patronage, see Bagnall 1993, 214 ff. 
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in sixth century legislation and the evidence for continued peasant prosperity suggest to them that 
the earlier legislation was essentially successful at sidelining large estates. 
Hardy’s assertions about the social significance of autopragia and the coloni adscripticii, 
Johnson and West claim, are unwarranted, arguing instead that the adscripticii were free tenants, 
registered on the estates strictly for the purpose of determining where they were to be taxed. 
Autopragia and the designation of coloni adscripticii (enapographoi georgoi in the papyri) were simply 
fiscal arrangements.13 They suggest that estate prisons, which Hardy sees as evidence of peasant 
quasi-servility, were likely used to detain and ransom the families of defaulters, rather than to 
control workers not at the time engaged in labor.14 In stark contrast to Hardy’s bleak picture of 
peasant life, Johnson and West see the peasants of Egypt as flourishing socially and culturally15 in 
this period. 
Along the same lines as Johnson and West, Carrié argues that the estates were less 
important to the overall economy than one might suspect from the surviving evidence; that they 
were only one among various systems of exploiting the land.16 On the coloni adscripticii to whom 
Hardy attaches so much importance, Carrié notes the difficulty of drawing conclusions about 
social conditions (e.g., servility versus freedom) from the legal sources discussing them. The 
designation of adscripticius, Carrié says, arose out of Diocletian’s legal reforms dealing with the 
fiscal needs of the empire. Among those needs was ensuring a stable tax income and harvest, both 
of which could be adversely affected by the movement of workers. Diocletian therefore attempted 
                                                
13 Johnson and West 1949, 31. 
14 Johnson and West 1949, 31. 
15 Rémondon 1974 was the first to draw attention to the disparity between the narrative of a semi-servile, socially 
oppressed peasantry and the papyrological evidence for peasants of middling wealth, acting as both lessors and lessees. 
The extent and details of the dealings of these sometimes prosperous peasants have been examined by Keenan (1980, 
1984, and 2007) and MacCoull 1988. 
16 Carrié 1983, 229. 
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to restrict such movement by tying taxpayers to a particular location. In this way the existing poll 
tax shifted to a system in which a community was liable for a certain sum, with each member 
paying a share of that sum. 17 Communities were associated with a particular locality and the 
members of that community were registered for tax purposes in that locality, their origo. Such a 
locality might be a village or a city or, in the case of the coloni adscripticii, an epoikion associated with 
an estate (see Figure 1, Appendix B). For this reason, Carrié argues, the adscripticii should not be 
seen as any more servile than other groups with a particular origo associated with their taxation, 
since most groups had such a fiscal association.18 The fiscal, rather than social, nature of the 
relationship is further highlighted by the fact that the state, not the landowner, designated the 
estate as the origo.19 
Gascou advances this position further by claiming that the estates became semi-public 
institutions. In contrast to Hardy’s assertions that the estates usurped state authority, he argues 
that the state co-opted the private bureaucratic apparatus of estates (employed for the purposes of 
collecting dues and produce, distributing payments and supplies, etc.) for a number of functions.20 
By the fifth and sixth centuries, Gascou asserts, the estates had become the organizational focal 
point for the division of duties, responsible not only for their own taxes, but also for the collection 
of taxes from those proximate to the estates.21 The way in which the large estates were organized by 
their aristocratic owners (often themselves members of the imperial bureaucracy) could readily be 
                                                
17 Carrié 1983, 217–218. Johnson and West (1949, 259–264) dispute that this capitatio tax was in fact a poll-tax. 
18 Carrié 1983, 217. 
19 Carrié 1983, 218. 
20 Similarly Rémondon 1974, like Carrié, sees autopragia as imperially sanctioned by the time of the Apions. He argues 
that autopragia began as a privilege bestowed upon certain estates by imperial authorities, but which estates began to 
assert for themselves. In response, authorities made attempts to curtail the practice, but ultimately tolerated and then 
recognized it. By recognizing the right, imperial authorities used the private structures to carry out official business. 
Rémondon explains the bucellarii and riparii as similarly disposed: private groups employed for government purposes. 
21 Gascou 1985, passim. 
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exploited for official purposes. Hence the contributions noted for a particular household were 
actually the contributions of that household and all those from whom the household collected.22 
The estates in turn were organized into collectives (synteleiai) among whose members various duties 
were delegated. This has become known as the “fiscal participation” model. Under this scheme, 
both taxes and rent were paid to the same people, and therefore the distinction between rent and 
tax began to disappear. Gascou presses this point further, arguing that public land was handed 
over to private individuals on emphyteutic leases, that is, on permanent leases of state or church 
land with an upfront payment and low annual installments.23 Such annual payments to the 
government for productive land were indistinguishable from taxes paid on owned land, hence 
Gascou’s designation of them as “rentes-impôts.”24 In sum, the public responsibilities that had before 
fallen to the civic curia fell to the estates, and rents, indistinguishable from taxes, ended up in 
government coffers.25 A key difference between Gascou’s model and those of Carrié and Johnson 
and West is therefore the centrality of the large estate. As Sarris has commented, “in this sense at 
least, the Gascou thesis is closer in spirit to the work of Hardy than might be supposed.”26 
While agreeing with Gascou’s fiscal participation model to a large extent, Bagnall has 
pointed out a fundamental problem with his contention that estates were semi-public institutions: 
“the documentation...includes some transactions comprehensible only in the context of a private 
                                                
22 This, as Hickey (2012, 153–154) has pointed out, has in the past led to a great overestimation of the amount of land 
comprising an estate like the Apions’. 
23 Johnson and West 1949, 72–74. Gascou's identification of apotactic—i.e., invariable—payments with emphyteutic 
leases is one of the more controversial aspects of his model. See Sarris 2006, 155–156, Banaji 2001, 94–94, and 
Hickey 2012, 53–58 for discussion.  
24 Under Gascou's model, along with tax collection, the duties of the bucellarii and riparii are simply another example 
of the delegation of state power to the estates. 
25 Evidence of the degree to which public and private had merged with the advent of the fiscal participation model can 
be seen, according to Gascou (1985, 19), in the increasing prevalence of official language used in ostensibly private 
contexts. 
26 Sarris 2006, 141. 
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economy. And clearly the public role was only possible if substantial private wealth remained to 
sustain the whole enterprise.”27 Hickey seeks to address this shortcoming in Gascou’s model by 
examining the private economy of the Apion estate, essential to its public functions. He 
determines that viticulture is the most likely candidate for producing a marketable surplus.28 In the 
course of his investigation Hickey finds that the amount of land devoted to vineyards on the 
Apion estate is surprisingly small. This discovery has two main implications. First, given the 
percentage of area usually devoted to vineyards, the small amount of vineyard land implies that the 
Apion holdings were much smaller than had hitherto been estimated.29 Hickey offers a revised 
figure which accords better with the expected ratio of vineyard land to total land. The smaller 
figure for the area of the estate appears to be at odds with the papyri (e.g., P.Oxy. 1.127) recording 
the Apions’ large contribution to the annona civica, which could only be produced by a much 
greater area of land (and which was the basis for earlier estimates of the size of the estate). But this 
discrepancy is readily explained by Gascou’s model: the annona civica contributions documented in 
the papyri include the contributions not only of the Apion estate, but also of other smaller 
producers. Hickey’s interpretation of the evidence again supports the contention that the Apions 
assumed the bureaucratic and administrative roles that had once been held by the civic curia. 
Moreover, the evidence for smaller estates fractures a cornerstone of the feudal model, which 
entails large estates managed directly.30 
                                                
27 Bagnall 1993, 160. 
28 Hickey 2012, Chapters 1–3.  
29 Hickey 2012, 153–154. 
30 On Sarris’ formulation, larger estates “seem to have been conducive to…the more widespread introduction of direct 
forms of estate management, bipartite estates better suited to specialised production for the market.” (2006, 198) 
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Second, the small area devoted to vineyards indicates that the Apion estate was not 
particularly interested in producing a marketable surplus from which to derive profit. Hickey 
examines several agricultural sectors on the Apion estate and fails to find indicators of profit 
seeking behavior. Rathbone’s study of the third century Heroninus archive dealing with the 
Appianus estate has demonstrated that accounts from that archive reveal centrally directed 
management geared toward producing a marketable surplus.31 Rathbone, however, cautions 
against projecting the same level of rationalism in management into the sixth century and estates 
like the Apions’.32 Hickey affirms Rathbone’s caution in attributing the rationalism of the 
Appianus estate to that of the Apions with his findings concerning crop selection, market 
engagement, and levels of risk aversion in the Apions’ undertakings: the estate did not privilege 
crops with a potential for a marketable surplus, and the estate was essentially autarkic and risk 
averse.33 
Banaji’s study of late antique estates arrives at very different conclusions about rationalism 
in the sixth century. Rejecting notions of decline in the late antique economy, Banaji instead 
argues for economic prosperity and an increase in rural population, leading to an active labor 
market. The prosperity, Banaji argues, is linked to the establishment in the fourth century of a 
stable currency based on the intrinsic value of gold. Because its value was so stable, gold became 
the preferred investment for storing wealth. Government officials, therefore, favored payment in 
gold, which led to a preference for taxes collected in gold over taxes paid in kind. Through 
                                                
31 These accounts reveal a highly monetized economy with fairly advanced accounting systems concerned with 
minimizing production costs by monitoring the efficiency of the overseers of different parts of the estate. 
32 Rathbone 1991, 402–403. His chief concern is that the incredible inflation at the end of the third century would 
have made the type of accounting found in the Appianus estate accounts untenable for the later centuries. 
33 Hickey 2012. 
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successful investment in gold a new class of wealthy landowners who became the main power 
brokers emerged. For Banaji the change had two major implications: First, the rural economy must 
have been highly monetized for producers to pay taxes in coin. This implies a high level of market 
engagement on the part of farmers. Second, a stable wealth base allowed aristocrats to invest in 
agriculture, and especially in the potentially profitable sector of viticulture.34 Banaji’s findings lead 
him to reevaluate the feudalistic view of the absentee landowner deriving steady income from tied 
coloni renting the privilege to work the land. Instead, Banaji describes landowners actively engaged 
in the management of estates directed towards meeting the demands of the urban market, which 
he claims were extensive. Crucial to this management was the control over the mobility and 
deployment of labor. This, Banaji claims, explains the numerous legal and contractual mechanisms 
by which landowners controlled workers who mainly worked for a wage rather than renting. 
In his examination of the extant accounts of the Apion estate, Sarris finds evidence for 
specialization, central direction, bureaucratic hierarchy, monetization, and accountability of 
overseers. All of these, Sarris argues, indicate that the estates were sophisticated, rationally 
managed enterprises, directed towards meeting the needs of urban markets. Sarris proposes a 
bipartite model of the estates in which certain portions of the estate’s lands were rented out and 
certain portions were directly managed using wage labor. He argues that the accounts demonstrate 
that the directly managed portions (the autourgia), provided the bulk of the marketable surplus for 
the estates, while the leased portions (the ktemata) yielded a more modest production intended to 
meet the needs of the autourgia (see Figures 1–4, Appendix B). In addition to meeting the 
autourgia’s needs for produce, the lessees of ktematic land were drawn on to work the autourgia 
                                                
34 Banaji, therefore, harkens back to Johnson and West’s earlier linking of irrigation and prosperity. 
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during harvest and sowing. In the accounts names of people appear along with the names of the 
land they cultivated. The origines of these cultivators are also recorded. Often the land cultivated 
and the origo are the same. Some of the cultivated land, however, differs from the origo of the 
cultivator working it. Sarris interprets this evidence to indicate that labor was deliberately 
transferred between properties to meet the particular needs of different areas at different times, 
indicating central direction in the management of the estate.35 Furthermore, certain epoikia—
usually translated as “hamlets”,36 but which Sarris describes as “labour settlements” for the 
autourgia37—show some signs of agricultural specialization, another indication of central direction 
and “tactical management.”38 
Sarris also sees in the accounts a highly complex bureaucracy guiding proceeds from 
agricultural surplus upwards. There is direct evidence for levels of administration from the 
phrontistai, who oversaw the ktemata, all the way to offices in Oxyrhynchus, on to Alexandria, and 
in all likelihood to Constantinople. Accounts from lower levels were collated and sums converted 
to different standards of currency at higher levels, with various levies extracted along the way. The 
activities of these administrators as recorded in the accounts mark not only the sophistication of 
the bureaucracy, but also the highly monetized nature of the rural economy. Sarris argues that 
because demand was relatively stable, cost reduction was the most reliable means of increasing 
profit margins. The purpose of the accounts, therefore, was to ensure the “honesty and reliability” 
of the overseers, to make them accountable to the next administrative rung for any unusual outlays 
                                                
35 Sarris 2006, 36–39. 
36 E.g., Bagnall 1993, 151. 
37 Sarris 2006, 36–39. 
38 Sarris 2006, 197–198. 
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or shortfalls.39 In arguing that such cost control demonstrates rational management, Sarris quotes 
Rathbone’s conclusions about the accounts of the Heroninus archive: “...the interest...in rigorous 
control of its costs of production...in itself indicates a high level of economic rationality in its 
management.”40 
The conclusions Banaji and Sarris draw from their analyses push back against Gascou’s 
model and Hickey’s conclusions. Banaji’s primary objections concern Gascou’s equation of the 
land classed as ὑπὲρ ἀποτάκτου χωρίων, which appears frequently in the Apion accounts, with 
emphyteutic leases; 41 his claim that the distinction between rents and taxes dissolved; and the 
emphasis on the public rather than private control over estate labor.42 Sarris, who envisions a 
“bitter struggle between the imperial authorities and aristocratic interests over access to the wealth 
created by—and extractable from—the labouring population of the empire,”43 argues that Gascou’s 
failure to apprehend the significance of the autourgia severely undermines his overall argument 
about the semi-public status of the estates.44 Sarris, like Banaji, objects further to Gascou’s 
identification of emphyteutic leases in the Apion archive, and points to an absence of evidence, 
papyrological or legal, for the diminution of civic structures, or for the formal colleges of 
aristocrats Gascou claims replaced them.45  
                                                
39 Sarris 2006, 146. 
40 Sarris 2006, 145. 
41 Hickey (2012, 53–58) does not accept this aspect of Gascou’s argument. He argues instead that emphyteutic leases 
were only one type of apotaktic, or fixed rent, lease. He further connects land ὑπὲρ ἀποτάκτου χωρίων with vineyard 
land. 
42 Banaji 2001, 93–100. 
43 Sarris 2006, 7. 
44 Sarris 2006, 155. 
45 Sarris 2006, 155–157. 
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Ruffini’s dissertation and the book it became use prosopographical connections and social 
network analysis to examine life in sixth century Oxyrhynchus and Aphrodito.46 Given the nature 
of the evidence, his examination of Oxyrhynchus necessarily focuses on the Apions. In them he 
finds a “highly centralized aristocratic elite whose economic power grew in relative isolation from 
social ties.”47 Society in sixth century Oxyrhynchus, he argues, had a hierarchical structure with the 
Apion family and the estate at the top. His conclusions about Oxyrhynchus contrast sharply with 
those about Aphrodito, which he describes as “a village society built on strong multiplex ties, a 
society in which economic action took place on social lines, a decentralized society in which 
literacy and mobility could give social prominence to men and women of relatively low social 
standing.”48 These findings appear to support the traditional views of these two locales, but Ruffini 
argues for a new explanation for these differences. Rather than reverting to notions of 
Sonderstellung or supposing that the incomplete evidence provides only a partial picture of both 
places,49 he claims that the difference reflects differences in scale, Oxyrhynchus providing the 
nome level perspective and Aphrodito the village level.50  
 
1.2 THE WEALTH OF THE APIONS 
Since the subject of this inquiry is the source of Apion wealth, it is necessary briefly to 
establish the extent of that wealth. By the time of Apion II’s consulship in 539 the family had 
                                                
46 Ruffini 2005 and 2008. 
47 Ruffini 2008, 3. 
48 Ruffini 2008, 3. 
49 Zuckerman 2004, especially 221–222, claims to have identified a large estate in Aphrodito similar to the Apions’ in 
Oxyrhynchus, though the evidence is tenuous. See Keenan 2005, a review of Zuckerman 2004. 
50 Ruffini 2008, 2–3. 
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accumulated significant wealth.51 The large ivory consular diptych of Apion II, now in Oviedo, 
Spain is one testament to this wealth.52 In the sixth century the family also had a mansion near the 
hippodrome in Constantinople, and the quarter of the city in which it sat was called τὰ Ἀππίωνος, 
very likely named after the family.53 The many expenditures required of a consul for horse races, 
theatrical performances, and processions in which coins were tossed to spectators also imply Apion 
II’s immense fortune.54 This is in contrast to Strategius I, who, in 436, was locally prominent as a 
dioiketes administering imperial land in Oxyrhynchus.55 The move from elite status in a provincial 
backwater to elite status in the entire empire was connected to the family’s increasing wealth. The 
direction of causation is uncertain,56 though wealth and status were in all likelihood reciprocally 
reinforcing. In either case, it is clear that during the intervening century, between Strategius I and 
Apion II, some activity generated a great deal of wealth for the family.  
 
1.3 CENTRAL QUESTION 
The current status quaestionis regarding the large estates of Byzantine Egypt revolves chiefly 
around the level of market engagement on the Apion estate and the implications of a high or low 
level. Sarris and Hickey are the exponents of each side of the debate, high and low level, 
respectively. As described above, Sarris has suggested that a certain category of land, the autourgia, 
occasionally referenced in the accounts and elsewhere, unlike other categories of land which were 
                                                
51 Bagnall et al. 1987.  
52 Volbach 1976, no. 32. On the cost of diptychs generally and Apion II’s specifically see Eastmond 2010.  
53 Sarris 2006, 86. Janin 1964, 311. 
54 CJ 105 1 and 2 delineate these expenditures. The laws actually reduce the consular expenditures, which had 
escalated beyond a sustainable level and which threatened the emperor’s place as benefactor-in-chief. See Bagnall et al. 
1987, 10–12. 
55 Hickey 2012, 8–9. 
56 Pace Montana 1983.u 
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leased out, was directly managed by the estates with its surpluses sold for the profit of estate 
owners. The surpluses from the autourgia do not appear in extant accounts because, Sarris asserts, 
they would have been kept separate from the accounts of leased lands. Alternatively, Hickey 
identifies the agricultural sectors, especially wine production, that offer the greatest potential for 
profits and finds little emphasis on those sectors in the extant papyri. This implies that little profit 
may have been derived from the goods produced on the estates. If the autourgia was not a 
significant source of wealth and Hickey accurately characterizes the estates as autarkic, then there 
must be another source of wealth on which the Apions drew. 57 The specific problem addressed in 
this dissertation, therefore, is how the Apions increased their wealth. The answer to this question 
directly relates to the broader issues in the field, such as the relationship between public and 
private, the size of estates in Byzantine Egypt, and the role of estates in the economy of Byzantine 
Egypt.  
 This dissertation comprises an introduction, four body chapters, a conclusion, and a 
bibliography. It also includes several appendices: a list of technical terms, four diagrams illustrating 
key aspects of the estate’s structure, and a listing of the papyri referred to in the text. In Chapter 2 
it is argued, pace Sarris, that the autourgia did not produce a large surplus, but instead was devoted 
to fodder production for a centralized transportation and animal infrastructure. Chapter 3 
describes the Apion estate as operating on a two tiered system and details the lower tier. The estate 
drew money upwards from its collection agents through contractual arrangements meant to skim 
some of the money from collectors’ speculation. The structure of the lower tier can also explain 
                                                
57 Hickey (2012, 155) suggests imperial patronage as a possibility, but does not elaborate further. On the relationships 
between consuls and the emperor at this time, see Bagnall et al. 1987, 10–12. 
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how a monetary economy could exist, absent direct market engagement by the estate. Comparing 
accounts from the lower tier to those from the upper tier also indicates that the amount of land 
over which the Apions had collection responsibility expanded rapidly in the sixth century. Chapter 
4 argues that the relationship between the upper tier of the Apion estate and the state is difficult 
to ascertain directly, but scholarship examining historical tax collection methods in a variety of 
milieux can limit the possibilities. Which of these possibilities was employed by a state is 
determined by sets of identifiable economic and environmental circumstances. The circumstances 
present in Byzantine Egypt suggest that a rent system, commonly known as tax farming, was the 
most likely arrangement between the Apions and the estate. Chapter 5 offers a comparative look at 
historical analogues for the two-tiered, large-scale, tax farming system posited for the Apions.  
 
1.4 SOURCES 
The source material mined in investigating these issues consists primarily of papyrus 
accounts, contracts, letters, and leases. These documents date principally from the Byzantine 
period, but also from the late Roman period during which nascent versions of Byzantine social and 
economic structures can be seen. The Apion documents from Oxyrhynchus, as the richest source 
about a single estate spanning a large period of time, are central. Despite the considerable number 
of documents from this period informing us about estates in Oxyrhynchus, large gaps, of course, 
remain. A comparative method is useful in filling these gaps. To this end relevant estates and tax 
collection methods from other places and times are discussed in relation to the Apion estate. 
Lastly, particularly useful also are legal sources, especially the laws of Justinian. 
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Getting a handle on genealogy of the Apion family is often complicated by naming 
conventions, ancient and modern. Members in several generations of the family share the names 
Apion and Strategius, and modern scholarship uses Roman numerals to distinguish one from 
another. The emergence of new members in newly published documents can confuse the situation. 
For example, after the publication of P.Oxy. 50.3584–3586, Strategius I of earlier scholarship 
became Strategius II. Mazza’s 2001 monograph organizes the evidence about the Apion family and 
the archive into an accessible format, disentangling these issues and tracking the careers and 
connections of members of the family. Her work also lists the papyri associated with the archive (to 
the date of the book’s publication), and includes very useful appendices gathering place names, 
population sizes, archaeological provenance, and other information about the locations mentioned 
in documents in the archive. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RECONSIDERING THE AUTOURGIA   
 
An incomplete papyrological record may explain the discrepancy between the rising level of 
wealth the Apions attained from the early fifth through the late seventh centuries and the lack of 
evidence for a clear means by which they acquired that wealth. The record can be incomplete in 
two broad ways. First, the picture of Oxyrhynchus the papyri provide is accurate, but the Apion 
holdings in Oxyrhynchus were an outlier. That is to say, in other areas of Egypt, Apion holdings 
and other similar estates might have been structured differently than they were in Oxyrhynchus,1 
and elsewhere produced massive surpluses to be sold at market for a profit. There is little that can 
be offered to rule out this possibility: comparisons to similar Byzantine estates elsewhere falter 
against a lack of evidence from other locales, and profound changes to the social and economic life 
in Egypt over the centuries make diachronic comparisons to large estates of earlier or later periods 
of limited use. In Aphrodito the papyrological evidence favors prosperous peasants rather than 
large landholders, and so provides an interesting contrast to the Oxyrhynchus documents.2 For 
instance Keenan has described the peasant Aurelius Phoibammon’s social and economic mobility, 
and Ruffini has found evidence of similar mobility in the social networks of the village.3 But the 
social stratum the Aphrodito documents usually describe is so different from that documented in 
the Apion texts that direct comparanda are hard to come by. Here and there isolated pieces of 
                                                
1 The noted scarcity of leases from the Oxyrhynchite compared to other Egyptian nomes in the Byzantine period is a 
possible indicator of this, but see Labor and Leasing Agreements below. 
2 While Zuckerman 2004, especially chapters 1 and 4, has sought to find evidence of an Apion-like estate in 
Aphrodito, the results are tenuous. See also Keenan 2005, a review of Zuckerman 2004. 
3 Keenan 2007 revises his 1980 assessment of Phoibammon’s career, seeing him as a highly prosperous farmer rather 
than as an ascending peasant in the Horatio Alger mold. Ruffini 2008. 
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evidence can illuminate contemporary estates elsewhere in Egypt, the Fayyum for example,4 but 
even when glimpses are caught, they differ in quality and quantity from the documentation for the 
Apion estates.5 Broader conclusions drawn from any investigation into the topic of Byzantine 
estates in Egypt relying on the Apion papyri must therefore be somewhat circumscribed. This is 
not to say that Apion evidence does not apply elsewhere, only that the possibility of Oxyrhynchite 
Sonderstellung must be borne in mind when conclusions drawn from it are applied elsewhere.  
 Second, the papyrological record may be incomplete owing to the inconsistent survival of 
different types of documents, distorting the impression of Oxyrhynchus. The argument goes that 
more weight than warranted has been given to certain types of documents from the estate only 
because they survived while equally significant documents were lost. Scholars have long been 
concerned that the hazards of survival have unduly skewed perceptions of the Apion estate. 
Johnson and West, Carrié, and Rémondon have all raised the issue.6 Peter Sarris’ 2006 
monograph, Economy and Society in the Age of Justinian, takes this evidentiary bias as its premise. He 
offers the most fully fleshed out and forcefully argued examination of the Apion estate since 
Gascou’s 1985 article.7 Sarris proposes a bipartite model of the Apion estate in which certain 
portions of the estate’s lands were leased out and certain portions were directly managed using 
wage labor. The directly managed portions of the estate provided the bulk of the marketable 
surplus for the estate, while the leased portions, the ktemata, produced a more modest yield. Sarris 
                                                
4 The sixth century archive of Sambas elaiourgos, consisting of about thirty documents, contains orders for delivery of 
oil as payment to various groups on behalf of a Fayyum estate. Payments are to artisans and buccellarii, and so the 
archive can help answer questions raised by the Apion documents from Oxyrhynchus, but is not rich or varied enough 
to bolster broad conclusions about the functioning of the estates as a whole. 
5 Ruffini (2008, 246 and n. 6) has borrowed from physics the term “dark matter” to describe the problem: there are 
aspects of life in Aphrodito or Oxyrhynchus we know must have existed, but which we simply have no means of 
accessing. 
6 See the historiography in the introductory chapter. 
7 Hickey’s 2001 dissertation and 2012 monograph are more narrowly focused than Sarris’ holistic approach. 
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identifies the directly managed portion of the estate with a category of land called the autourgia 
that appears occasionally in the accounts and a handful of other documents. Because the accounts 
which have survived only show the income and expenditures of the ktematic land and not what is 
taken to be the economically more significant autourgic land, studies treating these accounts as 
generally representative of the estates rely upon a grossly distorted picture of how estates were 
actually organized. 
 Sarris’ model has gained traction since its initial formulation and his subsequent 
publications on it, and, in many ways, has emerged as a dominant model in recent scholarship, 
especially outside of papyrology.8 Still, Sarris’ readings of the extant texts remain at times highly 
problematic. Whereas those earlier scholars who raised concerns about how representative the 
Apion dossier is mainly advised caution in the face of evidentiary gaps, Sarris seeks to fill in the 
lacunae. And he does this by mining the extant texts for clues about what is missing.9 Inevitably, 
then, broad conclusions are often drawn from scant evidence. This in itself is not necessarily a 
fault, since seeing the microcosm in meager remains is often the work of a papyrologist, and 
finding a suitable set of meager remains in which it is possible to see the microcosm is, as Keenan 
writes, “every papyrological historian’s dream.”10 Because of the prominence Sarris’ work has 
achieved, it is necessary to address directly the problems in the broad conclusions he draws from 
his attempts to fill the lacunae. The bulk of this chapter will therefore be devoted to an analysis 
and evaluation of Sarris’ readings of key texts, and a revision of the conclusions he draws from 
them. The main areas to be discussed are how the autourgia is identified in the papyri, the nature 
                                                
8 See reviews by Bjornlie 2007 and Maas 2008. See also Whittow 2009, and Mayerson 2006 who, citing Sarris, 
describes Gascou’s model of the Apion estates as “largely discredited” (110 and n.7). 
9 Sarris’ use of historical analogy to fill the lacunae, especially in his 2011 article, will be addressed in a later chapter. 
10 Keenan 2005, 286 in a review of Zuckerman 2004. 
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of leasing and labor arrangements, whether the estates can be seen as expanding over time, the 
nature of production on the autourgia, and the role of the autourgia on the estate. 
 
2.1 IDENTIFYING AUTOURGIA IN THE PAPYRI 
 Sarris claims that the autourgia appears in the expenditures portions of the extant accounts, 
but not in the income portion and concludes that production on the ktemata supported the needs 
of the autourgia. Those needs were not only for material, but also for labor, so that tenants from 
the ktemata were obliged to work on the autourgia during times of the year when extra labor was 
needed.11 This was essentially service labor, used for seasonal tasks such as planting and 
harvesting.12 On Sarris’ formulation the estate-owned epoikia, or hamlets, around which the 
ktematic lands were situated, were labor settlements.13 Through contracts or customary 
arrangements, the estates would oblige the inhabitants of these epoikia to work on the autourgia in 
exchange for housing, some provisioning, and access to land for leasing. On this model the 
autourgia were the primary source of surpluses on the Apion estates and these surpluses were sold 
at urban markets for a profit,14 thereby explaining the wealth and prominence of the Apion family 
and why the extant accounts, concerned as they are with ktematic land, do not show significant 
surpluses. Presumably the estates kept accounts for the autourgia, like those extant for the ktematic 
lands, showing the great surpluses, but these accounts do not survive, remain undiscovered, or lie 
unedited. Sarris’ position therefore argues from the assumption of severely incomplete sources. As 
                                                
11 This point is reiterated throughout Sarris 2006. It is summarized at Sarris 2011, 265–266. 
12 Sarris 2011, 267. Sarris 2011, 266, describes another system of direct management for those crops which required a 
steady input of labor, e.g., grapes, olives, and honey: certain persons or groups were assigned land to be worked and a 
production goal to be met in exchange for wages in specie. This will be discussed further in Section 2.4. 
13 Sarris 2006, 42.  
14 Sarris 2011, 271–279. 
 
 
20 
a result, much of his work involves perusing those sources which do survive for evidence about 
production on the autourgia and the importance of this production.  
 The nature of the autourgia, however, is far from a settled issue. Most of the documents 
referring to the autourgia are not clear about what the term means or how the land it refers to was 
used. Most often it is connected with land devoted to fodder.15 Based on his reading of the papyri, 
however, Sarris argues that the autourgia was highly commercialized and geared toward producing a 
surplus of a number of different cash crops, and not solely, or even primarily, fodder.16  
 Sarris offers P.Oxy. 16.1911 and 1913, annual accounts of estate stewards called pronoetai,17 
as evidence that the autourgia produced more than just fodder. His argument relies on two 
idiosyncratic readings of the text: the meaning of the phrase ἔξω τῆς πύλης and its connection 
with the autourgia in the accounts, and the meaning of the term γεωργός. In P.Oxy.16.1913 Sarris 
cites examples of vinedressers, garden farmers, and “land laborers” (georgoi) working on the 
autourgia.18 He identifies the land in question as autourgia chiefly because it is called ἔξω τῆς 
πύλης, “outside the gate.” Indeed, in P.Oxy.16.1911 and P.Oxy.55.3804 the autourgia is named 
αὐτουργία ἔξω τῆς πύλης. In P.Oxy.16.1913, however, the text says simply γεωργοὶ ἔξω τῆς πύλης 
without mention of autourgia or any other category of land. The Apions owned a large house 
referred to in the papyri as προάστιον ἔξω τῆς πύλης.19 This house is known to have had several 
                                                
15 On this connection and for references see Mazza 2008, 152. 
16 Sarris 2011, 268, also makes the argument that, even if the autourgia were limited to the production of fodder, in 
later seigniorial economies landowners sought to control meadows and other types of land where fodder grew. In such 
economies this land was highly prized and kept under direct control, since its produce guaranteed the productivity of 
land devoted to other types of crops and as such could be sold for profit. This explanation, however, does not account 
for the purchase of fodder and seed evidenced in, e.g., P.Oxy. 16.1911.178–80, 1913.36–39, 18 2195.132, and 
55.3804.244–48 (see Hickey 2001, 192–194 and n. 232). 
17 These accounts are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
18 Sarris 2011, 269–270. 
19 P.Oxy. 16.1925, PSI 3.193, P.Wisc. 2.66. 
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orchards,20 and P.Oxy.16.1911 and P.Oxy. 55.3804 make it clear that it also had autourgia land 
associated with it. It cannot, however, be inferred that wherever the phrase ἔξω τῆς πύλης is used 
without qualification αὐτουργία ἔξω τῆς πύλης is meant.21 The very fact that the land category is 
sometimes specifically called autourgia, and other times not, suggests that some distinction is being 
drawn when autourgia is or is not appended to ἔξω τῆς πύλης.22 
 Sarris’ reading of P.Oxy. 16.1913 and other documents as relating to the autourgia also puts 
significant weight on the meaning of the word georgos. He construes it as meaning specifically and 
exclusively “land laborer,” and understands this land laborer to be employed on the autourgia: “the 
georgos was obliged to reside on the ktema, provide general labour services on the autourgia, and pay 
his taxes.”23 Ruffini, however, notes that the term has a much wider semantic range than the one 
posited by Sarris: “...this term is more neutrally and more frequently rendered simply as ‘farmers.’ 
Even this masks the range of social ranks the term can cover. Consider the Aphrodito georgoi: 
Gascou and MacCoull once noted the case of Daueid son of Biktor, attested as a georgos in the 
Aphrodito cadastre (520s CE), and also appearing in P.Flor. 3.280, from the previous decade, as a 
former protokometes or village-headman of Aphrodito. In other words, he was a member of the 
                                                
20 Hickey 2012, 40 n.6; Mazza 2001, 85–86. 
21 See Hickey 2008, 97 n.45. Hickey 2012, 150 n.26 suggests Sarris was misled by the translation in the ed. pr. of P.Oxy. 
55.3804.269—τῆς γεουχικ(ῆς) αὐτουργί(ας) Ἔξω τῆς Πύλης as “the landlord’s autourgia (called) Outside the Gate.” 
The phrase might better be translated as “the landlord’s autourgia at the place called Outside the Gate.” But the 
identification of all land Ἔξω τῆς Πύλης as autourgic is argued deliberately by Sarris. 
22 ἔξω τῆς πύλης seems clearly a topographical reference point. In many cities and towns without a system of named 
streets such landmarks are used. For instance in San Jose, Costa Rica directions are often given relative to a shuttered 
Coca-Cola bottling plant. 
23 Sarris 2006, 63. Sarris arrives at this definition primarily by connecting the obligation to sow in PSI 1.62, a surety 
guaranteeing the presence of a georgos enapographos on the Apion estate, with the lists of numbers of laborers required 
to sow autourgia in P.Wash.Univ. 2.102 and P.Oxy. 27.2478. 
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village elite, not a land-labourer. We see other georgoi in the Aphrodito papyri who are also monks, 
deacons, priests, nomikoi, even an iatros. The term clearly cannot be limited to peasant labor.”24 
 It is possible that the usage of the word differed between Aphrodito and Oxyrhynchus, but 
among the Apion papyri as well the status of the georgoi is more complicated than Sarris envisions 
it. In P.Oxy. 70.4794, published in the same year as Sarris’ monograph, Aurelius Ieremias promises 
to provide surety for two enapographoi georgoi. In the document Ieremias describes himself both as a 
enapographos georgos and as a former meizon, village headman. The meizon was a relatively high status 
position, as someone responsible for arbitration of disputes within a village and between villages, 
providing sureties for other villagers, and in the sixth and seventh centuries also collecting taxes 
and helping to manage various aspects of the Apion estates.25 In P.Oxy. 70.4794, Ieremias pledges 
πάντα µου τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ὑπάρξοντα ἰδικῶς καὶ γενικῶς ἐνεχύρου [λόγῳ καὶ ὑποθή]κ̣η̣ς 
δικαί[ῳ.26 This phrase is formulaic, common in contracts and sureties after the fifth century, and 
pledges land in the case of default.27 The editor of P.Oxy. 16.1895 notes that ἰδικῶς καὶ γενικῶς 
means “‘individually and generically’, i.e. the liability attached to the property as a whole and to all 
its items.”28 And a ὑποθήκη is generally a mortgage on real property. This would confirm the 
P.Oxy. 70.4794 editor’s note that “the wording...suggests that Ieremias may have owned land, and 
that he could possibly acquire more land in the future.”29 The evidence of a high status Apion 
enapographos georgos, very likely to have owned his own land and maintained prospects of acquiring 
                                                
24 Ruffini 2009, 634. Ruffini 2011, index s.v. georgos, also lists numerous Aphrodito georgoi with various roles outside of 
peasant labor. E.g., Apollos 19 is a landholder, Apollos 38 is a shepherd and a field guard. 
25 Lajos Berkes, unpublished paper delivered at Pennsylvania State University in 2011 pp. 4–5. 
26 “all the things I possess and will possess individually and generically by reason of a pledge and by right of mortgage.” 
δικαίο[υ] pap. 
27 E.g., CPR 19 44, P.Col. 8 244, P.Dubl. 32, P.Dubl. 33, P.Michael 34, P.Oxy. 1.125, 1.136, 1.138, 16.1895, 19.2238, 
44.3204, among many others. 
28 Ad l. 15. But see also the possibility that the phrase means “in cash and in kind,” as in P.Yale 3.137.3 (p. 68). 
29 P.Oxy. 70.4794 19–21 with notes. 
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more, undermines Sarris’ claims that the Apion georgoi were strictly wage laborers tied to the ktema 
which they were granted the privilege of leasing. P.Oxy. 1.135, upon which Sarris relies in 
describing the terms of a georgos’ labor and residence on Apion owned land, does paint a different 
picture: the georgos is to “remain permanently in attendance and abide upon the said ktema along 
with his loved ones and wife and cattle and all his gear, answerable to all (the responsibilities) that 
pertain to his person or to the condition of a registered agricultural labourer, and that he is by no 
means to forsake the ktema or take himself off elsewhere.”30 Venticinque looks at the varied 
activities of a georgos named Pekusios who appears in P.Oxy. 16.1911 and 55.3804 and concludes 
that the Apion georgoi were more than strictly land laborers.31 Pekusios leased land himself, worked 
imperial land and autourgia, was a vinedresser and oil maker, and represented in transactions with 
the state associations of others engaged in these activities. According to Venticinque the estate 
viewed Pekusios as a man to be relied upon and influential in his community. Others appearing in 
the accounts, however, did not vary so much in their undertakings. Venticinque’s analysis of 
georgoi in the accounts, and the differences in P.Oxy. 1.135 and P.Oxy. 70.4794 confirm, as is to be 
expected, that the reality of land tenure in Byzantine Oxyrhynchus was not monolithic. The 
differences not only between Oxyrhynchus and Aphrodito, but also within Oxyrhynchus and the 
Apion dossier, as well as the many customary charges and payments in a single account, point up 
the variety of labor and land arrangements by which the land in Byzantine Egypt was exploited.  
 Another problematic feature of Sarris’ arguments about the autourgia is that of the four 
accounts surviving relatively intact, only two (P.Oxy.16.1911 and P.Oxy.55.3804) show the autourgia 
playing a significant role in the expenditures portions. What is more, those two documents—nearly 
                                                
30 Sarris 2006, 61. 
31 Venticinque 2013, forthcoming. 
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identical in many sections—are actually accounts for the same portions of the estate separated by 
some nine years. The documents therefore cannot be counted as independent data points 
regarding the significance of the autourgia for the overall estate. Of the other two intact accounts, 
P.Oxy.18.2195 mentions the autourgia only once, in line 133, in reference to hayseed bought for 
the “southern autourgia,” not categorized separately from the other entries; and P.Oxy.19.2243a 
makes no mention of autourgia. The fragmentary accounts, PSI 8.954, P.Oxy. 18.2204, 16.1912, 
and 16.2019 make no mention of the autourgia either, and in P.Oxy. 16.1913 the autourgia is 
mentioned explicitly only once, again in relation to hayseed that had been purchased.32 On such 
limited evidence, it seems overly confident to suggest that the entire purpose of the leased land 
well represented in the extant accounts was to support the needs of the comparatively little 
documented autourgia.  
 Aspects of the two accounts which do provide the most substantive evidence about the 
autourgia, P.Oxy.16.1911 and P.Oxy.55.3804, undermine Sarris’ fundamental claim that the 
autourgia appears only in the expenditures section of the account. In both documents the portions 
of the autourgia specifically named and delineated are each designated edaphe. Sarris notes that “it 
is primarily in relation to the autourgia that we find mention of the edaphe, implying that edaphos 
was the standard term for a subdivision of directly managed land.”33 Hickey disputes this, pointing 
out several instances in other papyri where leased land is designated as edaphe.34 Even in P.Oxy. 
55.3804 a number of named edaphe appear in the income portion, and significantly one, 
Pheltanbel, appears in both the income section (line 120) and the autourgic expenditures section 
                                                
32 Sarris contends that much of the account is actually referring to the autourgia. This point is discussed below. 
33 Sarris 2006, 33. 
34 Hickey 2012, 28 n.44. 
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(line 199).35 The obvious conclusion to draw from this latter point is that autourgia land appears in 
both income and expenditures in the accounts. This contradicts Sarris’ fundamental claim that 
ktematic land’s exclusive role was supporting the autourgia and that “no document to date (as of 
2010) reveals the pronoêtai to have handled productive arrears on the autourgia.”36 Sarris offers the 
possibility that these edaphe which appear in the expenditures portions “may have represented 
landholdings transferred to the ktemata of these settlements from their respective autourgiai in 
response to a shortage of land on the former.”37 This seems to torture the evidence, since there is 
nothing about these entries to favor this scenario over the straightforward explanation that both 
collections and expenditures could be made from those working the autourgia. If Sarris’ 
explanation were the case, the designation of land as autourgia in both P.Oxy.16.1911 and 
P.Oxy.55.3804 would be curious since it would mean that the supposedly outdated and inaccurate 
labelling of these portions of the estate persisted for at least nine years after their actual status had 
changed to ktematic land. The two documents are the fullest evidence about the autourgia, yet 
under Sarris’ model they become exceptional. 
 
2.2 LABOR AND LEASING ARRANGEMENTS 
 In keeping with the position that the leased ktematic lands surrounding the various epoikia 
associated with the estate were devoted to meeting the needs of the surplus producing autourgia, 
Sarris argues that the inhabitants of the epoikia were, as part of their lease agreement, obliged to 
                                                
35 Hickey 2008, 97 n.45, notes that this also undermines Sarris’ claim that the income reflected in extant estate 
accounts are strictly ktematic. 
36 Sarris 2011, 265–266. 
37 Sarris 2006, 33. The plural autourgiai does not appear in the papyri. 
 
 
26 
work on the autourgia for periods essentially determined by the lessor.38 As evidence Sarris points 
to P.Wash.Univ. 2.102, a list of the number of workers from certain epoikia required to sow the 
landlord’s autourgic land.39 The document clearly shows that workers came from the epoikia to sow 
the autourgia, but it does not show that the obligation was part of their leasing agreement. It is 
difficult to know what to make of the surprisingly small number of workers required from each 
epoikion, only one or two in each of the extant entries. If it were the general practice to oblige 
lessees from each epoikion, whose populations were in the neighborhood of a hundred people,40 to 
sow the autourgia, one might expect rather more workers to be demanded from each epoikion.41 
Nevertheless, requiring extra workers during sowing can be explained without assuming that they 
were lessees obligated by their leases. Banaji argues convincingly that workers like those mentioned 
in P.Wash.Univ. 2.102 were laborers, casual or permanent, paid a wage in cash.42 If fodder was the 
primary crop of the autourgia, as it is likely to have been,43 labor would more likely have been 
casual since the agricultural demands fluctuated seasonally. Much as “monks poured out of their 
desert monasteries into the Delta fields to work for a daily wage” during the harvest,44 those living 
on the epoikia without a direct claim to the fruits of leased land and in need of some means of 
                                                
38 Sarris 2006, 63–66. 
39 Sarris 2011, 267.  
40 Ruffini 2008, 109 table 8. 
41 Though the phrase τῆς γεουχικῆς αὐτουργίας might not refer to all of the landlord’s autourgia, but a portion 
understood by the parties involved. 
42 Banaji 1999, 211–212. Banaji prefers to see them as permanent laborers, but calls the two options “equally 
possible.” 
43 This point is discussed further below. 
44 Bagnall 1993, 123 and n.64. 
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income (e.g., family members of lessees and landless workers living in epoikia) could be drawn 
upon to work for a wage during periods of high need like the sowing or the harvest.45  
 This explanation also fits the orders and receipts for bread and wine rations that Sarris 
adduces in support of his contention that epoikia lessees were required to work the autourgia as part 
of their leases. P.Oxy. 16.2012 is a list of wine rations for a number of people from several Apion-
related epoikia. P.Oxy. 16.1952 and 72.4926–4929 are orders, and one receipt, to the monastery of 
Musaeus for the supply of given amounts of bread to given numbers of people from several 
locations known from other Apion texts. No explicit indication of the purpose of these rations is 
given, though the dates of the orders of bread coincide with the harvest and the phrase λόγῳ 
τροφῆς in 72.4927 argues against a charitable or festival context.46 Even if it is granted that the 
rations were for agricultural workers, it is unclear whether the work was being performed in the 
locations mentioned or elsewhere on the estate.47 Moreover, Sarris describes the locations 
mentioned in the documents as “various Apion epoikia,”48 which is not accurate since some of the 
locations named are komai, villages, rather than epoikia. The distinction is important since the 
population of a kome was larger than that of an epoikion, and unlike epoikia, komai were not owned 
entirely by a single person or estate.49 It is conceivable that along with people from the smaller 
epoikia, the populations of these villages, whether from the portions associated with the Apion 
                                                
45 The workers are called ἐργάται in	  P.Wash.Univ. 2.102, which Banaji (1999, 198) notes was the “normal term for a 
casual worker...but in late antiquity it came to be used of permanent labourers as well.” 
46 P.Oxy. 72 p.173. This reasoning cannot be applied to P.Oxy. 16.2012, dated to September 30/October 1, the time of 
sowing.  
47 P.Oxy. 72 p.173. 
48 Sarris 2011, 267 n.54. 
49 Hickey 2012, 25 with references at n.22. 
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estate or not, could be drawn upon for casual labor in times of increased need.50 But even if it is 
granted further that the work of those being given rations was to be performed away from the 
named locations and instead on the autourgia, it is still not clear that the workers are lessees rather 
than landless laborers seeking a wage. In short, these documents give no reason to think that the 
rations were associated with work obligations to the autourgia entailed in leases.  
 If it were the case that Apion lessees were required to work on the autourgia, one would 
expect to find the details of the arrangement—how many days were required, when, and where—in 
the documents relating to leases. Only four leases from the Apion estate survive, one of which is 
doubtfully attributed to the Apion dossier.51 In none of these leases is an obligation to work any 
land aside from that being leased mentioned, nor is the autourgia discussed. The paucity of leases 
from the Apion estate, and from the fifth and sixth century Oxyrhynchite generally, compared to 
other document types and places in Egypt may be the result of large estates in Oxyrhynchus 
shouldering out the smaller lessors and may indicate that leasing as a model of land exploitation 
was on the wane.52 However, the existence of ἀπαιτήσιµα, collection lists, and references to 
ἀπαιτήσιµα in other documents strongly suggest that leasing was still prevalent at the height of the 
Apion estate.53 Incomplete sources may once again be to blame, but Rowlandson has offered as an 
alternate explanation that leases might have been kept locally on the estates, rather than in the city 
of Oxyrhynchus proper, whose trash dumps are the provenance of most of the extant Apion 
                                                
50 The order for the most bread for the greatest number of people, P.Oxy. 72.4927, is for the village of Senokomis: 213 
individuals are to be provided for there; P.Oxy. 16.1952, for the supply of an epoikion and ktema, is a close second at 
200. Laura, a village, is supplied for 24 people; Meskanounios, Megalou Choriou, and Theagenous, all epoikia, are 
supplied for 50, 50, and 24, respectively. 
51 P.Flor 3.325, P.Oxy. 63.4390 and 67.4615. P.Oxy. 16.1968/SB 26.16722 is only tentatively attributed to the Apion 
estate. See Gonis 2000 for a new edition and commentary.  
52 See Gonis 2000 95 n.9 for relevant bibliography arguing this perspective. 
53 Gonis 2000, 95. P.Oxy. 16.2037 is an ἀπαιτήσιµον. Rent-rolls are referred to in several documents, e.g., P.Oxy. 
55.3803, 16.1915, 1.136, and P.Bagnall 33.10. 
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documents.54 She and Gonis have also argued that leasing did not disappear altogether. Instead 
leases came to be documented in a different way from the lease agreements of earlier centuries. 
Gonis quotes Rowlandson, “[a]s landlords grew more and more remote from their tenants and the 
terms under which their land was farmed perhaps became more standardised, the rent-roll 
replaced the lease as the most important record of their relationship.”55  
 If Rowlandson’s explanation is correct, then for leases drawn up according to the standard 
in the apaitesima only the name, location, and amount collected would need to have been recorded 
in the pronoetes accounts; the rest of the details could be assumed as standard. It was the special 
situations diverging from the standard which were recorded and noted in the accounts with special 
comments. This holds for both the receipts and expenditures sections. Hence, collections made 
according to the standardized agreements laid out in the apaitesimon were entered as names and 
amounts without further detail. If the lease was out of the ordinary, such as agreements involving 
the leasing of dovecotes or oil presses, ἀπότακτον χωρίων, or payment of a special tax, this was 
specified.56 If instead there was to be a reduction of rent for customary reasons or damaged land, it 
was mentioned in the expenditures section, alongside charitable contributions and payments to 
artisans, skilled workers, and the purchase of provisions.57 The consequence of this reading of the 
accounts is that those entries for which the accounts give the most detail ought to be regarded as 
                                                
54 Rowlandson 1994, 498. See also Gonis 2000, 95 n.8, who calls the suggestion “ingenious, but difficult to prove.” 
55 Rowlandson 1994, 499, and Gonis 2000, 95. 
56 E.g., a dovecote in P.Oxy. 55.3804.31, date palms and poll-tax in line 46, an oil press in 77, sheep and a poll-tax in 
93. On ἀπότακτον χωρίων see Gascou 1985, 7–8; Hickey 2012, 53–58.	  
57 E.g., various concessions κατὰ τὸ ἔθος, “according to custom,” in P.Oxy. 55.3804.157–160, concession for 
unsuitable land in 161, concession for land destroyed by a broken dike in 179. Hickey 2012, 53–58, esp. 54, argues 
that the category of land called apotakton chorion is fixed rent land owned by the imperial house and administered by 
the Apions. 
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exceptional, at least for the property administered by the pronoetai. Remissions on leased property 
appearing in the expenditures section, then, are all exceptional cases. 
 This leaves the regular, least elaborate entries in the receipts section, and the autourgic 
entries in the expenditures section of the pronoetes accounts as the source of evidence for the 
standard method of structuring the estates against which other methods were measured. In some 
entries in the receipts portion of P.Oxy. 55.3804, collections for one epoikion are made from people 
originating from a different epoikion. There are Lukiu collections from people from Konkon, 
Apele, and Pekty; and Tarusebt collections from people from Apele and Lukiu.58 To Sarris these 
entries are evidence of “a deliberate policy of labour transfer between estate properties.”59 And 
P.Oxy. 3804.196–202 records expenditures for autourgia related to Tarusebt, with certain entries 
(lines 196-198) showing that autourgia in Tarusebt was cultivated by people from Lukiu. According 
to Sarris, therefore, the purpose of this labor transfer policy was to supply the autourgia with labor, 
and “it is likely to have been primarily the labour requirements of the autourgia that dictated the 
character and extent of labour transfers between the Apion-owned settlements.”60 
 People from one epoikion leasing land in another can instead explain why collections for 
one epoikion are made from people originating from a different epoikion. In P.Oxy. 55.3804.92 a 
collection is made from Isaac son of Melas from the epoikion Apele for ἰδίας γῆς—land he privately 
owned, not leased—in Lukiu. If Isaac could own land outside his epoikion, given the varied 
economic statuses of georgoi, it is certainly conceivable that a relatively prosperous georgos might 
have leased land outside his own epoikion. If these people were not transferred from one epoikion to 
                                                
58 Lines 65, 84, 85, 86, 91; 116 and 123. 
59 Sarris 2006, 38. 
60 Sarris 2006, 38 
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another, it is not necessary to connect them with the presence of people from different epoikia on 
Tarusebt’s autourgia. Instead, they can be explained as the casual laborers suggested by the wine 
and bread rations and the list of laborers, discussed above.61 The picture of leasing and labor 
painted by the accounts supports that painted by the list of rations and laborers: some georgoi 
owned land, others leased land, some leased more land than others, and still others leased no land 
at all, but worked for a wage when they could. 
 
2.3 EXPANDING ESTATES 
 One of the consequences of the bipartite structure of the estates was, according to Sarris, 
an increase in the size of estates during the Byzantine period, and therefore in the amount of land 
from which profits could be extracted. Larger estates were “conducive to…the more widespread 
introduction of direct forms of estate management, bipartite estates better suited to specialised 
production for the market.”62 Sarris’ model therefore would be bolstered if expansion of the estates 
could be demonstrated. Jones attempted an estimate of the size of the Apion estates working back 
from the amount of the rate of embole taxation per aroura provided by P.Cairo.Masp. 1.67057, and 
the total contribution from the endoxos oikos in the Oxyrhynchite and Cynopolite areas, 
presumably the Apion estate, known from P.Oxy. 1.127r. The figures at which he arrives indicate a 
massive estate, on the order of 112,000 arouras, or 120 square miles.63 Hickey notes that these 
numbers are flawed in light of Gascou’s model of fiscal shares, under which the oikos would have 
been responsible for collecting a share of the total tax burden, which entailed collections from 
                                                
61 P.Oxy. 16.2012; P.Oxy. 16.1952 and 72.4926–4929; and P.Wash.Univ. 2.102. 
62 Sarris 2006, 198. 
63 Jones 1964, 784. 
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neighboring holdings.64 The total size of the Apion lands, therefore, would have been substantially 
smaller than the figure arrived at by Jones’ calculation. Based on accounts of wine and land 
devoted to vines, Hickey estimates the amount of vine land on the Apion estate to have been 
between 245 arouras at the very low end and 1172 arouras at the very high end, with somewhere in 
the range of 600 arouras the likeliest figure.65 In P.Amh. 2.79, a late second century petition 
concerning misdeeds in the collection of grain by local magistrates, figures for the farmland and 
vineyard land making up one person’s holdings are given, with vineyard accounting for about 
2.8% of the total. On the assumption that the Apions devoted a similar percentage of their land to 
vineyards, the total amount of land making up the Apion estate was likely only about 21,000 
arouras, and less than 42,000 at most.66 Hickey notes that given the Apions’ higher social status 
than the parties involved in P.Amh. 2.79, we might expect a still greater proportion of land devoted 
to vineyards, which would mean even smaller estates.67 With the increased significance of 
mechanical irrigation in the sixth century as compared to the second century and the connection 
of mechanical irrigation with wine production, this supposition seems all the more secure. 
 The rather smaller estates Hickey finds in the Oxyrhynchite correspond with the results of 
investigations into whether there is a discernible concentration of ownership from the Roman 
period through the end of the Byzantine period.68 In his examination of 4th century land-lists from 
the Hermopolite, Bowman writes that “it is difficult to find any clear indication in the registers 
                                                
64 Hickey 2012, 49, notes, “even Sarris, Gascou’s most vehement critic, acknowledges that the estate collected sums 
from settlements for which it was ‘pagarchically responsible.’” 
65 Hickey 2001, 69; 2012, 22–27. 
66 Hickey 2001, 71; 2012, 154. 
67 Hickey 2001, 71. 
68 It should be noted that when there exists an essentially fixed amount of arable land, as was the case in Egypt, since 
the floodwaters could only reach so much land, even when mechanical irrigation is accounted for, concentration of 
ownership and expansion of estates are synonymous. 
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that the very wealthy were systematically absorbing the holdings of the less prosperous landowners 
to a more marked degree than earlier...[I]f the prime evidence for the development of the 
‘Byzantine large estate’ can be found in the fourth century it will not come from the Hermopolite 
land-lists.”69 Like Johnson and West argued before,70 Rowlandson claims that the assumption 
among modern scholars of increasingly concentrated land ownership in the late Roman and 
Byzantine periods stems from the increasing frequency of the documentation associated with the 
estates, which does not necessarily correspond to an increase in the phenomenon itself.71 There is, 
Rowlandson notes, no evidence to support the assumption.72 Bagnall sums up the conclusion: “the 
phenomenon of concentration of ownership seems little changed from Roman times to the sixth 
century and tends to retreat into the future whenever confronted with evidence for any particular 
period.”73 
 Sarris, however, sees in P.Oxy.16.1915, a sixth century account of land owned by the 
emperor but administered by the Apion estate, which he considers alongside P.Oxy. 27.2479, 
evidence that the Apions assumed ownership of land that had formerly been a possession of the 
imperial government. The name of the epoikion Kineas appears in P.Oxy.16.1915 and also turns up 
in P.Oxy. 27.2479, a petition from a runaway georgos asking to be permitted to return to the farm 
he left. Sarris claims that P.Oxy. 27.2479 is the later of the two documents, and that Apion should 
by the time of its composition be identified as the owner, rather than the administrator of the land 
mentioned in it. Taken together, the two documents show that “the land had been fully integrated 
                                                
69 Bowman 1985, 155. 
70 Johnson and West 1949, 65. 
71 This skepticism falls into the second category of defective sources I discuss. 
72 Rowlandson 1996, 281. 
73 Bagnall 1993, 160 n.61. 
 
 
34 
into the Apion estates,”74 and therefore offer evidence of Apion expansion “at the expense of both 
private landowners and the imperial household.”75  
But Sarris’ case for dating P.Oxy. 27.2479 and identifying an Apion as the owner rather 
than administrator of the epoikion mentioned in it is rather thin. He writes, “this is on the 
presumption that the δεσπότης invoked in P.Oxy. XXVII 2479, line 1 was the head of the Apion 
family rather than the emperor, in which case one might have expected a somewhat fuller and 
more elaborate descriptive address than τῷ ἐµῷ ἀγαθῷ εὐεργ(έτῃ) (καὶ) δεσπ(ότῃ). That this 
δεσπότης rather than a third party owned the estate in question is suggested by the fact that Pieous 
(the petitioner in P.Oxy. 27.2479) describes himself as his γεωργὸς ἐναπόγραφος (line 7). If the 
identification is correct, the document should be dated to after 560.”76 Sarris is making three 
claims here: 1) the addressee is not the emperor, but an Apion; 2) the land has come to be owned 
by the Apion estate; and 3) the document was composed after P.Oxy. 16.1915. In the absence of 
other documents corroborating 1), it is little more than a gut feeling. Even if it is granted, however, 
that the emperor is not the addressee, it does not necessarily follow that the imperial house is no 
longer the owner of the land, as Sarris asserts in 2). The phrase γεωργὸς ἐναπόγραφος 
τυγχάνω τῆς ὑµε̣τέρας π[α]νευκλ̣ε̣οῦ ̣ς δεσποτείας in line 7, to which Sarris refers, could simply 
mean “a γεωργὸς ἐναπόγραφος under his charge,” rather than denoting ownership of the land to 
which the γεωργός is registered. P.Oxy. 16.1867, a 7th century letter to a village headman, contains 
the following phrase: τοῦ σὺν ὑµῖν δεσπότου ἡµῶν τοῦ ἀντιγεούχου ἐρχοµέν[ο]υ ̣, “…upon the 
arrival of our master, the landlord’s agent, who is with you…” In this text a person is explicitly 
                                                
74 Sarris 2006, 72. 
75 Sarris 2006, 83. 
76 Sarris 2006, 72 n. 8. 
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called “our master” and at the same time explicitly said to be the agent of the landlord, not the 
landlord himself. This interpretation is all the more likely in P.Oxy. 27.2479 if ἐναπόγραφος 
signifies a fiscal relationship and the administrator was responsible for various collections from the 
γεωργός. Moreover, other petitions use phrases similar to τῆς ὑµετέρας δεσποτείας simply as an 
honorific designation for people of particular importance or high status, without emphasizing 
ownership.77  
 In fact, nothing in P.Oxy. 27.2479 directly contradicts a continuation of the scenario in 
P.Oxy. 16.1915 in which the Apion estate managed both the private and public aspects of the 
administration of land owned by the imperial household.78 Sarris offers three other documents 
(P.Mert. 2.96, and PSI 3.196 and 3.197) as evidence corroborating the acquisition of imperial land 
by the Apions, based on references in them to either Kineas or Pempo, two of the epoikia 
mentioned in P.Oxy.16.1915.79 However, none of these documents demonstrates clearly that the 
Apions owned the land, only that they were associated with it and treated as having some kind of 
authority over its administration. PSI 3.196, an order for payment, is explicitly said to come from ὁ 
θεῖος οἶκος, the imperial house, indicating that at the time of its composition it was still under the 
arrangement seen in P.Oxy.16.1915, the very opposite of the claim Sarris uses it to make.80 
Although the beneficiary of the payment is lost from PSI 3.197, the document is of the same layout 
as PSI 3.196, and is addressed to the same person. It can therefore be presumed, as the Italian 
editors do, that it was also from ὁ θεῖος οἶκος. Little in P.Mert. II 96, a letter asking for the return 
                                                
77 E.g., SPP 10.111, P.Oxy. 16.1866, 1867, 1939, 1940. See also Gascou 1985, 24 explaining the use of “servile” 
language in reference to landlords. 
78 See Hickey 2012, 53–58, esp. 54, arguing that apotakton chorion is land owned by the imperial house and 
administered by the Apions. This type of land is mentioned in P.Oxy.16.1915 in connection with the epoikion of 
Pempo. 
79 Sarris 2006, 83 n.8.  
80 Land described as θεῖος, ἅγιος, and ἔνδοξος is imperial, church, and privately owned, respectively, 
 
 
36 
of a collector from Pempo to the city, suggests that Pempo is owned by the sender; the only fact it 
makes clear is that he has authority over the collector responsible for the epoikion, as one would 
expect of an administrator. Absent clear evidence to the contrary, any presumptions about the 
nature of the association between the Apions and the land around Pempo should align with the 
document in which that association is described explicitly, P.Oxy.16.1915, and in that document 
the association is strictly administrative. These documents show that the property lines are at the 
very least blurred, as Hickey describes them,81 and relying on them for evidence of expanding 
estates is hazardous. 
 
2.4 PRODUCTION ON THE ESTATES 
 Hickey highlights three areas as potential avenues for commercial agricultural engagement 
on the Apion estate: wheat, wine, and flax. In each of these areas, Hickey finds no evidence of 
attempts at, or the possibility of, commercialization. Wheat was grown for internal consumption 
and compulsory contributions, the estate did not produce enough wine to sell in great quantities, 
and flax production might have been significant on Apion land, but was not exploited 
commercially by the estate itself. Sarris disputes Hickey’s conclusion that evidence for 
commercialized agriculture on the estates is lacking. 
 Sarris objects that Hickey only considers what was grown on the ktematic lands, for which 
accounting records survive, and therefore ignores the vast majority of the estate’s production, 
which would have come from the autourgia. The problem, recurring in many areas of Sarris’ model, 
is that there is no evidence for the scale of the autourgia or for its production beyond fodder. 
                                                
81 Hickey 2001, 45–46. 
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Sarris’ claims about both the nature and extent of wheat, wine, and fruit on the autourgia cannot 
be substantiated on the basis of the surviving papyri. The evidence he adduces for these crops 
relies wholly on the problematic identification of ἔξω τῆς πύλης with αὐτουργία ἔξω τῆς πύλης. 
With respect to flax, Sarris concedes that there is not much evidence, but points to P.Oxy. 
19.2243a in which “a group of Apion estate workers is recorded to have purchased flax from the 
household.”82 The word used in line 26 to which Sarris refers is στιππῖον (for στυππεῖον), which 
does not mean simply flax,83 but tow—processed flax used for, e.g., rope, wicks, baskets, and mats.84 
Rather than flax, then, the georgoi gave the estate money for a small quantity—less than the worth of 
a single solidus—of a processed flax product commonly used in many facets of rural and urban life. 
The presence and use of flax products like tow on the estate come as no surprise, and do not 
necessarily indicate anything about the extent or location of flax cultivation on the estate.85 It is 
difficult, therefore, to make Sarris’ leap that based on this evidence the estate was involved in flax 
production. Sarris also adduces P.Oxy. 16.2033, an account with an entry concerning a quantity of 
tow. The papyrus has textual problems making the line regarding tow difficult to interpret, but it 
seems to concern a purchase of tow by the estate,86 indicating that flax was not produced on estate 
land in quantities sufficient to meet even its own needs.87 
                                                
82 Sarris 2011, 270. 
83 That word is λίνον. 
84 Pliny, Nat. Hist. 19.3.17: quod proximum cortici fuit, stuppa appellatur, deterioris lini, lucernarum fere luminibus aptior. See 
also P.Mich.14.680 n.3 and additional references there. The editor there says “essentially it is the raw material of flax,” 
quoting the Pliny reference, but it is properly the product of flax that has been scutched (beaten) and/or hackled 
(combed) to separate the linen from the tow. See Pliny, Nat. Hist. 19.3.16–18 for a description of the process. 
85 Just as the provision of axles and cogwheels by the estate does not indicate that there was commercialized wood 
production on the estate. 
86 Hickey 2012, 36, says “it was certainly not a sale.” 
87 Sarris 2011, 270. On the difficulties of interpretation see Hickey 2012, 36 and n. 104. 
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 Hickey argues that flax may indeed have been a significant crop on certain portions of the 
Apion estate.88 He relies chiefly on a set of four Apion documents in which the recipient of a loan 
agrees to pay interest in tow or in λινοκαλάµη, flax straw, another product of flax used much like 
tow. In two of those documents, P.Oxy. 8.1130 and 72.4918, the lender is an Alexandrian trader 
accustomed to doing business around Oxyrhynchus. In another, P.Oxy. 72.4922, a 
στιπποπραγµατευτής, tow dealer, extends a loan. On the model of the papyri concerning the 
Alexandrian trader, the editor of that document suggests supplementing a highly fragmentary line 
with language similar to the interest payment in linen. In P.Laur. 3.75 the recipient of a loan agrees 
to pay interest in λινοκαλάµη to his pronoetes. Given the relative ubiquity of tow in Egypt, it should 
not come as a surprise that someone might be in the business of selling it in and around 
Oxyrhynchus, nor that people should be in possession of it. Of finished textiles Bagnall writes, 
“good quality fabrics...served in antiquity also as a form of storing wealth, of keeping money in 
reserve. In that regard they were like items made of precious metals.”89 Dealers in linen and tow 
would have been uniquely suited to making that sort of stored wealth liquid. While the interest 
payments in the documents at hand were not made in good quality fabrics, the dealers would have 
been in a position to treat the base materials of textiles as similarly liquid.90 P.Oxy. 71.4831, dating 
from 429, provides evidence of another material unlikely to have been grown on the estate being 
used as an interest payment. The papyrus is an Oxyrhynchite loan to a person from a non-Apion 
epoikion with interest to be paid in woad, a dye plant on which there was an apparent state 
                                                
88 Hickey 2012, 34–35.  
89 Bagnall 1993, 33. 
90 Considering the relatively small amounts involved in the interest, commodities of sufficient value might have been 
more readily at hand than billon.  
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monopoly.91 There is evidence, then, of products (obtained and not grown on the estate) being 
used for interest payments. And even if Hickey correctly posits that substantial amounts of flax 
were grown on the Apion estate, he argues that flax was produced on leased land, not on the 
autourgia.92 
 The great majority of the evidence about the autourgia points to fodder as its produce. A 
total of nine Oxyrhynchite papyri mention the autourgia and have been dated to the fourth century 
or later. P.Oxy. 16.1911, 1913, and 55.3804 are the pronoetes accounts discussed above. In P.Oxy. 
16.1911 and 55.3804, where the autourgia is mentioned several times, either no crops are specified 
in connection with it, or as in 55.3804.241 it is mentioned in the context of a payment to field 
guards for watching over hay, or for the price of hayseed for the autourgia as in lines 244 and 246. 
The sole mention of autourgia in P.Oxy. 16.1913 occurs in line 37, a payment for the price of 
hayseed for the autourgia. P.Oxy. 14.1734, 18.2195, and 27.2480 are other Apion accounts in each 
of which the autourgia is connected explicitly and exclusively with fodder or hayseed.  
 Three documents mentioning the autourgia remain: P.Wash.Univ. 2.102, P.Oxy. 16.1918, 
and 2032. P.Wash.Univ. 2.102, discussed above, is a brief list of the number of workers from 
certain epoikia who are obliged to sow the autourgia of the estate. What this document can tell us 
about the production of the autourgia is limited, but the evidence points toward fodder. Mazza has 
suggested emending the toponym to which the workers must go to Path, short for Path 
                                                
91 P.Oxy. 71.4831 n.13 and refs. 
92 Hickey 2012, 35. He uses the four documents mentioned above as evidence that flax was grown at all. He looks at 
the relatively higher proportion of cash receipts on portions of the estate associated with flax in different periods, and 
concludes that cash rents on flax land were responsible for the differences. Hence, according to his argument, flax, if 
grown, was not grown on the autourgia. 
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Tampemou.93 If this emendation is accepted, Hickey notes, it may be significant that only fodder is 
attested from that place.94 The last two documents, P.Oxy. 16.1918 and 2032, are part of the same 
papyrus account, 1918 being a continuation and a classified summary of the figures in 2032. The 
document is a list of arrears (ἔχθεσις) in money, showing the amounts paid by various persons and 
groups against the remainder owed to the estate. Lines 68–90 are headed ἔχθ(εσις) τῆς 
αὐτουρ ̣[γ]ί ̣[ας]. It is not clear from the entries why money was owed to the estate. Most entries 
have a name, perhaps an occupation or an origin, and the amounts paid and owed. Sarris has 
suggested that the entries showing amounts owed by groups from epoikia appearing in other Apion 
documents “may represent sums owed by labourers with respect to payment for lodgings on the 
autourgia.”95 While possible, there is no evidence to support the suggestion. Moreover, given that 
the Apion estate collected taxes for land it did not own, it is not clear that whenever an epoikion is 
mentioned in an Apion account the Apions must be assumed to have owned that epoikion.96 These 
entries can tell us little about what was being grown on the autourgia. 
 In two of the entries in P.Oxy. 16.2032, however, a commodity is mentioned in connection 
with the arrears. Line 72 is damaged, but preserves a name, the word σίτου, and the amount of the 
arrears. Line 75 has a name, occupation, origin, and notes the arrears are for the price of arakos, a 
type of legume eaten by people but also frequently used as fodder.97 Still the exact situation that 
brought these people to owe money to the estate is not clear. Hickey has examined entries outside 
the autourgia section of the account, arrears owed by a Pamouthis for the price of wine, and offered 
                                                
93 Mazza 2001, 131. 
94 Hickey 2012, 30 n. 63. The other attestations of Path Tampemou in the papyri are P.Oxy. 16.1913.37, 16.1911.179, 
18.2195.132–133 and P.Oxy. 55.3804.244–247. 
95 Sarris 2006, 42. 
96 Ruffini 2005 (delivered at the 2005 meeting of the APA), 634: “We must be aware of the Apionic gravitational pull, 
and resist adding to Apionic property every toponym appearing in an Apionic text.” 
97 On arakos see Bagnall 1993, 26 and nn. 68–69. See also Hickey 2012, 31. 
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two possible readings: the money had been advanced to Pamouthis to purchase wine, or wine had 
been advanced and proceeds from its sale were owed the estate.98 Both types of transaction are 
attested in other documents, but the former is rather more likely since Pamouthis would be 
assuming a much larger liability than other such sales on credit.99 The way Pamouthis acquired the 
wine may clarify the two autourgia arrears entries for which types of produce are mentioned. Both 
people in those entries are ναῦται.100 Like Pamouthis, the two might have been advanced money 
for the transport costs associated with the acquisition of wheat and arakos. Specialized purchasers 
of fodder, χορτοπαραλῆµπται, are attested travelling large distances to acquire fodder, and if the 
autourgia did not produce wheat it is conceivable that the taxes in kind owed on it might have been 
acquired from without.101 Indeed, if the autourgia did not grow wheat of its own, but was still liable 
for obligations valued in that commodity, the wheat would need to be supplied from elsewhere. As 
Sarris emphasizes, the autourgia appears predominantly in the expenditures portions of accounts 
rather than in the receipts, a fact which can be explained if the autourgia did not produce wheat of 
its own. And if, as Hickey notes, the land in the accounts did not produce much surplus in wheat 
beyond their own fiscal obligations,102 then autourgic need would have to be met from outside of 
the estate. The possibility that the fiscal dues on autourgic land were adaerated—that is, paid in 
cash of an equivalent value to the grain owed—would similarly entail the estate drawing on other 
parts of their enterprise to provide the necessary cash.103  
 
                                                
98 Hickey 2012, 142–143. 
99 Hickey 2012, 143–144. 
100 In line 72 the occupation is restored by the editors to ν[αύτ(ῃ). 
101 Hickey 2012, 30–31. 
102 Hickey 2012, 29. 
103 It is unlikely that excess fodder was sold and the proceeds devoted to the fiscal obligations since the purchase of 
fodder seed suggests the estate was unable to meet its own needs.  
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2.5 RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF THE AUTOURGIA 
 Sarris argues rightly, then, that the leased lands did support the autourgic land, but in the 
more limited sense of covering its tax liability. The evidence points strongly to fodder rather than a 
variety of cash crops as the primary product of the autourgia. The fact that the estate bought seed 
for fodder makes it difficult to see how it could have been the main source of Apion wealth. If the 
evidence in the papyri supports a more circumscribed role for the autourgia than Sarris contends, is 
it possible to determine what that role might have been? Hickey suggests that the association with 
fodder might indicate a centralized transportation system used on the estates, wherein feed for the 
transport animals was grown on the autourgia and used throughout the leased lands associated with 
the estate.104 Given the significance of artificial irrigation on these estates,105 and the integral role 
beasts of burden played in the operation of the irrigation machines, as well as the centralized 
system of rent and tax collection,106 a centralized a system of fodder production should not be 
surprising. 
 P.Oxy. 16.1913 is the expenditures portion of an Apion account similar to pronoetes 
accounts such as P.Oxy. 16.1911 and P.Oxy. 55.3804. Its first five lines of text indicate the 
centralized use of animals for irrigation, which would argue in favor of some centralized system of 
obtaining fodder for their feed. The entry concerns a remission of rent for a certain group of 
farmers who were granted a plot of artificially irrigated land designated for fodder:  
συνε̣χωρήθ(η) τοῖς γεωρ(γοῖς) ἔξω τῆς πύλης ὑπὲρ τῆς µηχ(ανῆς) σπειροµ(ένης) 
ποτὲ π(αρὰ) Πέτρου καὶ κληρονόµ(ων) ἄπα Νακίου δ(ιὰ) τὸ τὰς ἀρούρ(ας) τῆς 
                                                
104 Hickey 2008, 97 n.45. 
105 “...the aristocrats invested heavily in the saqiya [mechane], which might be considered the hallmark of their estates,” 
Hickey 2007, 293–294. 
106 The agents collecting taxes and rents in kind from the many geographically dispersed lease properties would have 
required some means of transport to a central location. 
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αὐτ(ῆς) µηχ(ανῆς) δοθ(ῆναι) τοῖς εἰρηµ(ένοις) γεωργοῖς λόγ(ῳ) ἐνχόρτου, ὑπὲρ οὗ 
τὴν ἄρδ ̣ε̣(υσιν) ποιήσ(ονται) εἰς τὰ πωµάρ(ια) καὶ εἰς τὰ χωρ(ία) ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων αὐτῶν 
κτηνῶν ἀντὶ τῶν γεουχικ(ῶν) βοειδ(ίων) τοῦ ἐνδόξ(ου) οἴκ(ου) καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γ 
ἰνδ(ικτίονος) σίτου κ(αγκέλλῳ) (ἀρτάβαι) κα 𐅵.  
 
“Conceded to the cultivators Outside the Gate for the plot of irrigated land once 
sown by Peter and the heirs of apa Nakios because of the fact that the arouras of the 
same plot of irrigated land were transferred to the aforementioned farmers on 
account of its being land under grass, because of which they will provide irrigation to 
the orchards and to the vineyards from their own livestock in place of the landlord’s 
oxen from the illustrious house, in the third indiction 21 ½ art. canc. wheat.” 
 
 Sarris understands these lines to indicate that “a group of agricultural workers were obliged 
to work a section of the autourgia, irrigating it themselves with the aid of their own oxen, in return 
for payment in kind and access to a piece of land.”107 Setting aside whether the land in question 
ought to be identified as autourgia,108 this explanation does not accord with the meaning of similar 
entries in other accounts. Information about land leased out by the estate only appears in the 
expenditures section of estate accounts in special circumstances, such as when the land had been 
damaged or a customary arrangement was in place.109 When such concessions were due to some 
sort of extenuating circumstance, rather than custom, a fairly standard formula was followed. First 
the entry identifies the georgos or georgoi by name or origin, names the land in question, and then 
provides the reason, date, and amount for the concession. So for example P.Oxy. 55.3804.188–
190:  
συνεχωρήθ(η) Ἰωάννῃ καὶ Ἡρακλείῳ ἀπὸ κτήµα(τος) Λουκίου ὑπὲρ τῆς 
ἀφανισθ(είσης) αὐτῶν γῆς τοῦ δικαίου 
τῆς µηχ(ανῆς) Ναυατὲ διαφερούσ(ης) τῷ αὐτῷ κτήµα(τι) Λουκίου ὑπὸ τῆς 
                                                
107 Sarris 2006, 39. 
108 This is an instance where Sarris has identified ἔξω τῆς πύλης with αὐτουργία ἔξω τῆς πύλης. 
109 This fact alone should cast some suspicion on Sarris’ interpretation, since he describes his model’s usual case, not 
an exception. 
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διακοπῆς τῶν χωµάτ(ων)  
ἐπὶ τῆς ιγ ἰνδ(ικτίωνος) ὑπὲρ (ἀρουρῶν) γ νο(µίσµατα) β δ´ καὶ ἐπὶ 
τῆς ιδ ἰνδ(ικτίωνος) νο(µίσµατα) β δ´. 
 
“Conceded to John and Heraclius from the holding of Lukiu, on account of their 
land in the dikaion of the irrigated land of Nauate in the same holding of Lukiu, 
which was destroyed, carried off by a breach in the dikes, in the 13th indiction, 
regarding 3 arouras, 2 ¼ solidi, and for the 14th indiction, 2 ¼ solidi.” 
 
In cases where the occupant of the land has changed or possession has been complicated in some 
way, the reason for the complication is briefly explained, as in P.Oxy. 55.3804.169–170: 
συνεχωρήθ(η) τοῖς γεωρ(γοῖς) µηχ(ανῆς) τοῦ νέου λάκκου ἐν ἐποικ(ίῳ) Κοτυλεείου 
σπειροµέ(νης) ποτὲ 
π(αρὰ) Σµαράγδου νοταρ(ίου), νυνὶ δὲ δ(ιὰ) Παύλου Κουειέχος ἀκολούθ(ως) τύπῳ 
δοθ(έντι) αὐτῷ. 
 
“Conceded to the cultivators of the irrigated land of the new cistern in the epoikion 
of Kotyleeiu, once sown by Smaragdos, notarius, but now through Paul son of 
Kueiechos in conformity with the authority granted him.” 
 
 P.Oxy. 16.1913.1–5 follows this same pattern, but the custody of the land has changed in a 
way still more complex than in 55.3804.169–170. It appears that a plot of land had been leased to 
and sown by one group, Peter and the heirs of apa Nikios, and subsequently allowed to go to grass. 
Because it had gone to grass, the lease of the land was transferred to another group, the cultivators 
Outside the Gate. Part of the lease agreement was to supply water to the adjacent gardens and 
vineyards, using their own animals for the irrigation machinery. Such specifics about the land and 
lease agreements do not normally appear in the terse expenditure accounts unless there is 
something exceptional about them relevant to the concession. For instance, in P.Oxy. 55.3804 
concessions are given when part of the land was washed away by a broken dike, a customary special 
arrangement was observed, or unsuitable areas of soil were present. In P.Oxy. 55.3804.163 and 
175, portions of leased land described as enchortos, usually translated “overgrown with grass” or 
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“under grass,” were also treated as unsuitable for producing crops, and therefore deserving of a 
remission of rent.110 The plot of land in P.Oxy.16.1913 lines 1–5 is enchortos, and therefore 
“damaged,” but it is also classed as mechane, the standard term in the Byzantine papyri for land 
equipped with irrigation machinery.111 This land would therefore have retained some value 
because even if it were no longer productive itself, it could still supply water to adjacent vineyards, 
gardens, and fields. 
  P.Oxy. 16.1913 lines 1–5 appears in the expenditures section of an account because it is an 
exceptional case, and the two specifics of the lease agreement explain precisely how it is 
exceptional: the leased land was defective but had irrigation machinery, and the cultivators were 
using their own oxen rather than the estate’s for the irrigation of adjacent land. That the use of 
their own animals is specified as an exceptional circumstance indicates that in the usual case 
lessees used the estate’s animals for irrigation. A non-Apion lease from Oxyrhynchus dated to 411, 
P.Oxy. 55.3803, in which a plot of land with an irrigation machine is being leased, supports this 
conclusion. The terms of that agreement grant the lessee the use of one yoke of oxen (i.e., two 
animals). The irrigation machine referred to is the saqiya, which usually required two teams of two 
oxen, used in shifts.112 Line 18 of the document further stipulates that the lessee is leasing half of 
the irrigation machine and therefore only one yoke of oxen.113  
                                                
110 The fact that the Apions did not collect taxes for land under grass could also explain why the autourgia, associated 
with fodder, is mostly absent from the collections portions of the accounts. 
111 It may instead be the case that control of land gone to grass was assumed by the estates in order to assure control 
over fodder. See Rowlandson 1996, 23, for the agricultural importance of maintaining a fodder supply. See P.Oxy. 
16.1831, 1913, and 55.3803 and commentary for further examples of mechanai as land.  
112 On mechanical irrigation in Egypt, especially the saqiya and its identification in the papyri, see Oleson 1984, 
Bonneau 1993, and Wilson 2008. 
113 See P.Oxy. 55.3803 ad l.7. 
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 The other Apion lease for which the terms are extant, P.Oxy. 63.4390, does not mention 
the leasing of oxen, nor do the other published Oxyrhynchite leases of irrigation machines serving 
plots of land, P.Mich. 11.611, P.Flor. 3.325, PSI 1.77, P.Berl. Zill. 7, and P.Oxy. 58.3955. It is 
perhaps the irregular nature of the lease in P.Oxy. 55.3803—only half of the irrigation machine was 
being leased—that called for the specification of how many oxen were included in the lease. The 
adjective ὁλόκληρος usually modifies the µηχανή in each of these leases, which would indicate 
that the entire machine, including both yokes of oxen, was being leased.114 Essentially, the 
cultivators in P.Oxy. 16.1913.1–5 were leasing unproductive land from which they could still 
derive some income owing to its irrigation machinery. The situation is on the model of the 
irrigation agreements found in leases of the Roman period. From the advent of large scale 
mechanical irrigation, arrangements were commonly undertaken to share water raised by irrigation 
machinery, since the costly machines often lifted more water than could be used on the piece of 
land to which they belonged, and the plots of land owned or leased by an individual were not 
always contiguous. For example P.Ross.Georg. 2.19, of 141 CE, is a lease of partially damaged 
orchard and vine land under mechanical irrigation. As part of the lease agreement in this 
document, the lessee was permitted to make arrangements to sell the lifted water to neighbors and 
thereby recoup some of the lost production. Because they would derive less income than from 
productive land and because they had to take on the cost of owning and maintaining draft animals 
                                                
114 Preisigke’s Wörterbuch glosses P.Cair. Masp. 2.67170 as a parallel usage of the word: τὸ ὑπάρχο̣ν τῷ ὑφʼ [ὑ]µ ̣[ᾶς] 
ε̣[ὐα]γ̣εῖ µον̣(αστηρίῳ) ὁλόκληρο̣ν πωµάριο\ν/...σὺν λ̣[ά]κ̣κῳ ὁλοκ̣λ̣[ήρῳ] which he translates as “der Obstgarten 
gehört dem Kloster ungeteilt, ebenso zugehörige Brunnen.” P.Mich.11.611 is the lone instance where ὁλόκληρος is 
absent. In that text µηχανήν follows a damaged portion of the papyrus, for which the editor suggests supplementing 
ἀ<ντ>λ[ητι]κήν. In P.Oxy. 16.1968, a fragmentary lease which includes land and an irrigator, the adjective modifies 
the arouras rather than the machine: ὁλοκλήρους ἓξ ἀρούρας οὔσας ἐν µηχανῇ καλουµέ(νῃ) τοῦ Μοναστηρίου.  
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themselves instead of using the estate’s,115 they were deserving of a partial remission of the usual 
rent on the property.  
 Early in the early use of animal driven irrigation machines, during the first and second 
centuries CE, it is clear that even without centralized control of farmland, economies of scale were 
sought in the use of oxen. On the estate of Epimachus, rather than owning its own animals to be 
used only for certain seasonal purposes, oxen were leased.116 A centralized fodder production 
infrastructure on the Apion estate might indicate that the earlier system was subsumed into the 
new situation of large-scale control117 of arable land by a single oikos. Rather than having each 
lessee maintain his own set of oxen, a highly expensive arrangement which would have limited the 
pool of lessees to those with enough capital to own their own oxen, the estate itself maintained the 
oxen and the feed necessary for them. Having an infrastructure for feeding and maintaining 
animals would also have facilitated the centralized collection from smaller holders and lessees of 
both rents and taxes, which often came not in cash, but in kind and would therefore have required 
a means of transportation for the large volumes of grain. 
  P.Oxy.16.1913 also indicates that use of the estate’s oxen was not the only option. Other 
documents show clearly that there were enapographoi georgoi who owned their own cattle.118 The 
Apion documents provide evidence that there were some enapographoi georgoi who owned land and 
cattle, some who owned land or cattle, and some who owned neither land nor cattle. The Apion 
evidence, like the Aphrodito evidence, points to georgoi of various social and economic statuses. 
                                                
115 On the substantial costs of maintaining oxen, see Rowlandson 1996, 23. 
116 Kehoe 1992, 62–63. 
117 Note that control of land is not necessarily the same as owning it. There is fiscal control over the taxes to be 
collected from private landholders, but also leverage from those dependent on the estate for water access. 
118 E.g., P.Oxy. 1.135, 27.2479, 70.4790–4791. 
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Likewise, the Apion evidence shows that the estate had mechanisms in place to accommodate 
varied arrangements with cultivators of such varying status. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 This chapter began with a description of the broad categories of defects that might be 
present in the papyrological record of the Apion estate near Oxyrhynchus, Sarris’ model being the 
latest and fullest exemplar highlighting the weaknesses arising from severely incomplete 
documentation. His explanation of the discrepancy between the wealth the Apions attained and 
the avenues of wealth apparent in the papyrological documentation of their Oxyrhynchus holdings 
posits that the record over-represents the ktematic lands. Sarris concludes that the autourgia made 
up a significant portion of the estates, produced a wide variety of cash crops, and was worked by 
cultivators obliged by their leasing agreements for ktematic land to till the autourgic land. As a 
result of the bipartite structure of the estate, its “footprint” expanded from the fifth through 
seventh centuries. This chapter sets out to refute these positions, arguing instead that the autourgia 
was primarily devoted to producing fodder for estate-owned animals used by lessees and 
employees, and that its produce was not the source of Apion wealth. I have further argued that the 
autourgia was sown and harvested mostly by casual wage laborers drawn from the epoikia and komai 
associated with the estate, likely from the non-leasing population living in those places. The georgoi 
who did lease and live in the Apion-associated epoikia and komai were not of homogenous social 
and economic status, and the types of arrangements possible with the estate were similarly varied. 
Without the bipartite structure, expanding land ownership by estates should not be seen as 
necessary, and the evidence does not support the proposition.  
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CHAPTER 3 
BENEFITS FROM LOWER LEVEL COLLECTIONS 
 
 If documents recording the vast and varied production of the autourgia have not been lost 
and the papyrological record of the Apion estate does broadly represent how their estate in 
Oxyrhynchus functioned, then the source of Apion wealth remains to be found. The relationship 
of the Apion estate with the imperial government is a promising area in which to look for that 
source. Since the social and political fortune of the Apion family, especially under Apion II, was 
tied to its relationship with the imperial family, it is reasonable to investigate the extent to which 
their economic success was tied to it as well. Gascou’s model of fiscal shares has highlighted the 
economic entanglement resulting from the Apions’ collection of taxes on the government’s behalf. 
It can be safely assumed that the Apions and other estate owners would not have undertaken the 
difficult, time consuming, and, at times, risky endeavor of collecting taxes absent either reward or 
compulsion. The nature of the evidence which has survived does not offer many insights into 
whether, or how, the imperial government might have compelled large landholders to do the 
government’s bidding. The papyrus accounts, letters, and contracts do, however, offer a view into 
how collecting taxes benefitted the Apion estate.  
The next two chapters examine the benefits that accrued to the estate from collecting taxes. 
These benefits could be intrinsic—the estates could extract transaction fees from those whose taxes 
they collected—or extrinsic—the imperial government could remunerate and promote those 
ensuring regular and efficient collection of taxes—or both. In this chapter I discuss the evidence for 
intrinsic benefits, and in Chapter 4 the evidence for extrinsic benefits.  
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The pronoetes accounts, the texts which best document the lower-level functioning of the 
estates and their relation to the few extant accounts documenting the higher management level, 
are discussed first. The conversion of grain from one type of artaba to another in the pronoetes 
accounts offers an avenue by which the pronoetai and, by extension, the estates made money. Next, 
it is argued that the practice of meeting grain taxes by paying an equivalent sum in money allowed 
the estates to transmute their wheat produce into cash without directly engaging in the market. 
Then follows a description of how pronoetai were able to extract from those beneath them both 
money and produce, and how the estates, in turn, extracted further cash and produce from the 
pronoetai. A fourth century archive illustrates precisely how this system developed and functioned. 
Lastly, the number of prostasiai on the Apion estate in the Oxyrhynchite and thereby the scale of 
the intrinsic benefits are estimated. In the final analysis, it is concluded that the number of Apion 
prostasiai greatly increased over the sixth century, indicating that the area over which the Apions 
had collection responsibilities expanded and explaining the increase in collections apparent in the 
higher level accounts.  
 
3.1 THE ACCOUNTS OF THE PRONOETAI  
 The papyri in the Apion dossier documenting the activities of tax collection on the estate 
most thoroughly are the accounts of the pronoetai.1 How these information-rich documents 
functioned on their own or in the larger context of the estates, however, is not immediately 
apparent. With the exception of the extremely thorough commentary and presentation of P.Oxy. 
                                                
1 P.Oxy. 55.3804 and 16.1911 are the fullest and clearest in their organization. Other such accounts are P.Oxy. 
18.2195, 19.2243a, and 16.1912–1914. See Mazza 2001, 192 appendix 8 for an exhaustive table of the pronoetes 
accounts. 
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55.3804, their editions are not always as full as one might hope.2 This section aims to explicate 
how these accounts related to actual practices on the estates and clarify certain aspects of the 
terminology used in them.  
The Apion estate was divided into a number of administrative units called prostasiai, 
comprising a handful of epoikia or parts of komai. A pronoetes oversaw the collection of gold and 
grain for each prostasia.3 Collections were made according to a list called an apaitesimon, generated 
at a higher level of administration.4 The method of accounting used in the pronoetes accounts 
avoided altering the receipts side even when collections were not made according to the 
apaitesimon. Instead, pronoetai dealt with changes in inflow by counting them as remissions on the 
expenditures side. Money not actually collected as demanded on the apaitesimon was still entered as 
collected on the receipts side, but then also entered as a remission on the expenses side. In other 
words, failure to collect was treated as an expense cancelling out a notional, or target,5 receipt. The 
practice results in such stability in the target collections that the total receipts in P.Oxy. 16.1911 
and 55.3804, separated by 9 years, are identical down to the last choinix and denarius.6 As will be 
further discussed below, the solvency of the estates depended on the careful construction of the 
apaitesima. The way of operating evinced in the accounts, which “seems to us a peculiar method,” 
can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the receipts side of the accounts would have been largely 
similar to the “fossilized” apaitesima governing them.7  
                                                
2 Those accounts appearing in P.Oxy. 16 are without translation, and often without commentary or line breaks. Those 
with commentaries, such as 1911, often focus on mistakes of arithmetic committed by the scribe.  
3 See Hickey 2012, 25–27 for more on the division and classification of estate land. 
4 P.Oxy. 16.2037 is an apaitesimon. 
5 Describing the gross receipts, exclusive of remissions, as “target receipts” is Hickey’s term. 
6 The denarii, however, are converted to different amounts of solidi. This is likely owing to changes in the rates of 
conversion of billon to gold coin over the 9 years. See P.Oxy. 55.3804 note ad line 272. 
7 “Fossilized”: Hickey 2008, 20 n. 135. They were carefully constructed and so rarely changed. 
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The receipt portions of these texts (i.e., the lemmata) were discussed in the previous chapter 
(sections 2.3-2.5) primarily in relation to rents for ktemata collected from residents of epoikia 
associated with the Apion estate. A payment collected by a pronoetes for ἰδίας γῆς indicates that he 
was responsible for collecting something which was not rent and which was payable by the owner 
of the land, presumably a tax.8 Hickey has also shown that the Apion estate made collections of 
grain in villages in which they were unlikely to have owned property.9 There are also a handful of 
entries in the accounts which explicitly describe the collections as for taxes of one type or 
another.10 The accounts, then, reflect not only rent collected on pieces of land, but also taxes 
collected in both grain and money. The formulaic language of leases surviving from Apion and 
non-Apion Oxyrhynchite estates show that the lessor, not the lessee, was usually responsible for 
paying the taxes on the land.11 Thus a collection appearing in the lemmata of a pronoetes account 
could reflect either rent or taxes alone, or both rent and taxes together.  
Which of these categories a particular lemma falls into, however, is undifferentiated in the 
pronoetes accounts.12 This disregard for category distinctions can be explained under Gascou’s 
model of taxation through fiscal shares, wherein the Apion estate, along with other large 
landholders, were responsible for paying, and therefore collecting, a given share of the total tax 
burden for the nome.13 Whether the Apions would collect only rent, only taxes, or both rent and 
                                                
8 P.Oxy. 55.3804.92=16.1911.22. Other collections on ἰδίας γῆς: P.Oxy. 16.1912.87, 16.2032.10, 29, and 31; on which 
see Hardy 1931, 53. On identifying it as a tax, see Hickey 2008, 49 n. 61. 
9 Hickey 2008, 89 and passim. 
10 Hardy 1931, 52 and nn. 1 and 2 for references. 
11 P.Flor 3.325 and P.Oxy. 63.4390 (both Apion); and P.Oxy. 6.913 (not Apion, but from 5th century Oxyrhynchus) 
stipulate that the lessor is to pay the taxes. The other Apion leases do not contradict these documents, but either do 
not survive intact or refer to usual practices from the ἀπαιτήσιµα. The cost of the taxes could, however, be built into 
the lease price, making the lessee the ultimate bearer of the burden. 
12 Excepting the instances in n. 10. 
13 Gascou 1985, 48 and passim.  
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taxes from someone was determined by the tenure of the land, but the aggregate amount that they 
paid to the state was not. The pronoetai were told who was supposed to pay and how much. So long 
as the apaitesima, collection lists, were constructed in such a way that in the aggregate the tax 
revenue plus the rent revenue would cover expenses in grain and the estate’s share of taxes, it was 
not necessary to separate rents from taxes upon collection. For the purposes of the pronoetes 
accounts, then, it was immaterial whether the collection was for rent or tax. One of Gascou’s 
major contributions was pointing out that it is difficult to distinguish between taxes and rents in 
the accounts precisely because the two facets of economic activity were so inextricably linked for 
the estate.14 Because the pronoetai did not treat the collections of taxes and rents as fundamentally 
different activities, the more relevant distinction is between collections in kind and collections in 
money. Such is the distinction emphasized in the accounts themselves, both in the notation of 
individual receipts and expenditures, and in the way surpluses are dealt with. 
While sorting taxes from rents in the lemmata is difficult, it is clear that taxes paid in grain 
and taxes paid in money were handled differently by the pronoetai.15 P.Oxy. 1.126, a non-Apion 
document from 572, is a transfer of taxation from a father to his daughter for land given to her as 
dowry. The document shows the broad division of taxes a landowner was liable for in sixth century 
Oxyrhynchus. Stephanous, the daughter, agrees to pay 63 artabas for embole—the grain taxes for the 
provisioning of Constantinople and Alexandria—and two types of money taxes: 22 keratia on the 
public standard for the kanonika to the ethnikos, and 24 keratia (=1 solidus) on the public standard 
                                                
14 Gascou 1985, esp. 12–13. 
15 Hardy 1931, 51–52 and Hickey 2012, 50 n.63.  
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for arkarika to the “arkarikarios or embolator.”16 The Apions and the landowners from whom they 
collected would have been similarly liable for these money taxes on the land, but payments for 
taxes in money do not appear in the expenditures section of the pronoetes accounts.17 At the end of 
both P.Oxy. 16.1911 and P.Oxy. 55.3804, the best preserved pronoetes accounts, the scribe writes 
that he has passed along the surplus money to the estate trapezites in installments over the course 
of the year, indicating that there was a larger pool of money collected from the estate’s several 
pronoetai and that a higher level of administration drew on that pool to pay taxes in money.18  
In contrast, the grain for embole was handed over by the pronoetes directly to the public 
boatmen for transport, and appears in the accounts as a single item of expenditure.19 The pronoetes 
accounts balance in grain, either because receipts match expenditures (P.Oxy. 55.3804) or because 
the small surplus has been sold to the embolator (P.Oxy. 16.1911), the same official to whom 
Stephanous in P.Oxy. 1.126 was to pay the arkarika. The proceeds from the sale were handed over 
by the pronoetes to the estate trapezites and the grain was handed over by the embolator to the 
boatmen (P.Oxy. 16.1914).20 At the end of each of these accounts, where the end survives, the 
scribe writes πλήρης ὁ σῖτος, “the wheat is balanced.”21 The procedure, then, was a follows: grain 
remaining after the payments to charity and other expenses went first to the embole, so that as 
                                                
16 P.Oxy. 1.126.10–16. On the kanonika and arkarika see Johnson and West 1949, 309–310 and 302–303, respectively. 
On the embolator see Hickey 2008, 110. Regarding the public standard: the system of different standards for the solidus 
used in the Apion dossier is extremely complex and not wholly understood. The commentary on P.Oxy. 55.3805 ad 
lines 7–8 gives a detailed summary of the issues and attempts to shed light on a number of the problems. See also 
West and Johnson 1944, 140–157. 
17 The exception is the small fee (about 1 solidus per 150 kankellos artabas) paid to the boatmen for the transportation of 
embole grain. 
18 See the discussion of P.Oxy. 18.2196v and 16.1918, accounts from these higher levels, below. How the taxes were 
likely paid is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 as a tax farming arrangement.  
19 So in P.Oxy. 55.3804.149 the following expenditure appears: τοῖς κληρ(ονόµοις) Μηνᾶ ναύτου ἀπὸ Κόµα ὑπὲρ 
ἐµβολ(ῆς) ἀπὸ γενήµα(τος) ιδ ἰνδ(ικτίωνος) σίτ(ου) κ(αγκέλλῳ) (ἀρτάβαι) ρϙβ 𐅵 χο(ίνικες) ζ. 
20 On the embolator see P.Oxy. 56.3873 8 n.; Hardy 1931, 57; and Johnson and West 1949, 327. In P.Oxy. 18.2195 the 
account balances after the surplus is given away κα(τὰ) κέλευσιν τοῦ δεσπό(του) ἡµῶν. 
21 P.Oxy. 55.3804.273, 16.1911.209, 18.2195.146. 
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much of that obligation as possible could be met in kind rather than through adaeratio, the 
practice of paying amounts owed in kind with its equivalent value in money.22 Any further surplus 
in grain that remained beyond the payment for the embole would be sold to the embolator. In 
reality, then, all of the grain actually collected by the pronoetai, less charity and local expenses, went 
to the boatmen bound for Alexandria, either directly or through the embolator, who gave a cash 
refund on any amount of grain beyond that required for the embole.23  
That all of the grain collected by the pronoetai went to the boatmen, either for the embole or 
exchanged for cash, can explain the absence of analomata sitou, grain expenditures, in the higher 
level accounts. One such account, P.Oxy. 18.2195.v, records the sum of the lemmata in grain, and 
both lemmata and analomata in cash from all of the Apions’ Oxyrhynchite holdings.24 Hickey has 
noted that “it is not readily apparent why the taxes were later entered for the argyrika [money taxes] 
but not for the grain.”25 He explains that grain expenditures may be absent at the higher levels of 
accounting because surplus grain was reserved for the embole.26 But the grain surpluses after the 
embole payment in P.Oxy. 16.1911 and 1914 militate against this suggestion. And in P.Oxy. 18.2195 
the grain account balances only after a calculated surplus of 200 artabas has been conceded “to the 
farmers of Euangelion and others on the orders of our master,”27 indicating that the surplus was 
used for a purpose other than paying the embole.  
                                                
22 On adaeratio and the levels of the embole see Section 3.3 below.  
23 The cash for such remissions was presumably drawn from payments of money tax, like that Stephanous is to pay to 
the embolator in P.Oxy. 1.126. 
24 Two lines from this account were given in the introduction to P.Oxy. 18.2196.r. The text is to be published in an 
upcoming volume of the P.Oxy. series. Hickey 2008 provides a detailed description and preliminary discussion of the 
document, providing many of the figures it contains. It should be noted, however, that two numbers have been 
transposed in the figure for solidi in line 1 of the fourth section. That figure is given as 13,451; it ought to read 13,541.  
25 Hickey 2008, 90. 
26 Hickey 2008, 90. 
27 τοῖς γεωρ(γοῖς) Εὐαγγελίο(υ) καὶ ἄλλοις κα(τὰ) κέλευσιν τοῦ δεσπό(του) ἡµῶν⋅ 
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The other possible explanation Hickey offers is that the dues for the embole were paid in 
part or in total through adaeratio, and were therefore grouped with the argyrika as money taxes. Yet, 
as Hickey points out, the analomata argyrika in the higher-level account, unlike the analomata of the 
pronoetes accounts, exclude the expenses handled locally at the lower administrative levels.28 Unlike 
other taxes, payment of the embole in kind was treated as a local expense handled at the level of the 
pronoetai, and we should therefore not expect to see the tax expenditures in grain at the higher 
level accounts. Moreover, from P.Oxy. 16.1911 and 1914 it is apparent that grain in surplus of the 
embole was traded to the embolator for cash, which was then handed to the trapezites and from there 
to the higher administrative levels. There are no examples in which surplus grain is passed from a 
pronoetes to a higher-level administrator,29 who appear to have dealt strictly in cash. That is to say, 
above the level of the pronoetes, any grain surpluses would have already been transmuted into cash, 
so that there was no grain to be expended at the higher levels. This observation, however, raises 
the question of why lemmata sitou (absent from P.Oxy. 16.1918.v) appear in P.Oxy. 18.2196.v at all. 
The lemmata sitou of the pronoetes accounts are, as noted above, gross receipts, exclusive of the 
various remissions and expenditures. If, as Hickey reasonably supposes, there is no reason to 
suspect that the lemmata sitou figures of the higher level accounts are any different, then it is 
especially curious that this figure, which bears little relation to anything the higher level 
administrators would have received or the pronoetai would have paid out, should appear in P.Oxy. 
18.2196.v.30 One possibility is that the estates’ fiscal obligations were determined based on the 
                                                
28 Hickey 2008, 94. 
29 This is true even under Sarris’ administrative structure which dubiously makes the embolator an estate employee 
(2006, 79 fig.5). The embolator receives grain, not money from the pronoetai.  
30 Hickey 2008, 90. 
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total target lemmata sitou, but a firm answer, if one can be given, might have to wait until the full 
publication of P.Oxy. 18.2196.v. 
 
3.2 KANKELLOS AND METRON ARTABAS  
While the pronoetai write that the grain accounts balance, a closer comparison of grain 
receipts to grain expenditures complicates the sense of the term “balanced.” The standard unit of 
dry measure in Egypt was the artaba, whose unit of subdivision was the choinix. Artabas of several 
different names appear in the Apion dossier and other contemporary papyri, and the most 
significant in the accounts are the metron and the kankellos. The measure for wheat on the receipts 
side of the accounts is usually the metron artaba,31 whereas that for the expenditures is the kankellos 
artaba. At the end of the receipts section of P.Oxy. 55.3804, at the point where the sum of the 
collections is given, the scribe converts from metron to kankellos artabas and describes the method of 
conversion: σίτ(ου) µέτρ(ῳ) (ἀρτάβαι) Ατιβ δ´ χο(ίνικες) ε, αἳ κ(αγκέλλῳ) (ἀρτάβαι) ἐξ 
(ἑκατοστῶν) (ἀρτάβαι) ιε κ(αγκέλλῳ) (ἀρτάβαι) Αφθ δ´ χο(ῖνιξ) α.32 This compressed phrase reads 
“1312 ¼ artabas and 5 choinikes of wheat by metron, which by kankellos at 15 per 100 are 1509 ¼ 
artabas 1 choinix.” In other words, converting metron to kankellos entails adding 15% to the metron 
figure.33 
The nature of the relationship between these two types of artaba is not entirely clear, 
though the possibilities are limited. The conversion may be from a larger measure to a smaller one, 
i.e., the amount of grain is the same but the units into which it is divided are different. 
                                                
31 This is not a rule. P.Oxy. 55.3084.148 is an exception, as is the corresponding entry P.Oxy. 16.1911.75. P.Oxy. 
18.2195 has numerous kankellos entries on the receipts side.  
32 P.Oxy. 55.3804.141–142. 
33 On this conversion see the highly detailed note to ll. 141–142 in the commentary to P.Oxy. 55.3804. 
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Alternatively, the “conversion” could be explained as an actual difference in quantity of units of 
the same size. The former possibility could entail either a system with artabas of varying capacities 
containing different numbers of choinikes of a fixed size,34 or choinikes of varying capacities which 
make up artabas of similarly varying sizes.35 If the metron artaba and the kankellos artaba both 
contain the same number of choinikes, then varying artabas with fixed choinikes can be eliminated as 
a possibility. The editor of P.Oxy. 55.3804 points to several items in the account demonstrating 
clearly that the kankellos artaba has 40 choinikes.36 The question of the number of choinikes in the 
metron artaba has been more vexed. The editors of many of the early P.Oxy. volumes assumed that 
the metron had 46 choinikes, i.e., 15% more than the 40 choinix kankellos artabas. But in P.Oxy. 
16.1911.101–102 14 metron artabas are converted to 16 artabas 4 choinikes kankellos.37 Based on this 
calculation, Shelton has argued that the metron also contains 40 choinikes: “Fifteen percent of a 40–
choenix artab is 6 choenices. Multiply by 14, 84 choenices. Divide by 40, 2 artabs with 4 choenices 
left over. Add to 14 artabs metron, total 16 artabs 4 choenices kankellos as stated. This is plainly the 
scribe’s method of calculation, and it requires that both artabs, metron and kankellos, consist, each 
in its own system, of 40 choenices. Forty-six will not do.”38 Shelton then offers three other similar 
examples in which the metron artaba appears to consist of 40 choinikes: P.Oxy. 16.1910.18–27, 
2037.24–25, and 18.2195.99–101. The editor of P.Oxy. 55.3804, however, notes, “one may reach a 
                                                
34 The view expressed by of Duncan-Jones (1979, 347–75, esp. 361–369) and Mayerson (2006). 
35 Argued by Shelton (1977 and 1981, 102–106).  
36 The case is made at 141–142 n. He points to lines 173, 177, 180, and 181. 
37 σίτ(ου) µέτρ(ῳ) (ἀρτάβαι) ιδ, αἵ κ(αγκέλλῳ) (ἀρτάβαι) ἐξ (ἑκατοστῶν) (ἀρτάβαι) ιε. καγκ(έλλῳ) 
(ἀρτάβαι) ιϛ χο(ίνικες) δ.  
38 Shelton 1977, 59. 
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perfectly satisfactory conclusion on the hypothesis of artabas of 46 and 40 choinices: choen. 644 
(14x46) ÷ 40 = kank. art. 16 choen. 4.”39  
 The fourth column of P.Oxy. 55.3804, in which all the figures for the grain entries as well 
as the scribe’s column subtotal are extant, can answer the question definitively. The column is 
unique in that the individual entries are given in metron artabas and choinikes, whereas the subtotal 
is given in whole and fractional metron artabas. In the column, there are four entries of 31.25 
artabas and 5 choinikes, and one entry of 3 artabas. This totals to 128 artabas and 20 choinikes, which 
the scribe gives as 128 ½ artabas. ½ metron artaba is clearly equated with 20 choinikes, and so the 
metron artaba, like the kankellos artaba, consists of 40 choinikes. Varying artabas with fixed choinikes 
can therefore be eliminated. The possibility remains that the choinikes themselves varied in 
capacity, but always represented 1/40th of an artaba, regardless of that artaba’s size. Were that the 
case, we should still expect to find a consistent ratio between metron and kankellos artabas. While a 
ratio of 1.15:1 is common, it is not consistently so, and a number of different ratios can be found 
in the papyri.40 Further, Duncan-Jones notes P.Cair.Zen. 1.59004.14–16 in which an artaba is 
explicitly stated to contain 40 choinikes. He points out that if its capacity in choinikes had to be 
mentioned, it could not simply be assumed, and so militates against the idea that a choinix means 
1/40th of an artaba, regardless of the artaba.41  
 This leaves the second possibility, that the 15% added to the figures in the accounts 
represents an actual addition of uniformly sized units to the number collected, as the most likely 
                                                
39 P.Oxy. 55.3804 note ad line142. The editor is not arguing in favor of a 46 choinix metron, merely pointing out the 
flaw in Shelton’s reasoning.  
40 E.g., P.Oxy. 16.1910, 2027, and P.Iand. 4.63. The editor of P.Oxy. 55.3804 has suggested the varying ratios represent 
varying rates of surcharge. This possibility is discussed further below. 
41 Duncan-Jones 1979, 368 n.19. See also 369 n.25–33. I do not argue that all artabas were of 40 choinikes, only that 
both the metron and kankellos were. This argument should also be considered in light of the much earlier date of 
P.Cair.Zen. 1.59004 in the third century BCE. 
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explanation for the conversions. If this is right, the pronoetai accounts show that the pronoetes 
collected rents from lessees and taxes from both lessees and independent smaller landholders, then 
expended that amount plus an additional 15% on wages, payments, donations, and taxes, in order 
to balance the accounts. Attempting to explain the purpose of this additional 15%, the editor of 
P.Oxy. 55.3804 has argued that metron and kankellos are “accounting terms only, the former 
implying ‘exclusive of surcharges’, the latter ‘inclusive of surcharges’.”42 The editor points to 
Gascou’s model and holds that in the case of the Apion estate the surcharges are equivalent to the 
taxes collected by the estate on the state’s behalf.43 
 P.Oxy. 55.3804 balances in grain precisely without the need to sell excess to the embolator, 
hence the grain surcharges paid out must appear in the expenditures of the account. Because the 
embole entry of line 149 is the lone tax payment made in the expenditures, then on the editor’s 
hypothesis, under which the surcharges are to be equated with the taxes, the entirety of the 15% 
surcharge should have been devoted to the embole. This hypothesis can be tested by determining 
whether the amount of the embole is equal to the difference between the metron and kankellos 
figures,44 i.e., the 15% of the metron artaba figure added by the scribe. The difference between the 
metron and the kankellos figures is 195.75 artabas and 6 choinikes, and the embole is 192.5 artabas and 
7 choinikes, within .25% of one another compared with the metron total.45 This small discrepancy 
                                                
42 P.Oxy. 55.3804.141–142 n. The fact that remissions on rent are calculated in kankellos artabas, the tax-inclusive term, 
indicates that the reasons for a remission in rent also occasioned a remission in the taxes owed on that land by the 
estate.  
43 P.Oxy. 55.3804 note ad 141–142 (page 128). 
44 Exclusive of the 26 kankellos artabas collected. Line 139 is the lone instance in P.Oxy. 55.3804 of a collection made in 
kankellos artabas. It is not included in the calculation of 15% for the embole since, as the use of the term kankellos—i.e., 
surcharge included—indicates, it has already been supplemented with the 15% owed in taxes, and therefore need not 
be taxed again. 
45 14.92% and 14.67% of the metron figure, respectively. 
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between the figures may be attributable to methods of calculation used by ancient scribes generally, 
and this scribe in particular.46  
While the calculation works out well for this particular account, most of the other pronoetes 
accounts are not sufficiently intact to determine as easily the embole figure or its relationship to the 
totals collected and expended. But where an idea of those numbers can be had, the picture is more 
complicated. P.Oxy. 16.1912 preserves the figure for grain lemmata converted to kankellos artabas, 
(exclusive of the collections made in kankellos artabas), and also the amount of the embole paid out, 
also in kankellos artabas. Under the editor’s hypothesis, the embole figure should be 15% of the 
converted lemmata figure. In fact, it is more than 53%. In P.Oxy. 18.2195 the total collections for a 
tenth indiction are given in the text as 4236 ¼ kankellos artabas and 6 choinikes and the embole paid 
out is given as 3585.25 kankellos artabas and 6 choinikes. The embole thus makes up nearly 85% of 
the total collections. But unlike P.Oxy. 55.3804 where only one item of collection was given in 
kankellos artabas, a large number of the collections made in P.Oxy. 18.2195 are in kankellos artabas. 
These collections, like the 26 kankellos artabas collected in P.Oxy. 55.3804, would not have been 
subject to a second extraction of surcharges. Excluding the collections made in kankellos artabas 
reduces the number of metron artabas actually collected in the account to 2819.5 and 1 choinix. This 
figure converted to kankellos is 3241.75 artabas and 7 choinikes, making the embole more than 110% 
of the entire metron collection!  
Although the embole figure is missing from P.Oxy. 16.1911 and the column where it would 
appear is lacunose as well, the column subtotal survives.47 The extant expenditures recorded in that 
column are identical to the corresponding section of P.Oxy. 55.3804, being mostly the customary 
                                                
46 See 55.3804.141–142 n. on the occasional difficulty of determining how the scribe arrives at the figures he reaches. 
47 Column iv, ll. 76–77. 
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remissions or church donations. The lacunose areas in the column other than the embole can 
therefore be supplemented with some certainty using the figures from P.Oxy. 55.3804. Using those 
supplements, the embole figure in P.Oxy. 16.1911 can be recovered by subtracting the sum of all the 
entries in the column from the column subtotal given by the scribe.48 This yields a figure of around 
74 kankellos artabas for embole in 16.1911, or only about 5% of the metron artaba total, much less 
than the 15% in P.Oxy. 55.3804.  
Clearly the situation was not always so tidy as it is in P.Oxy. 55.3804, and it is certainly 
possible that the embole there is equal to the 15% added in the conversion from metron to kankellos 
only because of happenstance. But the perspective we get from the pronoetes accounts is not that of 
the operators of the whole system. The appearance in the accounts of payments from one pronoetes 
to another and the fact that certain receipts are reckoned in kankellos artabas, two practices which 
are perhaps related, imply a more complicated big picture.49 It is possible that seen from the bird’s 
eye view of the Apion bureaucrats in Oxyrhynchus and Alexandria these differences offset one 
another in the aggregate, so that the average amount paid for embole by all of the Apion pronoetai 
was 15% on top of the total grain receipts. Such a system would have entailed very carefully 
constructed apaitesima in order to ensure the aggregate numbers worked.50 Texts like P.Oxy. 
16.1918 and P.Oxy. 18.2196.v demonstrate that the higher levels of Apion administration did deal 
with aggregate numbers, operating from the bird’s eye perspective, rather than maintaining the 
prostasia divisions in their own accounts.  
                                                
48 P.Oxy. 55.3804 note ad line 168. 
49 For example, a payment for the estate of Kephalas in P.Oxy. 18.2195.144 is added separately to the account’s 
lemmata. On Kephalas see also P.Oxy. 16.1916, and Hickey 2008, 60 and n. 111. 
50 A reluctance to make frequent changes to those carefully constructed documents can explain the accounting method 
which avoids altering the receipts based on them. 
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3.3 ADAERATIO 
Another complicating factor in comparing the amounts of embole paid in one account to 
those paid in another is the practice of adaeratio. Because, as noted above, money collected was 
dealt with at a level above that of the pronoetes, we do not find adaerated embole payments in the 
expenditures of accounts of pronoetai. We might, however, expect a difference in the total amount 
of money passed along to the trapezites at the end of the account when adaeratio has occurred. It is 
the case that in P.Oxy. 16.1911, where less grain is handed over for embole than in P.Oxy. 55.3804, 
the amount of money given to the trapezites is greater by about 22 solidi. How many of those 22 
solidi, if any, were adaerated embole and how many were rents and money taxes is impossible to 
determine from the pronoetes accounts. It is possible, however, to determine whether 22 solidi is 
sufficient to accommodate the adaeration of the artabas expected in P.Oxy. 16.1911, based on the 
15% figure. In P.Oxy. 16.1909, a list of taxes from Oxyrhynchus, 10 artabas are equivalent to 
precisely one solidus. This gives a good approximation of the rate of adaeratio, but does not specify 
either the standard of the solidus or the type of artaba.51 Johnson and West give a table of prices of 
wheat in solidi from the 6th century.52 Several of the examples are instances of adaeratio, and most of 
those from Oxyrhynchus fall in the range of 9 to 13 artabas to the solidus.53 The different rates 
might be attributable not to actual variance in the rate of exchange but to the fact that which 
solidus and which artaba are meant is not always mentioned. P.Oxy. 16.1907 is a remission of taxes 
                                                
51 P.Oxy. 16.1909v gives different rates for unspecified artabas and solidi, but is not internally consistent and the 
arithmetic in it has problems.  
52 Johnson and West 1949, 177. 
53 There is an outlier at P.Oxy. 16.1911.147–149 and P.Oxy. 55.3804.184–185 in which one solidus is worth 24 
kankellos artabas. As the editor of P.Oxy. 55.3804 (note ad ll 184–185) comments, the higher value of the solidus may be 
due to the charitable nature of the transaction. 
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which gives 9 1/6 kankellos artabas to the ὄβρυζον solidus and also gives the equivalence of the 
ὄβρυζον to the Alexandrian standard.54 The standard of solidus used in the pronoetes accounts is the 
private, but P.Oxy. 55.3804.150 gives the equivalence between the Alexandrian and the private. 
This works out to about 9 1/3 kankellos artabas to the private solidus. In P.Oxy. 16.1911 the pronoetes 
hands over 118.5 fewer artabas of wheat to the boatmen than in P.Oxy. 55.3804, which, at 9 1/3 
artabas to the solidus, is equivalent to about 12.5 solidi and 5 karats. The 22 excess solidi in the 
surplus of P.Oxy. 16.1911 over that in P.Oxy. 55.3804 therefore can accommodate the adaeration 
of the embole absent from the grain expenditure in 16.1911. 
While the relatively lower embole payment and higher money surplus in P.Oxy. 16.1911 
could suggest that some of the dues in grain were indeed paid in money, in none of the pronoetes 
accounts is it explicitly clear that what the estate owed in grain it paid in cash. Given the long 
noted Apion preference for keeping gold rather than produce,55 it would be counter intuitive if the 
estate had its pronoetai pay even part of its grain taxes in money unless absolutely necessary. 
Nevertheless in P.Oxy. 16.1911 a small surplus in grain does remain. This fact undermines the idea 
that part of the embole was adaerated and suggests instead that less was due, or at least paid, for 
embole in the year recorded by P.Oxy. 16.1911 than for that covered in 55.3804. The editor of 
P.Oxy. 55.3804 proposes “this case seems to indicate rather that the Apions left themselves free to 
make up their quota of grain tax in whatever way best suited the particular current 
                                                
54 Ὄβρυζον, literally “pure”, refers to the wear of the soft gold solidi owing to circulation and use. When applied to 
coins going out of the imperial treasury, it means that it has not been diminished. In the context of payments into the 
treasury, it refers to an additional per solidus fee meant to account for the diminution. See West and Johnson 1944, 
132–133. The former is the case in P.Oxy. 16.1907. 
55 E.g., Hardy 1931, 100–101. 
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circumstances.”56 Alternatively, P.Oxy. 16.1907, a remission of a fourth of the grain taxes that had 
been paid, demonstrates that there were at times reductions of embole after the fact, and other 
sources record imperial remissions of taxes and perhaps increases as well.57 The reluctance to alter 
the receipts side of the accounts meant that the pronoetai’s target receipts remained unchanged 
during these occasional variations, and that remissions on the expenditures side of accounts 
increased instead.  
The possibilities for explaining the varying amounts of the embole thus outlined are: the 
amount of embole paid for a given prostasia remained the same, but part of the dues were adaerated; 
the total amount of embole owed by the estate remained the same, but the amounts owed by the 
different prostasiai varied; or the amount owed for embole occasionally varied, but the target receipts 
remained unchanged. The second two options are likelier than the first. The extant examples of 
adaeratio in the Apion dossier are mostly remissions given to the payers rather than payments into 
the treasury or to the embolator, and the exceptions are complicated cases. P.Oxy. 1.127 (sixth 
century) is a list of embole payments made by the Apion estate. There is a cash payment made along 
with the embole, characterized by the editors as adaeratio.58 This payment, called obscurely ὑ(πὲρ) 
τοῦ διαγράφου τοῦ τηγάνου,59 is at a rate of 55 ½ solidi per 10,000 artabas, a rate far below any 
other attested rates of adaeration. It is more likely a fee or surcharge of some type. P.Oxy. 16.2020 
shows the adaeration of grain related to the arkarika, the money tax that was to be paid along with 
the embole to the embolator in P.Oxy. 1.126. But the context of that account is very muddy. Column 
                                                
56 Note ad line 158. Which particular circumstances would make it advantageous to the estate to hold on to grain and 
expend money are not immediately apparent.  
57 See Hickey 2008, 95 and n.35 for references. See also NJ 148 and 163 on the remission of taxes. 
58 P.Oxy. 1.126 note ad line 9, referring to 1.127.2. 
59 τηγάνον for τάγηνον meaning usually “frying pan.” Johnson and West 1949, 317, offer some conjectures on this 
puzzling usage. 
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i, missing the first halves of its lines, describes the adaeration into solidi of a commodity (perhaps 
grain) for the arkarika. The name of what is being adaerated does not survive, but a payment of 
barley in kind is grouped with the adaerated entries, and only payments of barley in kind are 
present in the other two columns. The arkarika in P.Oxy. 1.126 was a money tax, explicitly 
contrasted with the embole to be paid in kind, always in wheat. There is no clear reason to connect 
the document with the adaeration of wheat for the payment of the embole. Indeed, it seems the 
embolator was more in the business of giving money for grain than of accepting money in place of 
grain. When a reduction of grain taxes was in order, grain was not returned to the payer, but 
instead the value of the grain in cash was paid out; when there was a surplus of grain, it was 
handed over to the embolator in exchange for cash.60  
Even if the pronoetai were not in the habit of making adaerated embole payments to the 
embolator, however, small holders from whom they collected still could have adaerated their own 
payments to the estate. While it is impossible to say how much of a given lemma was adaerated, the 
accounts make it clear that the dues collected from those associated with the estate were paid 
partially in cash. The pronoetai, however, paid out the embole in wheat to the greatest extent 
possible. In this way the estates retained a greater proportion of money, effectively transmuting 
their own wheat collected as rent into gold upon collection and payment of the estate’s share of 
the grain taxes.61 With this system in place, the estates were able to effectively “sell” their wheat 
collected as rent without producing a surplus above their fiscal obligation or engaging in market 
oriented commerce. The following hypothetical example illustrates the system I posit: Let us say 
                                                
60 E.g., P.Oxy. 16.1914 and 1907. 
61 This would also explain the inconsistent ratios of cash to kind in the collections lemmata: individuals who owed the 
same amount in either rent or tax, or both, adaerated different quantities of the wheat they owed. 
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the estate collects 750 artabas of wheat in rent. It also collects 50 solidi from lessees as the adaerated 
value of 500 artabas, and another 250 artabas of wheat for taxes from those who pay their taxes 
through the estate. The estate owes 1000 artabas of wheat in embole. From its pooled collections of 
both taxes and rents, it has 1000 artabas and 50 solidi. The estate pays the embole entirely in wheat, 
and is left with 50 solidi and no wheat. It has transmuted its 500 artabas of wheat into cash.62  
Banaji has described estates like the Apions’ as highly integrated into the monetary 
economy of Byzantine Egypt because of their ability to generate large amounts of gold.63 He 
attributes this ability chiefly to their adoption of mechanical irrigation and the related expansion 
of the wine industry. Yet Hickey’s studies have shown that the possibilities offered by capital 
investment and irrigation machinery were limited, and that the estates were essentially autarkic, 
generating only enough wine to meet their own needs.64 The system I describe can begin to 
disentangle the uneasy coexistence of monetary economy and productive autarky on the estates. If 
the estates were not selling their produce, the cash must have come from somewhere. The 
collection of adaerated sums from those paying taxes through, and rents to, the estate implies 
market engagement on the lower levels, and another set of activities on the part of the pronoetai. It 
is unlikely that the very small holders and tenants would have been dealing in large denomination 
gold solidi. Indeed, the appearance of denarii in their accounts confirms that the pronoetai dealt at 
least partly in billon. The process of transmuting that billon and kind into gold is another avenue 
by which the pronoetai and the estates stood to gain. This activity is discussed in the section below 
on the archive of Papnouthis and Dorotheos. 
                                                
62 This example would be accounted by the pronoetes as a balance in grain, with a cash surplus. 
63 Banaji 1999, 205. See also Banaji 1994 and 1996. 
64 Hickey 2007, 302; and 2001 and 2012. 
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3.4 WHERE DOES THE EXTRA 15% COME FROM? 
 If, as I argue, the accounts show that the pronoetai expended (or failed to collect) 15% more 
than they took in from collections, what then was the source of that additional grain? An Apion 
pronoetes contract confirms that the pronoetai were personally responsible for obtaining it: “I further 
promise to credit to your magnificence, as compensation for the receiving measure, fifteen artabas 
on each hundred artabas.”65 The question of where the pronoetes obtained the extra 15% therefore 
arises. The pronoetes’ ὀψώνιον (wage) is mentioned but not specified in P.Oxy. 1.136; in three 
pronoetes accounts it is said to be a customary 24 artabas of wheat and 2 solidi less 5 carats for the 
year, and in two other accounts the solidi are excluded while the artabas are the same.66 This is not 
nearly enough to make up the 15% surcharge, especially given the further stipulation in P.Oxy. 
1.136 that the pronoetes must pay the estate 12 solidi as a customary παραµυθία (compensation). 
 The disparity between a pronoetes’ income and the financial obligations he had toward the 
estate points to some means of money making activity outside the collections he made and 
recorded in the accounts. The editor of P.Oxy. 55.3804 suggests that “the real emoluments of the 
office were the perquisites which the stewards could extract from the tenant farmers.”67 P.Oxy. 
19.2239, a non-Apion contract of an epikeimenos, an estate overseer similar to a pronoetes but with a 
wider purview, gives an idea of the type of perquisites a pronoetes might expect. In addition to his 
payment in money and kind, Ieremias, the epikeimenos, is entitled to “all the perquisites which the 
                                                
65 P.Oxy. 1.136.27–29: προσοµολογῶ δὲ ληµµατίσαι τῇ ὑµῶν ὑπερφυείᾳ ὑπὲρ παραµυθείας τοῦ παραληµπτικοῦ 
µέτρου τῶν ἀρταβῶν ἑκατὸν ἀρτάβας δέκα πέντε. For the identification of this clause with the conversion from 
metron to kankellos, see also P.Oxy. 55.3804 note ad line 142 (p. 128). 
66 P.Oxy. 55.3804.154, 16.1912.130, 18.2195.89; 19.2243a.81, 16.1910. No other amounts are attested. 
67 P.Oxy. 55.3804 n.154, relying on Gascou 1985, 17. 
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overseer is used to taking customarily from the farmers, either in wheat or wine or other forms.”68 
But like the pronoetes in P.Oxy. 1.136, Ieremias also must pay the estate a relatively large amount in 
solidi, 30.69 The contract in P.Oxy. 1.136 is for one year, and although the term is not stipulated in 
P.Oxy. 19.2239, the editor points out that Ieremias describes himself as already holding the 
position of epikeimenos. This type of payment, therefore, seems not to have been a one-time entrée, 
but a due paid annually upon the renewal of each contract.70 Clearly the position was not a money-
loser for the pronoetai and epikeimenoi, so they must have been able to extract from the georgoi under 
them at least the amount to which they were liable to the estate, and in all likelihood more.  
 This arrangement from the perspective of the estate was essentially a way to extract more 
from the tenants and small holders associated with their estates. The estate obtained a fixed annual 
income guaranteed by contracts with its pronoetai and other administrators, thereby transferring 
some of the risk at the cost of a smaller return. By assuming this risk the pronoetes gained the 
opportunity to make money at the margins. A couple of petitions from enapographoi georgoi to their 
landlords show how this risk was pressed further down the social ladder onto the shoulders of 
lessees. In the case of a minor disaster on a farm, the pronoetai, or similarly charged administrators, 
would still obtain their perquisites even at the cost of ruin for the lessee. The first example is a late 
sixth century petition from a enapographos georgos to Apion II explaining that he was forced to take 
out a sizeable loan to replace livestock which had died, and if he does not receive some relief he 
would have to leave his land. In the petition the georgos complains that “my master’s subordinates 
                                                
68 19.2239.19–20: ...πάσας τὰς συνηθείας ἃς εἴωθεν λαβεῖν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπικείµε(νος) κατὰ τὸ ἔθος παρὰ τῶν γεωργῶν 
εἴτε ἐν σίτῳ καὶ ἐν οἴνῳ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις̣ εἴδεσιν. 
69 Whereas in P.Oxy. 1.136 this payment was called a παραµυθία, here it is an εἰσβατικόν. The word appears only one 
other time in the papyri, P.Lond. 2.393 (p.333), and in an obscure context. The editor of P.Oxy. 19.2239 note ad line 2l 
believes that the two terms are equivalent in the context of the contracts.  
70 The editor of P.Oxy. 19.2239 is ambivalent on this point. See the introduction and note ad line 21.  
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refused to act according to my good master’s will,” in releasing him from his obligations.71 In the 
second, a similar petition from a different georgos also very likely to Apion II,72 things have 
progressed further: the enapographos georgos asks to be permitted to return to his former ktema after 
three years of flight precipitated by the death of his livestock and his concomitant inability to pay 
what he owed. Without his animals, the georgos could not sow, and therefore could not pay, which 
led to “the pronoetes coming onto the ktema and seizing all my meager belongings.”73  
 
3.5 THE ARCHIVE OF PAPNOUTHIS AND DOROTHEOS 
 The clauses in the pronoetes contracts stipulating their obligation to the estates includes 
payment of gold solidi in addition to payment in grain. If their means of obtaining this money is 
taken to be analogous with their means of obtaining grain, then we should look to their 
relationship with the georgoi to discover the source of procuring that coin. Presumably the pronoetai 
could extract from the farmers anything of value in order to meet their obligations to the estate. 
That the estate required solidi from the pronoetai indicates a further level of activity since the 
quantities noted in the contracts are far larger than those which most georgoi would have been 
dealing with. The pronoetai, or perhaps those they dealt with, must have been engaged in 
transmuting the quantities of billon and kind extracted from the georgoi into gold.  
 While it is difficult to know precisely what this activity entailed for the Apion pronoetai of 
the sixth century, evidence from earlier centuries can be illustrative. The fourth century in 
particular is important to understanding the subsequent three centuries, since it marks the 
                                                
71 P.Oxy. 1.130.14–16: οἱ διαφέροντες τοῦ ἐµοῦ δεσπότου οὐκ ἠνέσχετο ποιῆσαι κατὰ τὴν κέλευσιν τοῦ ἐµοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 
δεσπότου. 
72 The origo of the georgos is the epoikion Kineas, known from P.Oxy. 16.1915 to have been administered by the Apions. 
73 P.Oxy. 27.2479.21–22:...ἐλθὼν ἐν τῷ κτήµατι ὁ προνοητὴς διήρπαξεν πάντα τὰ εὐτελῆ µου πράγµατα... 
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beginning of the social, political, and economic changes that would come to define the epoch. 
Sarris has written, “the fourth century witnessed the consolidation of those centrally articulated 
and centrally focused ‘tetrarchic’ governmental institutions that transformed relations between the 
imperial authorities and provincial elites.”74 While Sarris’ description of that transformed 
relationship differs from the one posited here, it is clear that the fourth century is not only a 
cultural touchstone marked by the official acceptance of Christianity, but is also an economic one 
marked by Constantine’s introduction of the gold solidus, the economic foundation of the 
Byzantine world for centuries beyond the flourishing of the Apions. Papyri from the fourth 
century, often qualitatively different from the type of evidence predominating from the fifth 
through the seventh century, can therefore illuminate otherwise inaccessible aspects of the Apion 
estate. 
An archive of the fourth century details the activities of Papnouthis and Dorotheos, two 
brothers engaged in the collection of rents and taxes in Oxyrhynchus on behalf of private 
employers and at least one praepositus pagi. The brothers provide a valuable model for conceiving of 
the activities of the Apion pronoetai. Papnouthis and Dorotheos’ archive comprises mainly letters 
detailing the business transactions involved in the collection of rents and taxes, and the problems 
that arose for them in the course of those dealings. The letters reveal precisely how collections of 
taxes and rents took place, information nearly absent from the Apion dossier. Significantly, the 
archive also indicates that the same individuals performed both public and private functions, 
perhaps at the same time.75  
                                                
74 Sarris 2011, 256–257. 
75 Bagnall 1993, 158–160 argues in favor of concurrence; Ruffini (in a unpublished paper delivered at the 2005 
meeting of the APA) argues against. 
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The system under which Papnouthis and Dorotheos operated in the collection of taxes 
entailed their purchasing the right to collect from the official in charge of collection for the 
amount that official owed. The brothers would take out a loan in gold and sometimes silver at 
interest from a private lender for the amount owed by a particular locale.76 The two brothers 
would then pay the official the full amount he was obliged to collect and be granted the right of 
collection.77 The next step was the actual collection of taxes, which would have been made not in 
gold, since the small amounts owed by individual villagers would not have amounted to the value 
of a solidus, but in billon and even kind.78 Converting this billon and kind into gold through 
market speculation was the area where collectors like Papnouthis and Dorotheos could hope to 
make a living.79 Bagnall has noted fluctuations in the price of gold on the order of 4% per year, 
enough to provide ample opportunity for profit.80 Thus the occupation existed on the margins and 
involved the assumption of huge amounts of risk. It also left the brothers exposed to double-
dealing on the part of the officials responsible for paying the taxes.81 Many of the letters in the 
archive detail the myriad ways in which things could go wrong.  
Some documents in the archive also show that Papnouthis was employed privately as a 
pronoetes, either concurrently or before he was engaged in tax collection.82 These documents do not 
reveal how such private collections were carried out in the same detail as those concerning tax 
collection, but the basic responsibilities of the position were similar to those of the pronoetai of the 
Apion estate. Owing to the public and private aspects of the archive of Papnouthis and Dorotheos, 
                                                
76 P.Oxy. 48.3394 and 48.3393.13–15. Interest: 48.3393.17–19 and P.Oxy. 48.3417.23–27 
77 P.Oxy. 48.3393.5–9; P.Oxy. 48.3419. 
78 P.Oxy. 48.3384–3429 introduction, p. 75–76. See also Carrié 1993, 146–150 and Bagnall 1993, 158–160. 
79 P.Oxy. 48.3401: Papnouthis has confirmed a good price on gold. 
80 Bagnall 1993, 159 n. 50. 
81 P.Oxy. 48.3393 and 3394. 
82 P.Oxy. 48.3387, 3388, 3406, 3407. 
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Bagnall has argued that it represents the nascent blending of public and private that we see fully 
realized two hundred years later in the activities of the Apion pronoetai.83 Ruffini has argued, 
however, that the notion of the Dorotheos and Papnouthis archive evincing a novel blending of 
public and private spheres is insufficiently supported.84 He points out that the chronological 
evidence for the letters in the archive suggests a private phase followed by a public phase in the 
brothers’ careers. He also notes that the letters documenting public activity and private activity 
cannot be definitively linked prosopographically. Rather than some new blending of the public 
and private spheres, Ruffini sees in the archive a business-as-usual revolving door wherein private 
connections led to work in the public sector.85 Ruffini’s impression that this transition from 
private to public was a poor career move is surely influenced by the nature of the archive. 
Collections that went smoothly would not have warranted a letter, and so are underrepresented. 
Nevertheless, distinctions between the private and the public are clearly drawn in the fourth 
century for Dorotheos and Papnouthis, whereas they are not so clearly drawn for the pronoetai of 
the Apion estate. Although distinct, the two activities were still sufficiently similar that the same 
individuals could be used for both public and private collections in the fourth century. The archive 
therefore does provide direct evidence for activities that look very similar to those suggested by the 
Apion dossier.  
Ruffini rightly points out that the root of the many difficulties that the two brothers 
encounter is their lack of social capital, which led to their being pushed around without recourse 
by those above them and without consequence by those below them. In making private collections 
                                                
83 Bagnall 1993, 159–160. 
84 Ruffini (unpublished paper delivered at the 2005 meeting of the APA).  
85 Ruffini (unpublished paper delivered at the 2005 meeting of the APA). 
 
 
74 
they would have acted as the agents of landowners of a higher social standing, trading on the 
prestige of their employers and thus being less susceptible to such problems. In their public 
collections the brothers were contracted by a public official, whose own obligation would have 
been met at the outset when the brothers paid him for the privilege of collecting. Thus the official 
had no reason to confer his status onto the brothers. This caused the brothers a number of 
difficulties, many of which are recorded in the archive. In one case the taxes the brothers had 
bought the rights to had already been collected, and in another rural tax payers refused to pay 
them.86 Clearly troublesome for those who would collect taxes, such a system would also have been 
detrimental to the efficient collection of taxes.87 From this perspective, the important transition 
apparent in the sixth century is a settling of tax collection in the sphere of those with the most 
social, economic, and political capital: large landholders like the Apions. Whereas the 
independent brothers, relative nobodies, could not bring any social sway to bear on those with 
whom they were dealing, the Apion pronoetai were direct representatives of those with the most 
sway. Thus it was also in the best interest of the imperial government, seeking the steady flow of 
taxes from Egypt to Constantinople, to have these large holders collect taxes.  
This leads to the question posed at the beginning of the chapter, whether it was through 
reward or compulsion that the imperial government persuaded large landholders to do their 
bidding. If the system at work in the Papnouthis and Dorotheos archive was subsumed into the 
system in place on the Apion estate, the money making process that such collectors benefitted 
from at the margins in the fourth century would also have been subsumed into the lower level 
management of the estate. Indeed, the two points at which money could be made in the fourth 
                                                
86 P.Oxy. 48.3393 and 3420. 
87 See Chapter 4. 
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century system, the loan from the private lender to the collectors and the speculation in gold 
markets, were brought into the estate’s favor in the sixth century. First, the additional 15% on 
grain and the flat fee in gold that the pronoetai had to pay the estate for the privilege of holding the 
position were functionally equivalent to the interest that Papnouthis and Dorotheos had to pay to 
the lender in the fourth century.88 Second, the Apion pronoetai would also have needed to 
transmute billon and kind into gold, engaging in the gold market in the process. The several gold 
payments made by the pronoetai to the trapezites over the course of the year may be seen as evidence 
of their engagement in this sort of activity. The increasing proportion of collections in money for 
both rents and taxes would have sweetened the proposition of taking over the role of rent and tax 
collections for the estates, since the opportunity for money making at the margins would have 
likewise increased. 
 
3.6 SCALE 
Based on the entries in P.Oxy. 16.2032, an account of payments from several people, Hardy 
counted entries from pronoetai for 20 prostasiai, which Ruffini has convincingly revised down to 
16.89 This gives the minimum possible number of prostasiai administered by the Apion estate, 
though both Hardy and Ruffini allow that there could have been several more. Using the aggregate 
target lemmata from all the Apion prostasiai in P.Oxy. 16.1918 and 18.2196v, along with the target 
lemmata from the extant pronoetes accounts, i.e. individual prostasiai, it is possible to estimate the 
total number of Apion prostasiai. From there it is possible to take the amounts that each pronoetes 
                                                
88 This is essentially rent seeking behavior: the Apions were granted a government monopoly on tax collection and 
could therefore seek rents from those who wished to undertake the activity. 
89 Hardy 1931, 82; Ruffini 2008, 107. Some names and locations are repeated. 
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needed to pay the estate each year for the privilege of collection, known from P.Oxy. 1.136, the 
pronoetes contract, and determine how many solidi the estate stood to gain from employing pronoetai 
in collecting taxes: total lemmata ÷ pronoetes lemmata = number of prostasiai; number of prostasiai × 
12 solidi = solidi gained from pronoetai annually. Taking 15% of the target grain lemmata from P.Oxy. 
18.2196.v, it is also possible to determine the total number of artabas the pronoetai contributed to 
the Apion estate on top of their mandated collections. These two numbers represent the intrinsic 
benefits which accrued to the Apions for their collection of taxes. 
There are six pronoetes accounts for which the gross lemmata in wheat and money are extant 
or can be calculated. Because the ratio of wheat to gold in these collections is not consistent across 
the accounts (ranging from 2.3:1 to 11.3:1 artabas : solidi), it is not possible simply to take either 
the grain lemmata or money lemmata from the pronoetes accounts and compare them to the grain or 
money lemmata from the higher level account. Instead, it is necessary to determine the value of the 
entire lemmata, cash and wheat combined, of a pronoetes account to see if a suitable paradigmatic 
number can be arrived at. Applying the adaeratio figure from P.Oxy. 16.1909, 10 artabas to the 
solidus, to the wheat lemmata in each of the pronoetes accounts, and adding this to the cash lemmata 
yields the total value in solidi of the target collections for each of the prostasiai represented in the 
accounts. In five of the six accounts, dating from the 550s to the 590s, the value of the combined 
lemmata in solidi is quite consistent, between 750 and 830 solidi, with an average of just under 800 
solidi.90 We may say, then, that a pronoetes’ target collection from a paradigmatic prostasia was valued 
at about 800 solidi per year. A similar total value figure can be determined for the aggregate target 
                                                
90 The outlier at 517.25 solidi is P.Oxy. 16.1914, whose figures came from the calculations determining the surplus at 
the end of the account, after deductions had already been made, so this number may be low. Cf. P.Oxy. 18.2195 and 
19.2243a. Including P.Oxy. 16.1914 drops the average to a comparable 750 solidi. The average, excluding either P.Oxy. 
16.1911 or 55.3804, since these accounts are for the same prostasia, remains essentially unchanged. 
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lemmata in P.Oxy. 18.2196.v, yielding an aggregate lemmata value of just over 29,400 solidi.91 
Dividing this total by the paradigmatic average, gives a figure of about 37 prostasiai in 586/7. There 
are no lemmata sitou figures in P.Oxy. 16.1918, the document most similar to P.Oxy. 18.2196.v, so 
that its total value is equal to its cash lemmata, just over 14,325 solidi. This gives a figure of about 
18 prostasiai in 542. 
Table 192 
Date Account
--------- P.Oxy Art choin sol kar Denarii
556 16.1914 1342 8 390.5521 -180 3.504 517.2521
557 16.1911 1509.25 1 647.125 2800 2.3323 798.6333
566 16.1912 3941.25 7 410 50375 9.6132 814.6198
566 55.3804 1509.25 1 647.125 2800 2.3323 798.6333
576 18.2195 4008.75 6 353.5729 5700 11.338 755.6354
590 19.2243a 3245.25 2 507.8542 -108 1006 6.4473 828.0888
542 16.1918.v 14325.19 14325.19
586/7 18.2196.v 108816.5 18512 191.75 5.8756 29401.64
Grain Money Ratio  
art:sol
Tot. val. in 
sol.
Each account represents collections made by a pronoetes in cash and kind on one prostasia. Valuing grain at 10 artabas 
to the solidus, based on adaeratio rates in other papyri, the rightmost column shows the total value to be collected from 
each prostasia. 
 
 Hickey has laid out several possible explanations for the significant increase in the money 
lemmata over the 45 years between P.Oxy. 16.1918 and P.Oxy. 18.2196.v: investment and increased 
productivity (the position of Banaji and Sarris), the acquisition of more land, expansion of fiscal 
obligations (the number of people whose taxes the Apions collected), or increases in tax levels.93 
The prostasiai numbers above narrow the possibilities significantly. The calculation of the overall 
value of the prostasiai lemmata show that their production levels were relatively uniform from one 
year to the next, and that they remained consistent over the course of more than thirty years. It 
also militates against tax increases as an explanation, since that would cause the per prostasia 
                                                
91 (108,816.5 kankellos artabas ÷ 10) + 18512 solidi + (191.75 karats ÷ 24). 
92 *At 4800 den. to the sol. From P.Oxy. 55.3804, and assuming a rate of 10 art/sol. 
93 Hickey 2008, 99. 
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lemmata to rise.94 Land acquisition and the expansion of fiscal obligations, then, are the 
explanations left. If the two upper level accounts are comparable, then the number of prostasiai for 
which the Apion estate was responsible doubled over the course of 45 years. The stability of the 
per prostasia lemmata further suggests that, if the increase in overall lemmata is attributable to 
expanded fiscal obligation, then it must have gone hand-in-hand with an increase in the number of 
prostasiai the Apions were responsible for. Whether the lemmata from these additional prostasiai 
were predominantly from lessees or neighbors who paid taxes is unclear, so that the expansion of 
the fiscal obligations could certainly have made up the lion’s share of the increase in lemmata. 
 Having an idea of the number of prostasiai for which the Apions were responsible also gives 
an idea of the intrinsic benefits of tax collection that accrued to the Apions. If the pronoetes 
contract of P.Oxy. 1.136 is taken to be standard, then for each of the pronoetai the estate employed 
it could expect to receive 12 solidi in gold each year: 216 solidi in 542 and to 444 solidi in 586.95 
Even more significant is the additional 15% of wheat the pronoetai would have contributed to the 
collections. The total amount of wheat to be collected by the pronoetai in 586/7 is 108,816.5+ 
kankellos artabas.96 Again, if P.Oxy. 1.136 is taken to be representative, then 15% of that figure was 
contributed by the pronoetai, some 16,322 artabas, worth more than 1,632 solidi at the adaeration 
rate in P.Oxy. 16.1909. This gives as a grand total in 586/7 more than 2,073 solidi to the Apions 
for the trouble of collecting their neighbors’ taxes. This is about 7% of the estate’s total target 
lemmata for that year. 
 
                                                
94 Even if the estate reduced its rents proportionally to a tax increase, the strictly tax collections made from small 
owners would have increased the total lemmata of the prostasia. 
95 12 solidi × 18 prostasiai = 216 solidi in 542; 12 × 37 = 444 in 586/7. 
96 Since lemmata sitou are absent from P.Oxy. 19.1918.v, a similar figure cannot be calculated for the earlier period. 
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
 The pronoetes accounts of the Apion estate record the collection of rents and taxes from 
tenants and independent small holders, and also the expenditures on estate expenses; provide the 
balance in cash and kind; and detail how surpluses were dealt with. In the accounting of grain by 
the pronoetai, the metron and kankellos artabas are used. The difference between the two is strictly 
one of accounting, the former being exclusive of extra charges, the latter inclusive. The use of these 
accounting terms implies the expenditure of more grain than was collected. While the most 
complete extant account, P.Oxy. 55.3804, suggests that this additional grain was for the embole 
payment, other accounts are harder to interpret. This difficulty of interpretation stems from the 
fact that the pronoetes accounts do not provide a system-wide perspective.  
The practice of adaeratio further complicates an understanding of the accounts, but it can 
begin to explain the apparent contradiction of a monetized economy and productive autarky at 
work side by side. Because the estates collected both grain and money for both rents and taxes, but 
prioritized paying taxes in grain, they were able to transmute their grain rents into money. 
Nevertheless the contracts of the pronoetai show that they were personally responsible for acquiring 
this additional grain, and were also obligated to give the estate a fixed amount of solidi annually for 
the privilege of the position. Because these obligations outstripped their wages, the pronoetai must 
have used their position to extract the amount of their obligation and more to make a living. 
Petitions from georgoi and contracts involving overseers similar to the pronoetai show that the 
extractions were made from the lessees and small holders from whom the pronoetai made their 
collections.  
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The fourth century archive of Papnouthis and Dorotheos provides details about a nascent 
form of the activities carried out by the Apion pronoetai, and shows the process by which they 
could make money. The nature of the difficulties the brothers encountered and the solution 
provided by the fully formed system used by the Apions show how large estates could have 
benefitted from collecting taxes.  
Finally, a quantitative comparison of the value of the lemmata of a paradigmatic prostasia to 
the value of the lemmata for the estate as a whole at points in the sixth century 45 years apart 
demonstrates a near doubling of the number of prostasiai in that period. This result suggests that 
the dramatic rise in gold lemmata during that period is attributable to the acquisition of more land 
or an expansion of fiscal responsibilities. The analysis also shows that the intrinsic benefits gained 
by the estate for the collection of their own and their neighbors’ taxes amounted to about 7% of 
their total gross income. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TAX COLLECTION ON TWO TIERS 
 
The tax collection system in Oxyrhynchus under the Apions can be described broadly as 
operating on two tiers. There was a relationship between the collectors (such as the pronoetai) and 
the estate, and another one between the estate and the imperial government. In the previous 
chapter a distinction was drawn between intrinsic and extrinsic benefits to the Apions from their 
tax collection activities. The papyri from Oxyrhynchus provide a great deal of evidence for 
evaluating the intrinsic benefits at the lower levels of Apion administration and the variety of ways 
in which the estate stood to gain from drawing money and produce upwards. But the processes by 
which the Apions derived extrinsic benefits from their fiscal relationship with the government—not 
drawn upwards from the rural peasantry, but flowing downwards from the imperial government—
did not leave behind a comparable record in the papyri or the literary sources. Most obviously this 
is owed to the provenance of the surviving papyri, Oxyrhynchus, which was not where most 
records of the high level dealings were kept. We simply do not have anything like the Papnouthis 
and Dorotheos archive or the Apion pronoetes accounts detailing the inner workings of the state-
estate relationship. The lack of direct evidence is the main stumbling block to examining the 
nature of the extrinsic benefits reaped from the Apions’ collection of taxes. In the absence of 
direct evidence, then, a model that can describe the various social and economic circumstances 
influencing the system of tax collection taken up should prove useful. This chapter therefore offers 
a theoretical framework laying out the different possible systems of tax collection on the estate, 
both at the upper and lower tiers, describes the social and economic circumstances associated with 
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each of these systems, and then evaluates which system best suits the circumstances apparent in 
Byzantine Egypt.  
Certain ideas from academic economics and sociology will be brought to bear on the 
economy of late antique Egypt. It is therefore necessary to counter objections to the application of 
concepts from these disciplines to the ancient world.1 Sarris has complained of “attempts to 
impose wholesale on the ancient economy the latest fashions in academic economics, such as the 
so-called ‘New Institutional Economics’. This can have the effect of reducing all past economic 
history to the glibly comparative language of business studies, generating largely ahistorical 
discussion of ‘firms’, ‘rent-seeking activity’ and such like. As the financial crises of the early twenty-
first century have revealed, liberal economists have problems getting to grips with modern 
capitalist society: it seems unlikely that they should have much to offer by way of insight into the 
ancient or medieval worlds.”2 A few points can be made in response to these claims. First, it is 
possible to apply aspects of modern economic theories to ancient economies without imposing 
them wholesale. Second, it is not the case that if the application of ideas from one area of modern 
academic economics to ancient economies is unsuccessful, that the application of ideas from any 
area of modern economics will also be unsuccessful. Third, the mere fact of a phenomenon not 
                                                
1 The bibliography on this subject is vast. The starting point of the modern formulation is Finley 1973 and 1999 
(=1973 updated and revised), arguing against the applicability of certain economic theories to the ancient world. 
Lyttkens 2010, 505 n. 1, offers a concise justification of economic analysis in ancient history: “The use of economic 
analysis in this context has been criticized on the grounds that economic life was ‘embedded’ in antiquity so that 
market forces played no independent part. This arguably is a matter of degree. On the one hand, much economic 
behaviour in the modern world is also ‘embedded’, so the ancient world was not that different. On the other hand, 
embeddedness leaves considerable scope for analyses based in institutional economics, which emphasizes social norms, 
interaction between economic and social domains, and people’s beliefs.” See Morris 1994 for another evaluation of 
the terms of the debate twenty years after Finley’s Sather lectures on which his 1973 book was based. Lyttkens 2013, 
passim and 6–13 especially, defends further the use of certain economic theories, and new institutional economics in 
particular.  
2 Sarris 2011, 259. Ronald Coase’s 1991 Nobel Prize speech, “The Institutional Structure of Production,” offers a 
primer on the intellectual basis of new institutional economics.  
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being named or recognized in the past does not mean that the phenomenon did not exist, nor that 
applying the modern label given to the newly recognized phenomenon makes its application 
ahistorical. Finally, the fact that modern economic theories failed to predict future events, does 
not mean that they cannot accurately describe events of the past. To be sure, there are limitations 
to the approach, the most significant being that it does not readily admit of quantitative analysis, 
e.g., determining the scale of the benefits. Still, it permits a narrowing of the range of relationships 
the Apions are likely to have had with the imperial government, and can point in the direction of 
candidates suitable for historical analogy, the subject of the next chapter.3 
Investigations into methods of tax collection in different periods and places have revealed 
three broad headings under which relationships between the state and the collectors fall: share, 
rent,4 and wage.5 Under a share system the actual collections are counted and a predetermined 
proportion of those collections go to the collector. Under a rent system—often referred to as tax 
farming—a collector pays some portion of the anticipated collections to the state, which grants him 
the exclusive right of collection. The collector keeps as his compensation any residual collected 
beyond the amount paid to the state. In wage systems the collector’s compensation depends not on 
the amount collected or expected to be collected, but on the level of effort expended in collecting 
taxes. Thus an agreed upon amount is paid for the service of collection and all collections are 
handed over to the state.6 
                                                
3 Another method with which Sarris 2011 takes issue, strangely since he relies heavily on analogies to Anglo-Norman 
England. 
4 “Rent” is used sensu lato in this chapter to refer to agreements in which the rights to something of value are handed 
over for a given period in exchange for money. In this case, the right to collect taxes is the thing of value. In order to 
avoid ambiguity, the word “lease” rather than “rent” will be used to refer to the specific type of rent agreement in 
which money is paid to a landowner for the use of land.  
5 Azabou and Nugent 1988; Coşgel and Miceli 2009. 
6 Coşgel and Miceli 2009. 
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 Each system relies on the state measuring a different cost associated with collecting the 
taxes: counting the actual collections after the fact (revenues), estimating anticipated collections 
accurately before the fact (the tax base), and monitoring the efforts of collectors. Which system of 
collection emerges, according to Coşgel and Miceli, depends on the relative magnitude of these 
three costs. If actual revenues are easier to measure than either the tax base or the effort of 
collectors, then share agreements are the norm. If it is comparatively easy to measure the tax base, 
then rent agreements predominate. If the efforts of the collectors can be easily and reliably 
monitored, then the wage model emerges. The relative magnitude of these three costs are in turn 
influenced by a number of social and economic circumstances observed in a variety of historical 
milieux and outlined by Coşgel and Miceli. Their model essentially establishes the causal link for 
the correlated sets of circumstances and collection systems. Therefore, wherever a set of 
circumstances can be observed, the correlated system of collection is implied. Operating on the 
assumption set out in Chapter 3 that the Apion estate would not collect taxes absent some reward 
or compulsion, the model can be useful in evaluating a relationship for which there is little direct 
evidence, as is the case for the relationship between the Apions and the imperial government. In 
the presence of a certain set of social and economic circumstances, one or another of the types of 
relationship can be expected to emerge more probably. Determining which set of circumstances 
most closely aligns with those observable in Byzantine Egypt can point to which type of 
relationship is most likely to have emerged there. 
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4.1 TESTING THE MODEL 
Because the system governing the relationship between collector and state is readily 
apparent from the evidence in the archive of Papnouthis and Dorotheos, it can serve as an 
instructive test case for whether Coşgel and Miceli’s model is broadly applicable to late antique 
Egypt. Letters in the archive state explicitly that the brothers borrowed a certain amount, handed 
that over to a representative of the state, then made their collections and kept any excess for 
themselves—a clear example of the rent system. Coşgel and Miceli observe that a rent relationship 
is preferred when a tax is difficult to count due to the inconsistent suitability of the produce 
involved (since this raises the costs of counting revenue and monitoring collectors).7 Just so in 
P.Oxy. 48.3400 where Papnouthis complains that he has found barley contaminating a village’s 
wheat contributions. They also note the difficulty posed by differing standards of measurement in 
the areas of collection.8 In that same letter Papnouthis expresses doubts that the measure used by 
the inhabitants of the village is actually equal to the kankellos demosios measure. 9  
A rent relationship is also preferred if the size of the tax base is particularly variable. This is 
because, in contrast to a wage or share system, when the tax base is particularly variable, a state can 
still expect to receive a steady level of revenue under a rent system. Coşgel and Miceli point to a 
number of external factors which increase the variability of a tax base, including inflation, 
population changes, and political upheaval.10 All of these are prominent features of the so-called 
crisis of the third century. Runaway inflation is evident in the Heroninus archive after about 270 
                                                
7 Coşgel and Miceli 2009, 411. 
8 Coşgel and Miceli 2009, 411. 
9 While the metron and the kankellos artabas appear to have measured the same volume (at least by the fifth century), 
there were numerous other types of artaba as well, including the mega metron and micron metron, which do appear to 
have been local measures. 
10 Coşgel and Miceli 2009, 413. 
 
 
86 
CE, and was only resolved in Egypt after Constantine’s introduction of the gold solidus around 
310.11 Precise population figures are notoriously difficult to come by for the late Roman Empire, 
even in Egypt where census were taken every fourteen years until the end of the third century.12 
Still, even in the fourth century Egypt was recovering from the Cyprian plague of the previous half 
century, which may have seriously affected the population there.13 The disarray during the fifty 
years between the reigns of Severus Alexander and Diocletian, when at least fifty-one different 
people were called emperor, have been characterized as “among the most disruptive ever 
experienced by the Roman Empire.”14 The archive of Papnouthis and Dorotheos comes then in 
the wake of a period of extremely high volatility. Under these circumstances, Coşgel and Miceli’s 
model predicts that tax collection would have occurred under a rent system, which the direct 
evidence from the Papnouthis and Dorotheos archive confirms. The method I propose in 
examining the aspects of the Apion estate for which direct evidence is lacking is to work 
backwards, identifying the circumstances conducive to a particular system of collection on each 
tier. 
 
4.2 THE SYSTEM OF COLLECTION ON THE LOWER TIER 
The fact that Apion pronoetai received an annual salary and handed over their collections 
suggests a wage model. Yet they also paid the estate at a predetermined level, plus a premium for 
                                                
11 Rathbone 1991, 5 and Appendix 2. 
12 Corbier 2005 (CAH 12), 398. See also Bagnall and Frier 1994. 
13 Corbier 2005 (CAH 12), 398. See also Tate 1992, 300–301. On the epidemiology of the Cyprian plague see Conrad 
1981, 70–71. 
14 Drinkwater 2005 (CAH 12), 28. 
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the privilege of collecting,15 and, as I argued in Chapter 3, they used their position both to provide 
themselves with capital for speculation and to extract from the peasantry what they could over and 
above the amount required by the apaitesima. Such behavior is much more characteristic of the 
rent model, wherein collectors “recoup their investments and make a profit on what they are 
legally entitled to collect—and often on what they can get away with collecting beyond that.”16 
There is evidence that the Apion estate was accustomed to enter into rent contracts for collection 
of revenues other than taxes. P.Oxy. 58.3958 is a contract between the estate and a collector of 
urban rents in Oxyrhynchus. The collector is to pay the estate 125 solidi for the right to collect 
from some of the estate’s urban holdings, that is, on a rent contract. The hybrid practice of the 
pronoetai is perhaps the vestige of the system under which Papnouthis and Dorotheos operated, 
wherein the private functions of the fourth century pronoetai (wage laborers) were distinct from the 
operations of the tax collectors (rent contractors). The minuscule level of wage payment to the 
Apion pronoetai compared to the annual fee they were obligated to pay the estate is evidence of the 
predominance of the rent model in their relationship with the estate.17 Therefore, as the tax 
collection responsibilities began to fall under the purview of the pronoetai, the wage aspect of their 
employment took on a secondary role.  
Like Papnouthis and Dorotheos did with the state, and the urban collector did with the 
estate, the Apion pronoetai maintained a rent contract relationship with the Apion estate. The rent 
charged the pronoetai by the estate was the value of the apaitesima, minus remissions, plus the 
annual contracted money payment and an additional 15% on wheat; their compensation rested in 
                                                
15 This is the 12 solidi and 15% on grain collections stipulated in the pronoetes contract P.Oxy. 1.136.  
16 Levi 1988, 72. 
17 The wage: P.Oxy. 55.3804.154, 16.1912.130, 18.2195.89. The annual fee: P.Oxy. 1.136. 
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the possible extraction of further collections—the perquisites discussed in Chapter 3—and the 
availability of capital for speculation.18 One objection to this characterization is that the pronoetai 
of the Apion estate did not borrow money up front to pay the estate in advance, and instead paid 
their money collections in installments after the fact.19 However, other historical instances of the 
rent model are consistent with payments made to the state from rent contractors in installments 
only after collections had been made, like those made by the Apion pronoetai.20 The installments 
paid after partial collection still diminished variance and allowed the estate and the pronoetai to 
benefit from speculation.  
Under such a rent system, the apaitesima look like an attempt to estimate the tax base. The 
apparent invariability or “fossilization”21 of these documents, at least during the nine years between 
P.Oxy. 16.1911 (557) and 55.3804 (566),22 might indicate that by the sixth century the variability of 
the tax base had diminished—an argument against the rent model. The accounting practices, 
discussed in Chapter 3, however, likely mask what variability there was, since failures to collect 
were reflected in the expenditure portions of the pronoetai accounts. In the absence of a 
mechanism to account for increases in collection relative to the apaitesimon, those documents 
would have been the high-end estimates of anticipated revenue. Over the longer term, however, it 
does appear that estimations of the tax base, as reflected in higher-level accounts such as P.Oxy. 
18.2196.v and 16.1918.v, separated by some 40 years, changed significantly.23 But even if the 
variability of the tax base had diminished, and the amelioration of the problems of inflation and 
                                                
18 The 15% on wheat and the annual payment were ways for the estate to benefit from the perquisites available to the 
pronoetai.  
19 See, e.g., P.Oxy. 16.1911 and 55.3804. 
20 Kiser 1994, 301.  
21 “Fossilized”: Hickey 2008, 20 n. 135. 
22 Assuming that the lemmata portions of the accounts are reflective of the apaitesima. 
23 Hickey 2008. 
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political instability by the sixth century would indicate that it should have, the other advantages 
offered by a rent system would have resulted in institutional inertia.24 Moreover, the possibility of 
the upper and lower tiers of the Apion estate’s tax collection scheme operating on different 
systems or on the same system under different terms allows for the lower level to deal with variance 
in the tax base on the local scale (e.g., crop failure, damage to levies) while the terms of the 
arrangement between the upper tier and the imperial government operated under terms consistent 
with low variance circumstances. That is to say, the use of the pronoetai as subcontractors on rent 
contracts shifted the risks entailed in the inherent variance to that lower tier.  
Coşgel and Miceli also note that the cost of measuring the tax base is reduced when an 
established system of accounting is in place.25 This is why, they argue, rent contractors have 
historically been employed to collect taxes from larger enterprises, where bookkeeping permits 
accurate estimation of production and therefore the appropriate level of taxation, than from small 
shops, for which such estimates are more difficult.26 The incorporation of tax collection into the 
carefully accounted private rent collection system in the transition from the fourth to the sixth 
century would have aided in estimating the tax base, and therefore been conducive to the rent 
system.  
 On the lower tier, then, the Apion estate collected taxes under a rent contract with the 
pronoetai they employed. Because the nature of a rent contract does not require close accounting of 
collections to ensure the reliability of the collectors, the pronoetes accounts and the related 
apaitesima were therefore more probably attempts to estimate the tax base, a repurposed vestige of 
                                                
24 The persistence of rent systems due to the other beneficial features they offer is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
25 Coşgel and Miceli 2009, 412. 
26 Coşgel and Miceli 2009, 212. 
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the wage rental collection system of earlier centuries. Indeed, in other milieux those sectors with 
detailed bookkeeping records were more likely to have their taxes collected using the rent system 
because those records were more conducive to accurate estimates of the tax base. By using a rent 
system on its lower tier, the estate could effectively transfer the risks associated with variance to the 
lower tier. In doing so, the estate was able to ensure a relatively stable revenue stream from the 
rents and taxes for which they had collection rights. 
 
4.3 THE SYSTEM OF COLLECTION ON THE UPPER TIER 
The taxes collected by the lower administrative tier of the Apion estate and handed to the 
upper tier were at some point passed along to the imperial government,27 again on the basis of 
either a share agreement, a rent agreement, or a wage agreement.28 It is not necessarily the case that 
the upper and lower tiers operated on the same system. There have existed multi-tiered systems in 
which a bureau might oversee collectors operating on one system, which itself operated under a 
different system, and was monitored by another tier on still another system.29 There is an Egyptian 
precedent for such a multi-tiered system, albeit on a smaller scale than that of the Apion estate. In 
P.Fay. 34 (161 CE) Heron buys the right to collect certain taxes from a pair of boethoi (the very title 
Papnouthis carried in his tax collecting capacity), who were themselves contracted to collect. As 
                                                
27 Money being fungible, it is not necessarily the case that collections from one year were handed to the state in that 
same year. It will be argued that payment in anticipation of collection was an important part of the arrangement 
between the upper tier and the state. 
28 This is again premised on the assumption that the Apions would not undertake to do something onerous in the 
absence of some motivation.  
29 Coşgel and Miceli 2009, 410. See also Kiser 1994, especially 294. 
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Wallace points out, Heron’s reference to former years as precedent for the agreement indicates the 
practice was not uncommon.30 
The pronoetai collecting taxes on the lower tier of the Apion administration were for all 
intents and purposes subcontractors like Heron was in the second century, and the set of 
circumstances directing their relationship with the estate was different from the set dictating the 
relationship between the estate and the state. The circumstances which made the rent system most 
attractive on the lower tier were the relatively low cost of estimating the tax base and relatively high 
costs of monitoring collectors and counting revenue. One of the factors Coşgel and Miceli observe 
as inflating the cost of counting revenue is the difficulty of counting collections in kind. As argued 
in Chapter 3, by the time the Apion collections had been handed to the upper tier of 
administration, grain had been passed along for the embole or, along with billon, transmuted into 
gold. Therefore the problems associated with quantifying collections in kind were resolved, and 
the upper tier could deal with the state strictly in solidi. Finally, the relative monitoring costs may 
have been lower in the relationship between the upper tier of the Apion estate and the imperial 
government. Collections from the estates at this level were made by a fully-fledged government 
bureaucracy, more effective at monitoring and requiring less monitoring itself.31 Thus the factors 
making the rent system most attractive on the lower tier were absent on the upper tier. It cannot 
therefore be assumed that the relationship at the upper tier with the imperial government was also 
based on a rent contract simply because that was the system at the lower tier.  
Even in the absence of these circumstances on the upper tier, the rent model would 
nevertheless have been attractive to the imperial government by making capital available in the 
                                                
30 Wallace 1938, 290.  
31 Coşgel and Miceli 2009, 414; Kiser 1994, 290 and passim. 
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form of advance loans secured by future collections of taxes—a circumstance notably absent from 
the Apion pronoetes accounts. Kiser has noted the tendency of rent systems using small-scale 
distributed tax farmers, like Papnouthis and Dorotheos, to consolidate over time into larger and 
larger syndicates.32 This phenomenon can be observed in historical milieux as disparate as 
Republican Rome and early-modern France,33 and therefore, he suggests, reflects a general 
trajectory of rent systems over time. Levi and Matthews argue that for Rome and France, 
respectively, this tendency stemmed from the role tax farmers assumed as de facto central bankers, 
able to loan money to the government.34 “Tax farming is as much a banking as a taxing system,” 
Levi notes, because tax farmers possessed sufficient capital to advance money, secured by the right 
to collect from taxpayers, to the government.35 As capital requirements of the government grew, 
the capital necessary to advance payments did as well; therefore smaller tax farming operations 
consolidated into larger ones.  
Coşgel and Miceli, however, point to instances of rent contracts in which the collector 
himself took out a loan in order to cover the amount required by the government, as we see in the 
Papnouthis and Dorotheos archive, or in which payment was not advanced, as was the case for the 
Apion pronoetai. Such cases undermine Levi’s assumption that tax farmers needed to possess 
significant capital. In the former case Coşgel and Miceli argue that the state could have simply 
gone to the same creditors as the collectors did in order to acquire capital on loan. But as Azabou 
and Nugent note, “since it had generally proved difficult for creditors to make sovereigns pay, until 
                                                
32 Kiser 2003. 
33 Levi 1988, 78; Matthews 1958, 36–42. These examples are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
34 Levi 1988, 77–78; Matthews 1958, 13–15. 
35 Levi 1988, 77. 
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relatively recently the state...lacked the power to borrow on its own.”36 Because they could be 
pressed by private lenders, collectors like Papnouthis and Dorotheos served as a buffer between the 
state and those with money to lend. So while they did not themselves possess capital, they were an 
essential intermediary for the state to acquire capital on loan.  
In the case of the Apion pronoetai, money yet to be collected could, of course, not be 
handed over. But the state’s relationship was with the estate rather than directly with the pronoetai, 
and so the availability of lending capital was only a matter of cash-flow for the estate. It is therefore 
attractive to attribute consolidation rent contract system of several small-scale collectors, of which 
Papnouthis and Dorotheos are an example in the fourth century, into the sixth century synteleiai 
(colleges of landowners) Gascou describes to the increasing importance of the tax farming system 
in making capital available to the imperial government.37  
But even if the use of rent contracts in tax collection did not arise and the collectors did 
not consolidate as a result of their ability to lend capital to the state, the availability of loans to the 
state could still have been a significant effect of it. In the sixth century Justinian embarked on 
numerous wars of conquest which, aside from the inherent costs of warfare, sometimes also 
involved payments of large tributes. So for instance the peace with Persia negotiated in 561/2 had 
Constantinople paying out 30,000 solidi per year, with the first seven years paid up front.38 This 
amounts to nearly 3,000 pounds of gold for the upfront payment, and more than 400 pounds 
                                                
36 Azabou and Nugent 1988, 686. 
37 On synteleiai see Gascou 1985, 49–52. 
38 Cameron 2000 (CAH 14), 84. The terms of the settlement are given in Menander Protector (Blockley 1981, fr. 6). 
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annually in subsequent years.39 The government therefore certainly had an interest in acquiring 
gold in short order, increasing the value of a rent system able to provide advances on taxes. As 
Hickey has argued, there was a limited level of agricultural capital investment possible for the 
Apions in Oxyrhynchus, and acts of munificence and lavish expenditure were legally constrained.40 
Acting as a creditor to the imperial government was one of the few uses of capital available to the 
Apions that would have generated returns. 
As I argue in Chapter 3 social factors also contributed to the transformation of the tax 
collection system from the fourth to the sixth centuries. The difficulties posed by the collectors’ 
social status and the increased risk it forced them to assume made the business unattractive to 
small-scale collectors,41 and therefore unattractive to the imperial government which could no 
longer reliably receive tax revenue or loans in anticipation of collection. The difficulties faced by 
Papnouthis and Dorotheos indicate that in the fourth century the risks were beginning to 
outweigh the potential rewards.42 Azabou and Nugent describe the progression of similar situations 
in other historical contexts. When tax collectors could no longer carry out their duties—whether 
because of their own insolvency or their unwillingness—the state would take over “on an 
                                                
39 An aid to visualizing this quantity: a modern 400 troy ounce gold bar is about 38.5 Byzantine pounds. The initial 
payment to the Persians would therefore have been the equivalent of about 78 modern gold bars. This is about as 
much gold as one could fit in a small refrigerator. 
40 Hickey 2007, 302: “It would not have taken much gold to exhaust the local investment possibilities: an expenditure 
of 20 per cent of the estate’s after-tax income (~2,600 solidi) on improvements would have been sufficient to build 
approximately 260 sawaqi, enough mechanai to irrigate over 2,000 arourai; i.e., about 5.5 km2. This level of expenditure 
for irrigation was surely not needed annually (if in any year) on the estate.” Sawaqi is the Arabic plural for saqiya, the 
geared water lifting device common on the Apion estate. For restrictions on munificence and lavish expenditure, see 
Bagnall et al. 1987, 10–12. 
41 The rent therefore required to entice collectors to take the bid would have been unacceptably low for the imperial 
government. 
42 Ruffini in an unpublished paper given at the 2005 meeting of the APA argues that the brothers’ move from the 
private to the public arenas was a poor business move.  
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emergency basis.”43 This is precisely what occurred in Oxyrhynchus in the late first century, 
another period when the system of rent contracts for tax collection was in transition.44 P.Oxy. 1.44 
is a letter from the strategus of the Oxyrhynchite nome to the basilicogrammateus about the difficulty 
of finding collectors willing to take on collection contracts. The collectors claimed that they had 
incurred losses enough already, but the strategus was going to review the contracts to make the 
terms more favorable to the collectors. Despite apparent efforts to sweeten the deal for collectors, 
Jones writes, “the supply of voluntary contractors dried up, and officials were ordered to collect the 
tax and pay in the sum reached on the previous bid…The official would have to make good the 
deficit out of his salary, or, more probably, charge an extra percentage on the taxpayers.”45 In order 
to resolve this problem, Azabou and Nugent continue, the state would turn to larger tax farms on 
longer term contracts, which brought about “a concentration of tax farms in the hands of a few 
large and wealthy merchant-banker-tax farmers.”46  
Tax reforms carried out under Trajan in the late first and early second century and 
intended to remove the burden of shortfalls from the collectors point to just how this tranmission 
of responsibility to the wealthy and prominent might occur. In order to relieve the difficulties 
facing collectors who failed to extract the amount owed from the taxpayers, the government 
instituted the µερισµὸς ἀνακεχωρηκότων and the µερισµὸς ἀπόρων, which divided any shortfall 
among the inhabitants able to pay.47 Those wealthier inhabitants would therefore have been 
invested with a personal motive to ensure that their neighbors paid their taxes. The move from 
                                                
43 Azabou and Nugent 1988, 686. 
44 Jones 1974, 166–168. 
45 Jones 1974, 168. 
46 Azabou and Nugent 1988, 686. 
47 Wallace 1938, 135–146. 
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that position, in which the wealthy bore all of the risk and reaped none of the potential benefits, 
to actually collecting taxes themselves (and so benefitting in some way), is not difficult to imagine. 
Faced with similar problems centuries later, estates like the Apions’, following the trajectory 
described by Azabou and Nugent, filled the role the prosperous villagers had in the earlier period, 
but availed themselves of some of the rewards in addition to taking on the risks.  
It should be noted that these were not changes to a different system of collection (rent to 
share or rent to wage), but changes in the implementation of the same rent contract system. In the 
example of first century Oxyrhynchus, the rent contract system remained after collections were 
assumed by government officials, but the use of bids to award the collection contract had been 
removed. Instead, the award was given directly to an official on the same basis previously set by 
auction. The same is true of a transition from the Papnouthis and Dorotheos situation to the 
Apion situation. Once a long-term rent contract had been awarded to local elites (e.g., the Apions) 
auctions could no longer be used to determine an appropriate level of payment expected from 
collectors in exchange for the right to collect. The continuity of the regions for which the Apions 
collected over long periods, evinced especially by the near identity of the epoikia collected from in 
P.Oxy. 16.1911 and 55.3804, indicates that the regions of collection were fixed once acquired. 
Bidding at auction for shorter-term contracts would have involved changes in the areas for which 
the estate was collecting. More likely, then, estates engaged in direct negotiation with the 
government for the right to collect over long periods. In such direct bargaining situations, Coşgel 
and Miceli describe two mechanisms by which the payment level was set depending on the 
volatility of the tax base: conducting frequent surveys of the tax base or using the results of a 
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previous auction.48 The accounts of the pronoetai, and presumably the apaitesima, provided such a 
survey of the tax base drawn based on previous years. 
Under a rent system, it makes little sense for the contracting body, here the Apion estate, 
to require that its collectors keep detailed records to ensure their square dealing. An advantage of 
the rent system is that it obviates the need for monitoring the efforts of tax collectors,49 since the 
rent charged the collectors is determined ex ante based on the estimated tax base. Once the 
representative of the state had received the amount required of Papnouthis and Dorotheos, for 
example, he had little need for an account of what they had actually collected. The incorporation 
of the private aspects of the estate into the tax collection aspects offers one explanation for the 
pronoetai’s detailed records of their collections and expenditures. But rather than a check on the 
honesty of the agents, the purpose of the accounts with respect to tax collection was as an aid in 
the estimation of the tax base for subsequent collection years. Some estimation of the tax base was 
necessary since rent systems of tax collection rely upon estimates of the tax base and the last 
Egyptian census occurred in the latter half of the third century.50 If this observation is correct, by 
the sixth century responsibility for estimating the size of the tax base had fallen from the state to 
the collectors.  
In other historical contexts, the size of the tax base might be measured either by the 
government (strictly speaking, the body contracting the collectors) or by the collectors themselves. 
Coşgel and Miceli argue that when collectors are the ones doing the measuring they might “have 
                                                
48 Coşgel and Miceli 2009, 403. 
49 Aside from ensuring that they do not overburden the tax base with their “extracurricular” collections. See Kiser 
1994, 290.  
50 Bagnall and Frier (1994, 9–11) suggest that the census ended due to a reformation of the tax system. See also 
Montevecchi 1976, 77–84 for an alternate explanation of the cessation. 
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an advantage in measuring [the tax base], owing, for example, to their local knowledge.”51 Such 
advantage, they continue, would be immaterial if there were a number of similarly disposed 
collectors vying for the right of collection because, “collectors will compete away any rents 
associated with their private information,” but “the collectors might be able to capture some rents 
if they are not sufficiently competitive.”52 Under a rent system the combination of superior local 
knowledge and a lack of competition (thanks to the exclusive long-term right to collect for in a 
given area) would have given the Apions the opportunity to extract charges in excess of the 
estimated tax base from the peasantry.53 Significantly, on the lower tier the same local knowledge 
advantage would have accrued to the pronoetai with respect to the Apions.54 In this light, the extra 
15% on wheat and annual payment required of pronoetai perhaps look like the estate’s effort to 
recoup some of the losses arising from the information imbalance. 
In the first century, when the prospects for a tax farmer were not sufficiently good to 
attract bidders, the duty of collection fell upon local officials who could compel payment from 
taxpayers. The same problem was emerging in the fourth century when Papnouthis and Dorotheos 
were operating, and by the sixth century the duty lay not in the hands of government officials but 
in those of rural estate owning local elites, like the Apions, playing the same role as the merchant-
banker-tax farmers Azabou and Nugent describe. Kiser observes that as tax farming operations 
consolidated the state “often allowed local notables to collect a fixed amount of tax. Lump-sum 
negotiated payment collected by locally controlled officials or notables (usually agents of regional 
                                                
51 Coşgel and Miceli 2009, 407. 
52 Coşgel and Miceli 2009, 407. “Rent” is used in the technical economic sense (as in rent-seeking) to mean benefits 
extracted from a monopoly position or exclusive access to information.  
53 E.g., a piece of land was more productive than assumed by the apaitesimon, and therefore further perquisites could 
be extracted. 
54 Kiser 1994, 294 and n. 47 discusses the problem large tax farming operations responsible for determining the tax 
base would have monitoring their own agents when under a wage contract. 
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estates or municipalities) was common in both France and Spain, and in modified form in 
England, for the collection of direct taxes.”55 This trajectory of tax farming systems recurs 
frequently in history, and fits what we know of the Apion estate well. That the estate paid a lump 
sum to the state is suggested by P.Oxy. 1.144 (580 CE), a receipt for gold handed over by an Apion 
trapezites to be taken to Alexandria. Hardy noted that the number of solidi (2,160), excluding the 
fee for obruza, is equivalent to precisely thirty pounds of gold.56 Ruffini, pointing to the three 
collection periods per year, argues that the text suggests “a flat fee for the Apionic estates of 90 
pounds or 6,480 solidi for the full year,” and notes the figure is “remarkably consistent” with the 
6,917 solidi paid in taxes in P.Oxy. 16.1918.v from forty years earlier. 57 The round number in 
P.Oxy. 1.144 suggests that the payment actually made to the state was a negotiated sum rather than 
one arising organically from collections. If the trajectory Kiser describes does fit the Apion 
situation, then the estate’s upper tier operated on a rent system, paying the state a lump sum and 
assuming much wider tax collection responsibilities, formerly held by dispersed small-scale 
collectors. 
The use of the rent system and lump sum payment further explains why the Apions did 
not distinguish between lease collections and tax collections in their accounts. Such a pooling 
together of rents and taxes is wholly intelligible if the estate was operating under a rent contract for 
the collection of taxes. Once the amount the estate would pay the government (i.e., the rent for 
the right to collect) had been determined, whatever they actually collected—whether from lease 
                                                
55 Kiser 1994, 305 n. 2. 
56 Hardy 1931, 56–57. 
57 Ruffini 2008, 105–106. The obruza is not explicitly separated from the payment in P.Oxy. 16.1918.v, which could 
perhaps explain the non-round number there. P.Oxy. 18.2197.v, contemporary with P.Oxy. 1.144, has the much higher 
tax payment of 12,694 solidi from the estate, though Hickey 2008, 94–95 argues that this disparity can be explained by 
adaeration of grain taxes. Hickey’s description of the unpublished P.Oxy. 18.2197.v was not available to Ruffini for his 
2008 book. See also Chapter 3. 
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collections or tax taxes—was the estate’s to keep. Wheat was separated from money, since the state 
deemed it essential to have a supply of grain for the residents of Constantinople and Alexandria, 
and the embole was handled by a different part of the imperial government.58 This division is 
shown explicitly by P.Oxy. 1.126, the transfer of taxation from a father to his daughter discussed in 
Chapter 3, though the possibility of adaeration complicates the picture in the later period. Still, 
separating the governmental arms responsible for grain-related taxes and money taxes dates back to 
the Ptolemaic period when money taxes were first introduced.59 The special treatment of grain 
likely has to do with the transportation infrastructure required to move huge volumes of grain over 
long distances, and the political importance of supplying the staple to cities. Nevertheless, though 
separate from the money, the embole operated on a similar lump sum system, as the occasional 
small surpluses transmuted to money and passed to the trapezites (estate banker) in the Apion 
pronoetes accounts attest. 
 While the upper tier of the Apion estate need not have had the same relationship to the 
imperial government as it had with the collectors who worked under it, a rent contract based on a 
negotiated lump sum is the most likely system governing the relationship between the state and the 
estate. The circumstances making this the most attractive option are quite different from those 
which made the rent system attractive for the relationship with the lower tier. The primary feature 
of the rent system that made it attractive to the imperial government was its ability to make capital 
available before tax collection had been carried out. This feature was also attractive to the estate 
because it offered a means by which it could productively use what capital had been amassed. 
Moreover, rent systems of tax collection tend to consolidate into larger collectives like those 
                                                
58 CJ Nov. 163 remits a year’s taxes, spread over four years, but explicitly exempts wheat taxes from remission. 
59 Wallace 1938, 286ff; Bingen 2007, 160–169. 
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Gascou compared to the Apion administration.60 Because the estate’s payment to the government 
was a lump sum negotiated ex ante, there was no need for the estates to distinguish between their 
collections for rent and taxes. A rent system on the upper tier therefore answers the question of 
why the estate did not concern itself with distinguishing between rents and taxes in its accounts. 
Another implication is that the accounts and the apaitesima were intended for the estates to 
estimate their own tax base in order to maximize their collections relative to the lump sum 
payment to the state.  
 
4.4 A SUMMARY OF THE TWO TIERS WORKING IN CONCERT 
The tax collection system posited for the Apion estate operated on two tiers, both using 
rent contracts, but implemented in different ways and for different reasons. This system resulted in 
the Apion estate collecting more from those for whom it was responsible than it paid to the state, 
and this was a significant source of its wealth. On the lower tier an independent small landholder 
paid his fiscal obligations in kind and in billon as demanded by an Apion pronoetes. The pronoetes, 
pooling other such collections along with lease revenue in kind and billon, dispensed whatever 
wheat had been collected to the boatmen bound for Alexandria, and was paid by the embolator for 
any excess above the estate’s share of the embole. The pronoetes owed the amount stipulated in the 
apaitesimon, less the adjustments detailed in his account, to the estate. But because collections from 
the small holders and lessees were not in gold solidi, he engaged, like Papnouthis and Dorotheos 
had, in speculation to transmute billon and kind into gold. Over the course of the year his 
obligation to the estate was paid in installments to the trapezites, the estate banker, along with 
                                                
60 Gascou 1985, 49-52. 
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whatever money the embolator had given for excess wheat. Both the state and the estate benefitted 
from using pronoetai under these terms because it permitted them to deal strictly in gold for their 
dealings with one another, at the expense of whatever marginal profit was to be had by the 
pronoetai in gold speculation. For the estate, the risk of a poor crop, tax evasion, and failure on the 
speculation market was also shifted to the pronoetai, who were contractually obligated to make up 
any shortfalls from the agreed upon amount.61 Viewing the relationship between the Apion estate 
and the imperial government as similar to the large scale tax farmers who emerged in Europe many 
centuries later goes much of the way toward explaining how the Apion family’s wealth increased in 
the absence of commercialized production. 
 
4.5 IMPLICATIONS OF A TWO-TIERED RENT SYSTEM 
Viewing the relationship between the estate and the state as existing under a rent contract 
for tax collection can also answer a number of questions that have arisen in studies of the estate’s 
role in the Egyptian economy. Clauses in labor contracts stipulating penalties for not upholding 
the terms,62 wage advances treated like loans,63 and the use of pittakia64 (a type of scrip) in lieu of 
cash payment have all been viewed as efforts on the part of land owners to restrict the mobility of 
                                                
61 See P.Oxy. 1.136 especially lines 24–27: εἰ δὲ συµβῇ τι ἔχθεσιν γενέσθαι ἐν τοῖς προγεγραµµένοις κτήµασιν, ἐµὲ 
ταύτην ἀποσυµβιβάσαι τὴν δὲ ὑµῶν ὑπερφύειαν ταύτην ἑαυτῇ καταλογίσασθαι ἐν τοῖς ἐµοῖς λόγοις· τὰ δὲ ἐξωτικὰ 
πάντα ἐµὲ εἰς πλῆρες ληµµατίσαι καὶ εἰσπρᾶξαι καὶ εἰσενεγκεῖν τῷ εἰρηµένῳ γεουχικῷ λόγῳ. And lines 32–34: 
δώσω δὲ τοὺς λόγους πάσης τῆς ἐµῆς ὑποδοχῆς τοῦ τε λήµµατος καὶ ἀναλώµατος, καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν λογοθεσιῶν 
ἀποπληρώσω, εἰ λοιπαδάριος φανείην ἀκολούθως ὡς εἴρηται τοῖς ἐµοῖς ἐνταγίοις. 
62 Banaji 2001, 190–191. 
63 Banaji 2001, 203–205. The harsh terms in many of these contracts would have essentially indentured debtors to 
their creditors. The concept is known as “debt bondage.” The possibility of detention of family members in estate 
prisons would have mitigated the risk of flight.  
64 On which see Sarris 2006, 92–93. 
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those associated with the estate.65 Imperial legislation also restricted mobility. A number of the 
Novels of Justinian relate to the colonate and tie coloni to the land.66 These efforts have usually been 
attributed to a scarcity of people available to work the land (whether as wage laborers or as lessees) 
stemming from a dip in the overall population. Banaji, however, has argued against a demographic 
decline in late antiquity, writing “it is now likely that for most of late antiquity population was on 
an upward climb and that the dominant agrarian classes were able to draw on a ‘surplus’ rural 
population.”67 The economic expansion spurred by an increase in the use of mechanical irrigation, 
he argues, led to greater rural prosperity and therefore a population boom.68 Brass has pointed out, 
however, that a surplus in the rural population should not correlate with limitations on mobility, 
since such limitations are meant to counteract the unfavorable pressures on landowners resulting 
from high demand for a small supply of workers and tenants.69  
Banaji attempts to reconcile the apparently conflicting phenomena of a surplus rural 
population and efforts to restrict its mobility by arguing that the legislation aimed at restricting 
worker mobility was not connected with labor supply, but rather facilitated the state's efforts at 
tracking the “taxable labour capacity of estates, and landowners were thus required to maintain a 
list of all regular labourers who counted for taxation purposes.”70 Kehoe, however, notes that such 
legislation was not restricted to Egypt, and would have, of course, applied elsewhere in the empire, 
                                                
65 “Those associated with the estates” are lessees and people paying taxes through the estate, but under Banaji’s 
formulation they are wage laborers. See Kehoe 2003, 716–717. 
66 Banaji 2001, 207–211. 
67 Banaji 2001, 215. Emphasis in original. 
68 Banaji 2001, 206–207, 214–215. 
69 Brass 2005, 142–143 n. 48. In such a situation one estate might offer higher wages or more favorable leases and 
attract labor away from another. 
70 Banaji 2001, 211. The activity Banaji describes might in other words be described as estimating the tax base, an 
activity which I argue had fallen to the estate by the time of the Apions. 
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including places that calculated taxation differently from Egypt.71 He argues instead that legislation 
concerned with the mobility of georgoi was indeed connected with the labor supply, and stemmed 
from the imperial government’s desire that estates retain sufficient labor to remain productive, 
regardless of how taxes were calculated.72 Kehoe thus sees the conflict in Banaji’s argument as 
insoluble and claims that there was a population shortfall: “in Egypt it seems likely that the 
population reached its peak in the 2nd c, and, after a decline in the 3rd c, regained some ground 
in the next two centuries.”73 This shortfall, Kehoe argues, drove the efforts at the imperial and 
estate levels to restrict the mobility.  
But Sarris, like Banaji, sees evidence of population growth in late antiquity. For evidence of 
growth, he relies on Ward-Perkins’ survey of “the archaeology” which argues that the eastern 
empire reached peak population and population density in the fifth and sixth centuries. On 
Egypt’s population specifically, however, Ward-Perkins does not rely on archaeology, but on the 
papyrological evidence for greater use of mechanical irrigation, indicating greater exploitation of 
marginal land, a phenomenon associated with increased population density on the limestone 
massifs in Syria.74 But artificial irrigation was used in Egypt not only to make marginal land more 
productive, but to grow crops requiring perennial irrigation or to have more than one harvest per 
year on a single plot of land.75 The use of artificial irrigation therefore does not necessarily indicate 
that there was population growth.  
                                                
71 Kehoe 2003, 717. 
72 Kehoe 2003, 717. 
73 Kehoe 2003, 718 n. 22.  
74 Ward-Perkins 2000 (CAH), 321. 
75 Gardens and vineyards required constant year-round irrigation. Fayyum evidence points to multiple crops on 
artificially irrigated land: Johnson and West 1949, 11–15. 
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Moreover, population growth in one place does not necessarily entail growth everywhere; 
as Kehoe writes, “for urban areas, Late Roman Egypt presents a varied picture, with some cities 
apparently maintaining prosperity and others declining.”76 The same is surely true when 
comparing Egypt to the even more geographically and economically disparate locales Ward-Perkins 
surveys. In light of this varied picture, Sarris’ and Ward-Perkins’ arguments for population growth 
are less secure, but Kehoe’s objection to Banaji is also problematic. If trends in population and 
prosperity differed from location to location, then imperial legislation might have been crafted to 
address needs and problems arising in some (or many) parts of the empire, but not in others. It is 
conceivable therefore that the laws restricting mobility were made with Egypt and its basis of 
taxation in mind, and had little practical application elsewhere where the basis was different.77 
Banaji’s argument cannot therefore be disregarded only on the grounds Kehoe offers. 
But even if it is granted that population numbers did, in fact, increase in Egypt in late 
antiquity, population growth (size relative to previous population) does not necessarily entail a 
population surplus (size relative to the demand for people to work the land). In other words, there 
may have been growth insufficient to exceed labor demands. This observation vitiates Banaji’s 
underlying assumption that an increase in overall population means an increase in the population 
of lessees and workers. Banaji also neglects to consider another possibility, that there was an 
increase in Egypt’s population, but the increase was in the number of small landholders without 
                                                
76 Kehoe 2003, 718 n. 22.  
77 There are other instances in which imperial legislation was only applied to one province, e.g., CJ 1.40 applied 
(initially) only to Italy; CJ Nov. 154 concerns unlawful marriage in Mesopotamia; CJ Nov. 145 concerns only certain 
cities in Asia Minor. 
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an increase in the number of available lessees and workers.78 Landowners might therefore have 
desired to restrict mobility even when the overall rural population had risen, since demand from 
smaller landowners for relatively scarce supply of casual labor would be greater. Banaji’s 
explanation also falters in explaining the private efforts of the estates to restrict mobility. He argues 
that these efforts stemmed from “the high instability of labor, with workers frequently deserting 
jobs.”79 But as Brass notes, this explanation merely pushes the question back a step to why labor 
was unstable, and the answer to this question militates against Banaji’s claims of surplus labor: “if 
workers were much sought-after, and higher wages consequently on offer elsewhere, then this 
would account both for their ‘reluctance’ to remain with a single employer (=at a given wage rate) 
and for the countervailing need of landowners generally to combine the decasualization of 
employment with the use of coercive mechanisms.”80 
Thus efforts to restrict the mobility of those working the land in late antique Oxyrhynchus 
might have occurred in four possible situations: There was population growth, but efforts to 
restrict movement were related to tracking the taxable capacity of estates, not to the supply of labor 
(Banaji). There was not population growth, and therefore a scarcity of labor, so the state and the 
estates both desired to restrict the mobility of labor (Kehoe). There was population growth, but not 
in excess of the demand for labor, so labor was scarce. There was population growth, but not 
among those from whom labor was demanded, so that labor was scarce. Determining which of the 
four was actually the case in Egypt, as framed to this point, requires the extremely difficult task of 
local demographic analysis. The rent model of tax collection proposed here sidesteps this thorny 
                                                
78 As Brass 2005, 141 n. 38, puts it, “Banaji is making an assumption that equates population growth simply with an 
over-supply of workers, without asking into what other occupational channels…such expansion might be diverted.” 
79 Banaji 2001, 205. 
80 Brass 2005, 128 
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issue, and can explain restrictions on the mobility of labor both on the part of estates and that of 
the imperial government, irrespective of the population status. Restricting the mobility of those 
who work the land also has the effect of stabilizing the returns expected from each unit of taxation 
at the expense of maximal efficiency.81 If there were population shortfalls, even restricted only to 
certain areas, then blanket legislation would have solved the problem in those areas and had little 
or no impact where the population level sufficed to maintain productive land. The prospect of 
stable returns can therefore explain why the imperial government would choose to impose 
restrictions on mobility. As for the private efforts, maintaining the number of people whose taxes 
fell under the Apion umbrella would have increased the scale of their tax farming operation. The 
more land for which they were fiscally responsible and which was being productively worked, 
regardless of tenure, the more the estate stood to gain from tax farming. Hence, even in period 
with a labor surplus, landowners might have opportunistically taken advantage of legislation 
restricting mobility and made efforts of their own to prevent lessees and workers from leaving, 
thereby sustaining the size of their tax umbrella.  
Another impetus for the efforts to restrict mobility was the economic pressure placed on 
lessees by collection practices. If the burdens placed on them became severe, then flight might have 
been an attractive option. The desire to restrict mobility would therefore still arise, even in a 
period with a rural surplus population, if that population was sufficiently pressed. In the model 
proposed here, bringing land and small landowners under the estate’s taxation umbrella was a 
means for the estate to increase its share of the tax collection burden, which in turn increased the 
                                                
81 The maximally efficient distribution of workers to land would occur in the absence of restrictions on mobility. For 
example, if piece of land x is potentially highly productive but short on labor, then restricting the mobility of workers 
on neighboring, less productive piece of land y reduces overall efficiency. The upside is that state knows the taxes it 
can expect from x and y, even though the units as a whole produce less than they would without mobility restrictions. 
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absolute amount it could make from its tax collection efforts. If the expenditure necessary to 
collect more taxes was less than the amount it stood to gain, then expansion of the umbrella was a 
moneymaking proposition. Once the collection infrastructure was in place, economies of scale 
suggest that that condition would have been satisfied. 
The use of a rent system can also explain the expansion of mechanical irrigation, since it 
would augment the total area on which taxes were due. An estate owning land made newly 
productive by an irrigation machine would have to pay the tax on that land, but the machines 
could bring in revenue as well by providing water to neighboring land without direct access to 
floodwaters or an irrigator of its own. Evidence for this practice exists from the advent of 
widespread use of mechanai. P.Ross.Georg. 2.19, a lease from 141 CE, permits the lessee to sell water 
rights to neighbors. Evidence that this practice continued at least into the sixth century comes 
from several leases of ἄνυδρος land—land relying on an irrigation machine installed on a different 
piece of land.82 Most of these leases are from sixth century Aphrodito, none from sixth century 
Oxyrhynchus, but, as discussed in Chapter 2, this absence is likely due to the waning importance 
of lease documents there, not the absence of leasing itself. Such agreements would have been 
lucrative for the Apion estate in two ways: from selling the rights to the water (or charging 
correspondingly higher lease rates, as the case may be) and from increasing the land available to 
smaller landholders. These smaller landholders would have been entirely dependent on the estate 
for their livelihoods, and would also have been subject to its tax collection efforts. 
                                                
82 For example P.Lond. 5.1689, 1693, and 1770. 
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 As Hickey has pointed out the gross cash lemmata, target receipts, of the Apion estate 
increased roughly two-fold between the years recorded by P.Oxy. 16.1918.v and 18.2196.v. 83 At the 
end of Chapter 3 it was argued that this increase came about neither from increases in taxes nor 
increases in production, but chiefly from increases in the amount of land either owned by the 
Apions or for which they collected taxes. It has been a matter of some debate whether the estates 
can be seen as expanding or merely taking responsibility for tax collection from greater numbers of 
small holders. The difficulty stems again from the lack of concern for distinguishing between rents 
and taxes in the extant accounts of the Apion estate. But the evident lack of concern reflects the 
insignificance of the distinction for the estate: the taxes and perquisites84 gotten by Apion 
collectors from small holders and lessees alike extracted a great deal of any surplus beyond the 
cultivators’ bare subsistence level, irrespective of land tenure. Even in cases where lessees might 
seem more prosperous, owning their own land, the estate could become involved. Justinian’s Novel 
128 c.14 stipulates that a landowner was not obliged to pay taxes on the lands owned by those 
coloni responsible to him,85 unless he willingly made himself so liable.86 This was clearly the 
situation for Isaac son of Melas who in P.Oxy. 55.3804.92 made a payment to an Apion pronoetes 
for ἰδίας γῆς. This legislation was highly favorable to large estate owners like the Apions, since it 
                                                
83 Hickey 2008, 99. 
84 See Chapter 3. 
85 Meaning leasing his land. A colonus might rent some portion of the land he works, and own some other portion. 
Banaji interprets coloni adscripticii/georgoi enapographoi idiosyncratically as primarily wage laborers. For criticism of this 
view see Brass 2005. 
86 Nullus autem penitus molestetur pro tributis terrarum quas non possidet, sed etiam si contingat agricultores alicui competentes 
aut inscriptos propriam habere possessionem, illos <pro ea publica exigi tributa, domino eorum nullam pro eis> molestiam sustinente, 
nisi forte propria voluntate tali functioni se fecit obnoxium. Again, the assumption that an estate owner would not do 
something for nothing implies that if this obligation was taken on willingly, then he must have stood to gain from it in 
certain circumstances. 
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permitted them to assume liability for the taxes on a piece of land on their own terms, i.e., when it 
was financially beneficial for them to do so.  
 Another area of disagreement in examinations of the estates of Byzantine Egypt is whether 
the relationship between influential landholders was cooperative or antagonistic. Sarris has 
described the recent trend in scholarship “to emphasise co-operation between public and private 
authority, aristocrat and emperor.”87 Indeed, Gascou’s model of fiscal shares implies a close 
relationship between the public and private spheres. Pushing back against this idea, Sarris sees the 
relationship as “a bitter struggle between the person of the emperor and elements within the 
political and social elite of the empire.”88 But to describe the relationship between aristocratic 
estate owners like the Apions as either cooperative or antagonistic is to mis-categorize it. Better, if 
the state and the estate were involved in a rent contract for the collection of taxes, is to view the 
state and the estate as parties in a negotiation, each advocating for its best interest in a mutually 
beneficial arrangement. This view entails certain actions appearing antagonistic, but which end in 
a mutually beneficial, cooperative agreement. This feature holds for any negotiated settlement, 
whether between a buyer and seller, political parties, or unions and management. As evidence of a 
bitter struggle, Sarris offers the example of Justinian’s Edict 13, which chides those involved with 
the collection of taxes, including imperial officeholders, for their skimming of collections from 
Egypt.89 Yet the public statements of the emperor disassociating himself from the widely hated tax 
collectors were clearly propagandistic, a point which Sarris himself admits,90 but also gained him 
negotiating leverage by stoking that hatred and casting himself as the defender of the people from 
                                                
87 Sarris 2006, 149. 
88 Sarris 2006, 3. 
89 Sarris 2006, 2–3. 
90 Sarris 2006, 3. 
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the tax collectors. The tactic diverted blame for onerous taxes from the emperor, while still 
granting the emperor the ability to garner good will from occasional tax remissions (which might 
not relieve collectors of their own obligations to the state).91 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 As Gascou has demonstrated, the Apion estate was engaged in the collection of taxes for 
cultivators in its area. Whether these cultivators were lessees or smaller independent holders does 
not particularly matter since the taxes collected went into the same pool as what was collected from 
leases, and from that larger pool the Apions paid the taxes on their own land and that of the 
smaller holders according to the contract negotiated with the state. In this chapter it is posited that 
collections were accomplished using two tiers, each operating on a rent system wherein a fixed 
amount was handed over to the contracting party and collections above that fixed amount were 
compensation for collection. On the upper tier the contracting party was the state, while on the 
lower tier it was the estate. The documents in the Apion dossier suggest that on the lower tier 
collections were subcontracted to pronoetai and other agents of the estate under a rent system and 
circumstances in force at the lower tier—a pre-existing accounting system, and the difficulty of 
making collections in kind—support that conclusion. A rent system of collection requires an 
estimate of the tax base, and so the apaitesima and pronoetes accounts look to be attempts on the 
part of the estate to do just that. The upper tier of the estate’s collection apparatus also operated 
under a rent system, contracted by the state, though for different reasons from those on the lower 
tier. The system was primarily attractive to the state because it made capital available for its exigent 
                                                
91 E.g., CJ Nov. 163 demands that any collections already made on remitted taxes must be handed over to the state. 
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expenditures. As needs for capital increased, the collection often consolidated into the hands of 
larger, more prominent estates. The system was also valuable for the estate because it was one of 
few ways in which it could productively put accumulated wealth to use. 
 A number of historical examples parallel the transition from the rent system apparent in 
the Papnouthis and Dorotheos archive to the one posited for the Apion estate. When social and 
economic factors made it unattractive for collectors to assume the risk of the contract, the problem 
was often solved by granting longer-term collection contracts to larger collectors. This tendency to 
place collection into the hands of the wealthy can be explained by looking at second century 
legislation aimed at a similar problem which transferred much of the risk for shortfalls onto the 
most prominent taxpayers, making the elites keenly interested in their neighbors of lesser means 
paying their taxes. 
The consolidation of collection also changed the terms of the rent contracts with the state. 
Granting the estate exclusive collection rights for a long period had the effect of making the estate, 
rather than the state (as was the case for Papnouthis and Dorotheos), responsible for the 
estimation of the tax base. The disparity in local knowledge between the estate and the state could 
be exploited by the estate for their own gain. But the estate’s own use of pronoetai to estimate the 
tax base left them facing the same type of knowledge disparity. In order to counter it, estate owners 
imposed fees on the perquisites their collectors extracted.  
 There is also evidence that the estate’s upper level paid the state a round, lump sum 
annually. This fits into historical patterns in which tax collection through rent contracts 
consolidated into the hands of local elites. Such lump sum payments on the upper tier can further 
explain why the accounts of the Apion estate are not at pains to distinguish between rent 
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collections and tax collections: the lump payment would be drawn from the larger pool of total 
collections, with the remainder left to estate coffers.  
 The picture of tax collection by the Apion estate offered here can address some of the 
vexing issues scholars have been grappling with while studying the role of the estate in the 
economy of Byzantine Egypt. The efforts on the part of the state and the estates to restrict the 
mobility of those who cultivated the land do not accord with claims of a surplus population in late 
antique Egypt. The use of rent contracts for tax collection on the Apion estate can account for 
efforts to restrict mobility irrespective of population: the more people the estate collected from, the 
greater their revenue from tax collection. In addition, the significant burden the estate’s collection 
practices placed on cultivators also made the option of flight attractive, even if there was a 
population surplus. Expansion of mechanical irrigation was also linked to the rent system of tax 
collection, since more arable land would have meant more taxes to be collected by the Apions. The 
question of whether estate revenues increased in the sixth century because of expansion of 
ownership or expansion of collections also takes on a different character: land owned by the estate 
did not produce a marketable surplus, and land which the estate owned and leased, and for which 
it collected taxes, both contributed to earnings from tax collection. The question of land tenure as 
it relates to estate receipts therefore becomes immaterial. Finally, characterizing the state and the 
estate as either cooperative or antagonistic fails to recognize that both were parties in a negotiation, 
each lobbying for its own interest in arriving at a mutually beneficial arrangement. 
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CHAPTER 5 
APION TAX FARMING IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
The pronoetes accounts indicate that the Apion estate’s lower tier of administration used a 
rent system for the collection of taxes on its own land and that of its neighbors. In Chapter 4 it 
was argued that the forms which the relationship between the state and the estate on the upper tier 
could take were fairly circumscribed, and the evidence, though fragmentary, pointed to a rent 
system. This chapter presents the emergence of tax farming systems—a subset of the rent system—in 
Athens, Ptolemaic Egypt, and Republican Rome as historical analogues for the development of the 
Apion tax collection system out of the system apparent in the Papnouthis and Dorotheos archive. 
These examples are offered as evidence that the model constructed in the foregoing chapters is not 
eccentric, but with precedent and that it reflects often natural developments of tax farming 
systems. They are also offered as analogues which allow inferences about the Apion estate and 
Byzantine Egypt which cannot be directly observed from contemporary evidence. The chapter then 
presents France’s tax collection system from the Middle Ages through the seventeenth century, as 
an analogue for the development of a two-tiered system in a context similar to that of the Apion 
estate. Examining the motivations for, and ramifications of, the development of the French system 
offers a number of interpretive possibilities for the Apion system and the estate’s place in 
Byzantine Egypt.1 More generally, the similarities between the Apion collection system and other, 
more fully understood historical instances of tax farming can help to fill in gaps in our 
understanding of estates in Byzantine Egypt. 
                                                
1 The discussion of the background on analogous examples is not meant to provide detailed accounts of those very 
broad, complex, and bibliographically imposing subjects. Instead, the focus is on the specific ways in which they 
explicate the Apion situation. 
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5.1 CONSOLIDATION AND THE FORMATION OF COLLECTION SYNDICATES 
5.1.1 Athens 
The system of tax farming employed by the Athenians conforms to the tendency noted by 
Kiser for distributed, small-scale collectors to consolidate into larger syndicates revolving around a 
wealthy elite.2 While liturgies predominated, a variety of taxes still played a role in financing 
Athens. Most taxes collected by the city were indirect—that is, the state did not collect from the 
people liable to the tax, but from intermediaries who took payment on transactions.3 Such indirect 
taxes included the import and export tax (πεντηκοστή), the harbor tax (ἐλλιµένιον), and the tax on 
prostitutes (πορνικόν). Aristotle’s Athenaion Politeia prescribes that the right to collect these taxes 
should be sold to the highest bidder. In other words, they were to be farmed.4 The highest bidder 
was to pay half of the bid upfront, the προκαταβολή, and the other half, the προσκατάβληµα, 
after six months.5 An individual collector could bid on a single minor tax or on several small taxes 
which had been bundled together and sold as a lot.6 Collectors were not always of significant 
means, so a surety was required of them to guarantee payment.7 For taxes which generated high 
revenues, such as the πεντηκοστή, or for large bundles of smaller taxes, even a wealthy person 
                                                
2 Kiser 2003. 
3 A modern example of an indirect tax is a sales tax, with the merchant acting as the intermediary from whom the state 
collects the tax, as opposed to the customer who bears the burden of payment. In other words, the person paying an 
indirect tax to the state can pass the cost on to someone else, whereas the person paying a direct tax (income, e.g.) 
cannot. A rent model for such taxes accords well with Coşgel and Miceli’s model, since the high costs of monitoring 
myriad small transactions would have made the simpler prospect of renting out collections for a fixed sum highly 
attractive. 
4 Ath. Pol. 47. Jones 1974, 153 and n. 18.  
5 Youtie 1967, 9.  
6 Andreades 1933, 160. 
7 Plut. Alc. 5, relates an anecdote in which Alcibiades acts as surety for a metic whom he has compelled to outbid the 
other tax farmers.  
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might have had difficulty covering the bid on his own.8 For these major taxes, associations of 
wealthy individuals would take out shares in the farming contract bid on by a head tax farmer, the 
τελωνάρχης.9 Andocides describes breaking up one such association that was colluding to keep the 
price of the bid down,10 and Lycurgus mentions that Leocrates had a share in the farming of the 
πεντηκοστή.11 In sum, indirect taxes in Athens were bundled together into substantial sums, and 
the contracts for them were assumed by groups of wealthy citizens. 
The special case of the direct tax in Athens is also of particular interest in comparison with 
the model proposed for the Apion estate. The εἰσφορά, “a special tax on capital intended to cover 
an urgent national need,”12 was likely first implemented in 428/7 BCE during the Peloponnesian 
War.13 The precise nature of the εἰσφορά in its initial formulation has been a matter of some 
dispute,14 but the tax appears to have been a determined sum divided evenly among the wealthiest 
citizens of Athens and collected directly under the authority of the generals.15 After 378/7 BCE 
the εἰσφορά underwent a series of reforms which made the tax a regular part of revenue collection 
by the Athenian state, rather than the emergency measure it had been originally. The method of 
collection effected by these changes parallel on a smaller scale the tendencies observed in 
Byzantine Egypt by Gascou. Gascou describes the Apion family as a member in a college of local 
                                                
8 Jones 1974, 153 and n. 10: revenue from this tax is attested as high as 200 talents annually, and shares were still 
taken out for the “exceptionally low” yield of 30 talents attested in Andocides’ de Myst. 133. 
9 Andreades 1933, 160 n. 8. 
10 De Mysteriis 1.133. 
11 In Leocratem 19.  
12 Andreades 1933, 327. On the εἰσφορά, see De Ste. Croix 1953 and Christ 2007.   
13 According to Thucydides 3.19, this was the first time the Athenians exacted the εἰσφορά, but it is unclear exactly 
what πρῶτον	  indicates in the context (whether absolutely, since the start of the war, since the start of his history, etc.). 
There is some evidence that it dates back to Solon. See Christ 2007, 54–55; Thomsen 1964, 14–23; and Andreades 
1933, 330–334.	  
14 See Christ 2007 for the terms of the debate. 
15 Christ 2007, 59–60. 
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elites (synteleia) collecting taxes on behalf of their neighbors and paying the state.16 Similarly, in 
Athens the εἰσφορά was not collected directly from the fifteen hundred or so people liable to the 
tax,17 but one hundred groups (symmories) liable for the same amount of the tax were formed. 
Each symmory was headed by its three richest members, who paid the προεισφορά, an upfront 
payment of the whole amount due from their symmory.  It was then left to the three hundred 
leading members to recoup this amount (less their own contributions) from the other members of 
the symmories in whatever manner they could. As Gascou describes the Apion estate, groups 
comprising a wealthy subset of those liable to the tax paid the state the amount of the tax on 
behalf of everyone liable to the tax. Similarly, both direct and indirect taxes collection in Athens 
came to be carried out through wealthy syndicates. Collection of the direct εἰσφορά was 
consolidated by design, while consolidated collection of the indirect taxes arose from necessity. As 
was the case on the Apion estate, in Athens collecting both direct and indirect taxes also entailed 
partial or entire payment to the polis in anticipation of collection.  
Jones singles out the εἰσφορά as one Athenian tax which was not farmed.18 This claim is 
true in the narrow sense that it was not collected by the class of τελῶναι (tax farmers), but from a 
systematic point of view the collections were carried out on a rent model. Through the use of the 
symmories and the timema, a valuation of the property to be taxed, the Athenians were at pains to 
measure and standardize the tax base.19 This type of measurement activity correlates with a rent 
system on Coşgel and Miceli’s model. There is no evidence that the three hundred members 
providing the advance were remunerated in cash for their collection efforts, but this is not integral 
                                                
16 Gascou 1985, esp. 49–52. 
17 Christ 2007, 63. 
18 Jones 1974, 154. 
19 Andreades 1933, 334–337. 
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to the rent system of collection. In other milieux, collectors might be compensated in non-
monetary ways, such as by exemption from military service.20 One clear benefit to the three 
hundred was avoiding the opprobrium of the other citizens for perceived stinginess in their acts of 
civic giving, potentially disastrous in litigious Athens. Payment or non-payment of the εἰσφορά was 
used as ammunition in the Athenian law courts.21 Moreover, the likely purpose of the reform to 
the εἰσφορά and its certain result were to expedite access to the tax by having wealthy citizens, able 
to bear the cash flow demands, advance the sum in the form of the προεισφορά in anticipation of 
actual collection. Both the explicitly farmed indirect taxes and the direct εἰσφορά, which was also 
collected on a rent system, display the tendency of these systems to consolidate from dispersed 
independent collectors into syndicates headed by those with the greatest wealth and social capital. 
Athens demonstrates the role that the possession of capital played in reaping benefits from 
tax farming, especially in the shares taken out for the farming of indirect taxes. The benefits 
derived from collecting indirect taxes self-reinforce: the wealthy who were able to take on the tax 
collection responsibility became more wealthy, and therefore able to take on more and larger 
collection responsibilities with the potential of still greater benefit. Even in the case of the 
εἰσφορά, where a profit motive was absent, the collection responsibilities concentrated into the 
hands of a wealthy elite who saw the potential to accumulate social capital. The trajectory of tax 
collection in Byzantine Egypt from the fourth to the sixth centuries was similarly determined. The 
conditions attendant to the Apions’ rising status—a state in need of funds, small scale collectors 
                                                
20 The publicani were granted exemption from military service as compensation in exceptional circumstances during the 
fighting against Hannibal in 215 BCE (Badian 1983, 16–17). Other arrangements have also been observed: In Moghul 
India military and civil officers were compensated for their services with tax collection rights. Habib 1963, esp. 259–
273. 
21 Lysias 19.42–43 and 21.1–5 uses the payment of eisphora, and other liturgies, as a defense. Isaeus 5.45 reproaches 
someone for his stinginess in his liturgies. See Andreades 1933, 132 and n. 2, and 358–361.  
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unable to advance those funds, locally prominent estate owners with a collection apparatus—
permitted the Apion family to assume tax collection responsibilities that were once the purview of 
many independent collectors, and to rise in wealth due to the self-reinforcing benefits of tax 
farming reaped by the already relatively affluent. 
5.1.2 The Publicani 
The publicani were the tax collectors of the Roman Republic, “and were an integral part of 
the res publica as far back as we can observe it or trace it.”22 Along with collecting taxes, the 
publicani were involved in other activities with a public bent, such as building and road 
construction, mining operations, and requisitioning goods for the army. The publicani were 
therefore responsible for collections from the public or from public properties (e.g., mines), and 
for expenditures on the public’s behalf.23 In the former capacity, they handed money to the state 
for the right to collect from the public; in the latter, they took money from the state in order to 
perform a service for the public. For the expenditures, they were required to provide collateral in 
case they failed to complete a project; and for the collections, they were required to pay all or part 
of the bid up front. Consequently, both roles required that the publicani possess a certain level of 
capital. Early on the publicani banded together in their various undertakings to form societates.24 
Badian argues that the purpose of the groups was to distribute risk, since bidding on the contracts 
required large amounts of collateral and sureties.25 On this view, the growth of the societates and 
other tax farming syndicates operated on the same principle as insurance companies: small returns 
                                                
22 Badian 1983, 16. 
23 Levi 1988, 86. 
24 Badian 1983, 67–82; Youtie 1967, 10. These groups eventually became legally incorporated, becoming perhaps the 
first examples of the modern concept of corporate personhood.  
25 Badian 1983, 69. 
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from a large number of bets more than offset occasional losses on a minority of them, and the 
greater the number and the variety of the bets, the more sizeable the offset.26 As was the case for 
the Athenian τελῶναι, the sheer cost of many undertakings—beyond the capacity of any single 
person to finance—also likely spurred the consolidation of the publicani into societates.27 The 
collection of taxes required the same risk-mitigation and cost-distribution that expenditure projects 
did, demanding capital up front and entailing a great deal of risk. 
The archive of Papnouthis and Dorotheos shows that small scale collectors in fourth 
century Egypt faced the same basic difficulties in bidding on tax rights as the early publicani: 
acquiring sufficient capital to pay the bid and assuming the risk of being unable to collect the 
taxes. The solutions which the publicani employed to address these problems can be found in the 
collection system of the Apion estate. In Chapter 3 it was argued that the relatively low social 
status of collectors like Papnouthis and Dorotheos increased the risks they assumed because it 
exposed them to exploitation by those above and below them in the social hierarchy, while higher 
status collectors like the Apions were immune to these difficulties. Badian’s explanation for the 
consolidation of the publicani makes better sense of why those on a higher social stratum, like the 
Apions, would be more suited to dealing with the risks than were Papnouthis and Dorotheos. The 
publicani banded together to increase the pool of bets and distribute the risk. The size of the 
Apions’ holdings had much the same effect, and their involvement in the synteleia would have 
likewise dispersed the risk they were assuming. Moreover, whereas a small-scale collector might bid 
                                                
26 Groups of publicani eventually grew so large and influential that they could operate as cartels, dictating the price of 
the bids to the state. See Badian 1983, 74. 
27 Badian 1983, 67–68 notes that in the time of Cicero and Caesar, the richest man in Rome was said to have had a 
fortune of 48 million denarii and a building project one hundred years earlier was contracted at 45 million denarii. 
That amount, he notes, was also 450 times the property requirement for the equestrian class, to which most publicani 
belonged.  
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on the rights to a single village, the scattered geographical layout of Apion holdings distributed 
many of the risks to collection, such as local flooding and dikes breaching. As large landholders, 
the Apions were also able to collect taxes from those over whom they already had some control in 
their role as landlord. While the surviving Apion leases mostly indicate that the lessor was 
responsible for the taxes owed on the land, the amount of tax owed by the Apions on a particular 
piece of land would have been included in the determination of the lease price, making the tenant 
responsible for the taxes de facto.28 As a result, the situation is akin to an indirect tax: while the 
Apions were responsible to the state for the tax, they were not the party ultimately bearing its 
burden, just as those collecting harbor dues in Athens paid the state while others bore its burden. 
The taxes over which the Apions had collection rights would not have been separated from the 
other revenue to which they were entitled—indeed they were not separated in the pronoetai 
accounts. Because the Apions were already leasing and collecting revenue separate from taxes, the 
collection apparatus would already have been in place and largely the same as a tax collection 
apparatus. 
Another notable similarity between the publicani and the Apions is the involvement of 
private entities in public financing. The publicani were involved in loaning the Asian cities huge 
sums in order to pay off the indemnities Sulla imposed on them in 84 BCE. When the cities were 
unable to pay the publicani, they were forced to accept their loans on unfavorable terms. 
Predictably, this placed the cities in perpetual debt to the publicani.29 Money lending was among 
the varied roles tax farmers played in the financial workings of both local and empire-wide 
government. The possibilities for credit that tax-farming systems create are a crucial part of their 
                                                
28 P.Flor 3.325 and P.Oxy. 63.4390; also P.Oxy. 6.913 (not Apion, but from 5th century Oxyrhynchus). 
29 Jones 1974, 118–121. 
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use, and they can explain both why tax farming was used and why it persisted despite drawbacks. 
The extent to which the Apions were involved in the credit aspects of tax farming is further 
discussed below (Section 5.5.2) in connection with the more fully understood French tax farming 
system. One conclusion to be drawn at this point with respect to the Apion estate in Byzantine 
Egypt is how absolutely normal it was in the ancient world for private entities to be insinuated into 
the financial workings of the state. Therefore to expect a division in estate accounts between public 
and private finances is anachronistic. 
 
5.2 OPERATING ON MANY TIERS 
The example of the publicani also offers substantial evidence for subcontracted local 
employees making collections. Youtie notes that the rendering of the Greek τελῶναι into publicani 
in the Latin New Testament misunderstands both terms, not least because it conflates several 
layers of the collection hierarchy.30 The reviled “publicani,” grouped rhetorically with prostitutes 
and sinners, were actually local collectors employed by or collaborating with the publicani.31 Youtie 
writes, “the Roman publican, a knight and a member of a societas publicanorum, powerful in wealth 
and influence, would have blushed with shame at this lowly use of his professional title.”32 The 
large collection operations of the publicani functioned on several tiers, as indeed all large collection 
operations in the pre-modern world must have. The difficulty of communication and transport 
made direct involvement logistically unmanageable, and the status of those at the higher echelons 
of collection operations made it socially unthinkable. Bagnall writes of the liturgists of fourth 
                                                
30 Youtie 1967, 8. The publicani appear at Mark 2.16; Matthew 9.10–11; Luke 5.30; 19.2.  
31 Badian 1983, 11.  
32 Youtie 1967, 8. 
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century Egypt, “it is impossible to imagine the members of the top 100 families of Oxyrhynchos or 
Hermopolis, who held most city liturgies connected with taxes and would have to pay up if they 
were not delivered in full to the imperial government, going about the dusty countryside collecting 
a few artabas here, a few grains of gold there, from their social inferiors.”33 The same sentiment 
applies to those contracting with the state to make tax collections over large areas, be they the 
publicani or the Apions.  
A multi-tiered collection system becomes particularly apparent when the publicani were 
permitted to bid on the lucrative tithes levied from Asia. The publicani with the winning bid would 
negotiate with the Asian cities for the payment of a lump sum. The cities must have used some 
collection system of their own to obtain these payments, implying a tier below the publicani, about 
which the publicani likely cared little so long as the cities made their payments. Even in Athens, 
where the collection system for the εἰσφορά was not particularly large, the efforts used several tiers. 
The three hundred responsible for the προεισφορά existed on an upper tier, interacting with the 
polis. The three hundred, in turn, must have had some means of recouping those funds from the 
other members of their symmory. Social forces again make it difficult to envision the three 
hundred wealthiest people in Athens making the collections themselves. While the methods 
employed on the lower tier are obscure, that some lower collection tier was in place is unavoidable.  
In each of these examples those who were contracted to collect taxes on a large scale were 
faced with the same problem as the states which had hired them. And they had at hand the same 
solutions: rent, wage, and share systems. Difficulties in communication and transportation in the 
pre-modern world made multi-tiered, delegation-dependent operations essential to large-scale 
                                                
33 Bagnall 1993, 158. 
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collection systems. For the contractors physically to make collections from all those who owed 
them was simply impractical. The type of collection system used by the Apions therefore required 
multiple tiers. Where close monitoring of geographically distributed collectors or the central post 
facto counting of all collections was prohibitively expensive, or the possibilities of speculation and 
tax anticipation were attractive, the rent model arose on the lower tiers. On the Apion estate, the 
two tiered collection system was large in scale and widely distributed, and speculation was used to 
convert collections in billon and kind into gold. The use of a rent system on the lower tier, 
therefore, would have shifted risk and also allowed the upper tier (the estate) to derive some 
benefit from the speculation through contractual arrangements.  
 
5.3 SPECULATION AND TAX FARMING 
 Given that Apion pronoetai made collections in kind and billon, but payments to the estate 
in gold, the lower-tier Apion agents likely engaged in the type of speculation Papnouthis and 
Dorotheos did. The collections made by the pronoetai on grant from the Apions were effectively a 
loan of capital from the estate, offering potential for making money through speculation with 
earnings exceeding the interest due on the loan. This course is all the more likely in light of the 
fact that the pronoetai were obliged to hand over a substantial portion of the perquisites which they 
extracted from the lessees and taxpayers34 and which functioned as interest on the loan of the 
principal. Parallels for speculation that used collections as principal exist elsewhere where tax 
farming on multiple tiers was employed. For example, Webber and Wildavsky note that collectors 
in Rome of the first century BCE would accept payment in kind from cultivators, offering a very 
                                                
34 Around 15% on grain collection and twelve or more solidi per year, in the extant examples. See Chapter 2. 
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low price, when they knew that urban markets would bear a much higher price.35 Handing over to 
the state the original value owed in money, the collectors were able to keep the remainder. In this 
way, the Roman collectors speculated on the grain market using their knowledge of markets 
inaccessible to the cultivators from whom they collected. Webber and Wildavsky write, “the 
principal opportunity for extra gain stemmed from the absence of a market mechanism for 
converting agricultural produce into money. As a barter economy still existed in the agricultural 
districts, local subcontractors profited by converting taxes paid in grain into the money payments 
demanded by the Roman Senate.”36 The pronoetai on the lower tier of the Apion estate, who 
collected billon and kind from rural populations but made payments in gold, faced precisely the 
same situation. Webber and Wildavsky further note that tax farmers would “…collect in-kind taxes 
at remote places where taxpayers were ignorant of the market value of their produce. Agents could 
convert grain into money at less than the going rate, then profit later from its sale.”37 Justinian’s 
Novel 128 (545 CE) stipulates that collections in kind be valued at specific prices or according to 
specific markets, indicating that collectors contemporary with the Apion pronoetai were attempting 
the same profit seeking speculation.38 
 Webber and Wildavsky’s description of the publicani’s collections in Asia also reveal how 
control over land expanded and what role longer term contracts came to play in that expansion: 
“Syndicate agents in Roman Asia exacted a tithe of 10 percent of the crop from all landowners, 
unmercifully and irrespective of personal circumstances. If a landowner could not pay, the 
                                                
35 Webber and Wildavsky 1986, 117–118. Frank 1962, 154. 
36 Webber and Wildavsky 1986, 117. 
37 Webber and Wildavsky 1986, 118. 
38 Novel 128 c. 1: …declarantes quantum unicuique provinciae sive civitati pro unoquoque iugo aut iuliis aut centuriis aut alio 
quolibet tam in specie quam in auro fiscalium causa imminet, indicantes quoque specierum aestimationem secundum mensam et in 
unoquoque loco tenentem <consuetudinem>, et quid ex his in arcam inferri aut in unaquaque <provincia> dari aut expendi 
oportet… 
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syndicate…offered to lend funds at interest…When the landowner could not pay tax arrears plus 
accumulated interest, the tax-farming syndicate confiscated his land.”39 The merciless collection 
practices are reminiscent of the complaints from Apion tenants in P.Oxy. 1.130 (sixth century) and 
P.Oxy. 27.2479 (sixth century) who described the confiscation of moveable property by the 
pronoetai despite their dire circumstances. In a number of contracts from the Apion dossier, 
moveable and immoveable property were written as collateral against default.40 And Novels 32 and 
34, from the mid-sixth century, were meant to combat the problem in certain provinces that small 
amounts of grain were being loaned to farmers against their land, and upon default in desperate 
times the farmers would be dispossessed of their property. It is, therefore, easily conceivable that 
when tax collections were made by pronoetai on lands not owned by the Apions, similar 
confiscations (and perhaps lending) on behalf of the estate occurred, leading to some expansion of 
Apion land.  
A contributing factor to the merciless collection practices of the publicani was the length of 
the collection contracts on which they bid. Rather than the usual annual bidding, the Asian 
contracts were extended to five years in order to compensate for the difficulties of making 
collections in so remote an area.41 This removed the check on the publicani’s avarice, namely, the 
possibility that their contract might not be renewed if there were complaints of extortionate 
collection or collusion in bidding. The pronoetes contract P.Oxy. 1.136 demonstrates that on the 
lower tier of the Apion estate contracts were annual. But the consistency of the areas of collection 
                                                
39 Webber and Wildavsky 1986, 118. 
40 E.g., P.Oxy. 19.2238, 44.3204, and 70.4794. 
41 Webber and Wildavsky 1986, 117. 
 
 
127 
found in the Apion accounts suggests that collection agreements made on the upper tier were long 
term.42  
 
5.4 STATE BUREAUCRACY AND TAX FARMING: PTOLEMAIC EGYPT 
Along with many other Greek institutions, the τελῶναι (tax farmers) were introduced to 
Egypt at some point after Alexander’s conquest.43 By 259 BCE, the date of P.Rev. (an assemblage of 
regulations governing tax farming practices),44 tax farming in some form was widespread there.45 
But that document shows the role of the Ptolemaic τελώνης to have been so limited that he ceased 
to resemble a tax farmer. Collections were made by local agents who were paid a wage by the nome 
officials and served at the joint discretion of nome officials and tax farmers,46 not an unusual 
situation for a large-scale collection effort. But the tax farmer was also supervised by a wage 
employee of the state, the ἔφορος.47 And the tax farmer had no independent recourse if someone 
failed to pay.48 Making no collections and having little authority over collectors or taxpayers, the 
tax farmer’s role was limited to “fix[ing] the amount of the tax, control[ling] the collection and 
accounting, and determin[ing] whether the total was greater or smaller than the amount bid.”49 
Préaux argues that the system of tax farming manifest in Ptolemaic Egypt was therefore mostly a 
                                                
42 This point is elaborated upon below in Section 5.5.4 
43 Though Monson (2012, 218 and n. 52) argues against Greek origins for tax farming in Egypt, pointing to evidence 
of participation by Egyptians in the Ptolemaic system, priests farming temple revenue in Egypt and Babylon, and 
Egyptian priests’ involvement in revenue collection under the Persians. On tax and revenue collection under the 
Persians, largely an adoption of policies already in place, see Manning 2009, 24–26 and Briant 2002, 388–421. 
44 TM no. 8859. P.Brit.Mus. 1.10528 may attest tax farming by the Greeks in Egypt as early as 291 BCE, but Manning 
(2009 152 n.138) sees no evidence suggesting tax farming over other types of collection in that document. 
45 Bingen 2007, 160. On tax farms in Hellenistic Egypt, see Préaux 1939, 450–459; Manning 2009, Chapter 5, esp. 
152–157; Monson 2012, 209–246. On P.Rev., see Bingen’s revised edition in SB Beiheft 1 1952; Préaux 1939, esp. 65–
111 and 165–181; Bingen 2007, 157–188; and Thompson 2008, 25–38, esp. 32–33. 
46 Youtie 1967, 13–14. 
47 Youtie 1967, 14. 
48 Youtie 1967, 14. 
49 Bingen 2007, 164. 
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terminological veneer over the direct collections carried out by the centralized royal bureaucracy, 
and that the tax farmers were an essentially useless part of a Greek system grafted onto the existing 
Egyptian one.50  
Bingen attributes the persistence of the veneer to a lack of imagination on the part of the 
conquering Greeks who conceived of no other way to make collections of indirect taxes.51 He 
concedes that the tax farmers were assigned the further role of “insuring for the kings benefit 
against financial risks,” but writes “it is unthinkable that the first Ptolemies deliberately gave only 
this role, and such a limited role, to the tax farming companies.”52 This assessment, however, 
underestimates the value of tax farmers who oiled the gears of the fiscal machinery in a world 
before central banking. Manning writes that the Ptolemaic taxation system’s “complexity, and the 
competitiveness of tax farming arrangements…served the interest of the king by creating new 
organizations within the state that prevented collective action against him.”53 He continues, “the 
auction process…may have functioned as a recruiting device to bring persons into the bureaucratic 
structure.”54 Moreover, tax farming is unique among the collection systems in that it gives the state 
access to capital from taxes in anticipation of collection, allows for a predictable income, and lays 
much of the risk at the feet of collectors. The publicani and the French tax farming system 
(discussed below in Section 5.5) also show that tax farmers could act as clearinghouses for the 
state, eliminating the need to transport bulky or highly valuable goods to a centralized location 
                                                
50 Préaux 1939, 450–451. 
51 Bingen 2007, 167.  
52 Bingen 2007, 166–167. On this role of the τελώνης, see Rostotvzeff 1941, 320–330. 
53 Manning 2009, 142. 
54 Manning 2009, 156, citing Eisenstadt 1963, 129. 
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before redistributing them back whence they came.55 Under a strict wage or share system, these 
properties do not readily arise for the state to exploit. The Ptolemaic example therefore shows that 
a tax farming system might coexist with a state collection bureaucracy, much as the Apion 
collection system functioned within the state collection apparatus extending from Constantinople. 
Thompson describes the relationship between the tax farmers and the state bureaucracy as 
mutually reinforcing: “Collection rights were auctioned on a specified occasion and the guarantees 
provided by the successful tax-farmers served to ensure the revenues of the crown, while the regular 
royal officials in post provided the lists of taxpayers and helped in recording the process.”56  
 
5.5 THE FRENCH TAX FARMING SYSTEM 
 The development of the French tax collection system from the late Middle Ages to the 
eighteenth century provides an explanatory model for the transition from the fourth century 
method, evident in the Papnouthis and Dorotheos archive, to the system it is argued here was in 
place under the Apions. This section offers first a description of the French system,57 then a 
discussion of points of contact with the Apion estate’s relationship with its collectors and the state, 
as well as a possible explanation for the expansion of the area for which the Apion estate collected 
taxes. The French system provides a particularly apt comparison to the Apion estate because it was 
derived its revenue from a largely agricultural base, involved a wealthy elite with connections to the 
central government located in a remote capital city, was used in a period of expanding importance 
of money taxes and heavy state expenditure, operated on multiple tiers, and existed alongside a 
                                                
55 Webber and Wildavsky 1986, 117; Matthews 1958, 12–13. 
56 Thompson 2008, 31–32. 
57 The description relies on Matthews 1958, especially the introductory chapter. 
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robust state bureaucracy. Because the French system and the working of the Apion estate share 
many critical features, inferences about the Apion estate can be made from knowledge about the 
French system.    
5.5.1 Revenue Farming and Tax Farming 
 Tax farming was used extensively in France from the late Middle Ages through the 
eighteenth century. It grew out of the revenue farming practiced by landholding aristocrats as 
money income associated with the lands they owned increased. Land was leased out, granting the 
lessee rights to the produce grown on the land. The other rights associated with the land—tolls, 
rent on structures, and other dues—also fell under rental contracts.58 Like tax farmers, revenue 
farmers assumed potential risks and profits, and, like the state, the landowner ensured himself a 
steady revenue, unburdened himself of administrative chores, and potentially benefited from 
payment in advance of collection. Matthews writes that the basis of the revenue farms in France 
was at times a marketable surplus of produce—which made the revenue farmer essentially a tenant 
farmer.59 More often, however, the basis lay in the money charges associated with owning the land. 
Land owned by the monarch was managed in this same way, and eventually taxes were among the 
money charges owed on such land. The collection of taxes was treated in the same way as the 
collection of other revenues, and on royal land “the legal relation between a tax-farmer and the 
king was the same as the relation between a revenue-farmer and the proprietor of an estate.”60 
 In the French revenue farming system, the rights to individual tolls or dues could be 
farmed out separately so that different farmers might have collection rights over the same piece of 
                                                
58 In Roman Egypt a rent contract could include the right to sell water raised by mechanical irrigators installed on the 
property. See, e.g., P.Ross.Georg. 2.19 (141 CE). 
59 Matthews 1958, 6. 
60 Matthews 1958, 7. 
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land. Taxes, one of the revenue sources associated with a piece of land, fell into a special category 
because it was not the landowner who retained the ultimate tax rights over the produce of the 
land, but the state. Tax farmers made collections on three classes of land: state-owned land, land 
which they owned themselves, and land owned by others. On state-owned land, the possessor of 
the tax rights was identical to the possessor of the rights to other revenues, eliminating any 
meaningful distinction between taxes and other revenues collected. Outside of state land, 
ownership—the ability to benefit directly from or farm out rights to the produce, tolls, and dues—
was divorced from tax rights, which the state alone had the ability to farm out. Where the tax 
farmer was the also the landowner—i.e., the landowner had won the bid for the right to collect 
taxes associated with his own land—the situation was akin to state-owned land: taxes were not 
distinguishable in any meaningful way from other revenues. A tax farmer might also make 
collections on land owned by a third party without alienating him from his other rights to the 
land. In that case the tax farmer treated the rented tax rights over a neighbor’s land the same as 
any other revenue source over which he had rights.  
All three situations have analogues to collections made by the Apions. The pronoetes 
accounts provide evidence that the Apions held tax farming contracts for land they owned, and 
that they collected certain taxes from neighboring landowners. The non-tax rights to land in the 
former category were also held by the Apions, so that they rented out the rights to the produce 
(tenant farming) and the other productive assets on the land such as mills, oil presses and 
dovecotes, along with the tax collection rights.61 Once the payment to the state for the rights of tax 
collection had been settled, all the collections they made on this land were bound for the same 
                                                
61 Several such examples are in P.Oxy. 55.3804. 
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coffers, irrespective of whether the right was for taxes or for other revenues. As in the French 
system, taxes collected from neighbors were treated similarly to their other revenues. The example 
of Isaac son of Melas in P.Oxy. 55.3804.92, who pays the Apions ὑπὲρ ἰδίας γῆς, makes this clear.62 
P.Oxy. 16.1915 also reveals that the Apions administered imperial land, collecting taxes and other 
revenues from those associated with the land accounted for in the document. In this case the state 
farmed out to the Apions not only its tax rights, but also rights to its other revenues. The Apions 
then incorporated the state-owned land into their larger collection apparatus. 
 The same choice among systems that a state faced in the collection of taxes, a large estate 
would face in the collection of the revenues produced on its land. The circumstances under which 
states farmed out taxes are the same as those under which estates established agricultural tenancy 
rather than direct management of the land. Many of the determining factors were largely the same: 
when land was managed directly (i.e., a wage system was used), laborers did not have an immediate 
incentive to maximize yields;63 and monitoring was necessary to ensure that laborers did not sell 
produce on the side for their own profit. Under a rent system monitoring of labor was 
unnecessary, since cultivators were self-interested and payment to the landowner was independent 
of productivity.64 Sarris argues that the Apion estate mostly managed its land directly under a wage 
system, using a rental system only as a supplement. While he overemphasizes the role of such 
direct management, clearly at least some Apion land was exploited directly, especially on orchards 
and vineyards adjacent to the large house the Apions kept, known as the προάστιον ἔξω τῆς 
                                                
62 Taxes collected on a neighbor’s land would be treated like other revenues to which the Apions were entitled. 
Consider, for example, an estate renting oxen to its neighbors. Simply because the estate did not own the land on 
which the oxen were used, we would not expect them to treat the income generated from renting those oxen 
differently from rent gotten from lessees renting oxen for use on estate land. 
63 The wage was not dependent on the yield. 
64 The owner was paid a negotiated sum based on anticipated yield, the contracted cultivators were motivated to 
maximize yield because their remuneration was the amount in excess of the negotiated sum.  
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πύλης.65 Most of the land associated with the Apion estate was not contiguous, but distributed 
throughout the nome. In light of the relative advantages and disadvantages of direct exploitation 
versus a rental system, it is plausible that those lands most proximate to the center of operations 
and therefore most easily monitored were exploited directly, whereas the farther flung lands were 
under rental agreements. The point of emphasis is that once the estate acquired a tax-farming 
contract, that contract became a revenue source much like any other. There is no reason, 
therefore, to suppose that a different system of collection was used for taxes than for other types of 
revenue on the Apion estate. If, as was argued in Chapter 2, Sarris’ arguments about the autourgia 
are incorrect and the produce from land was exploited chiefly through leasing, then it should 
follow that tax collection on the lower tier was also carried out through a rental system. 
5.5.2 Credit 
 Under the French system, credit was provided to the state by tax farmers through different 
mechanisms increasing in complexity over the centuries. The most straightforward provision of 
credit was payment of all or part of the money bid for the right of tax collection before completion 
of the actual collection. Tax farmers would pay the state the bid price in regular intervals over the 
course of the year, but collect much more sporadically, sometimes taking three to four calendar 
years to collect a single year’s taxes.66 The state additionally required a deposit from the collector in 
the case of default, money which could be used by the state immediately. These practices are 
similar to those of the lower level of the Apion estate. The pronoetai were required to provide a 
deposit once given the right of collection. As discussed earlier, this deposit functioned as interest 
on the “loan” (i.e., the right to collect taxes to which the Apions were entitled) extended to the 
                                                
65 Attested in P.Oxy. 16.1925, PSI 3.193, and P.Wisc. 2.66.  
66 Matthews 1958, 11 and 28. 
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collectors on the lower tier. Furthermore, the deposit provided the estate with an infusion of 
immediately available capital. Like the payments made by the French tax farmers, the pronoetai paid 
the Apions in regularly scheduled installments throughout the year.67 Ruffini argues such regular 
payments also occurred on the upper tier from the estate to the state.68  
As the French state began to rely increasingly on the farms to provide credit, the scale of 
tax farms increased. Whereas in its early incarnation tax farming was “fragmented,” with each tax 
farmed under a different contract by a different contractor, Matthews writes that “both the 
government and the financiers felt the need for larger, more centralized tax-farming units 
embracing all taxes of similar type levied upon a province rather than a parish or upon the entire 
kingdom rather than upon separate parishes.”69 The larger units could be administered more 
efficiently by reducing overlapping bureaucracies, managed more easily by the state, and “above all, 
such large tax-farms served as more adequate bases for the manipulation of the credit potentialities 
of the tax farming system.”70  
The most significant such “credit potentiality” was the system under which tax farmers 
would accept collection rights for future years in exchange for honoring the state’s requests for 
local expenditure in excess of the current year’s collection revenues. In many cases tax farmers 
acted as clearinghouses facilitating the payment of locally incurred expenses. The use of the French 
tax farmers avoided the need to transport large quantities of coins long distances, only to transport 
them back to make local payments. The Apion pronoetes accounts show that a similar function was 
                                                
67 The schedule on which their payments were made is noted at the ends of the expenditure sections in the accounts, 
e.g., P.Oxy. 55.3804.275–281. 
68 Ruffini 2008, 105–106 and Chapter 4. 
69 Matthews 1958, 38. 
70 Matthews 1958, 38. 
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carried out on the lower tier of the estate, with the pronoetai noting expenditures as remissions 
from their collection. This practice avoided the need for making all the collections, handing them 
to a central office, and then making all expenditures separately. Before the advent of banknotes, 
such clearinghouses were crucial to the fiscal operation of states, and the publicani also played this 
important role in the Roman Republic.71 In the French system, the tax farmer was instructed to 
disperse money owed by the state and could thus deduct that amount from the bid promised to 
the state for the right to collect. As the French state incurred more and more costs, the amount of 
the local expenditures asked of the tax farmers outsized the amount the tax farm owed the state for 
the bid. The tax farmers were thus required to dip into their own funds or acquire more funds on 
credit. As a result, having a certain level of capital on hand was essential to their ability to provide 
the state with credit.  
But the French tax farmers were to some extent dependent upon their ability to obtain 
credit for themselves from private citizens who were, as Azabou and Nugent have noted, 
understandably wary of lending money directly to a sovereign.72 As discussed in Chapter 4, 
Papnouthis and Dorotheos exercised a similar intermediary function. The Apions had 
relationships with bankers, but they were also able to obtain credit through different means, credit 
which could then be extended to the state. Issuing pittakia in lieu of payment enabled the estate to 
consider as paid off those they owed payment to without having transferred any real money to 
them, thereby obtaining a form of credit from those over whom they exercised control as landlord 
or tax farmer. As compensation for their extension of credit, French tax farmers obtained 
collection rights for future years over greater areas at rent which had been lowered according to the 
                                                
71 Webber and Wildavsky 1986, 117. 
72 Azabou and Nugent 1988, 686. 
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level of debt incurred by the state. As the debt requirements of the state increased, rights for 
collection could be extended further into the future, or the area over which a particular collector 
had rights could be expanded, or both. By honoring these expenditures in excess of the bid, the tax 
farmers were providing credit to the state. In the course of its development from the late Middle 
Ages through the eighteenth century, the quasi-national bank function of large tax farmers was 
fully realized and the provision of credit to the state came to be emphasized over collection 
functions. Providing the state with credit became more commonplace, and the umbrella of tax 
collection for which the French tax farmers were responsible expanded.73 
 The Apion expansion coincides with a period during which the state was engaged in 
numerous costly undertakings and its finances were severely strained.74 Expansion similar to that 
undergone by the French tax farming companies, owing to the growing importance of their role in 
making credit available to the state, offers an explanation for the rapid expansion of the number of 
prostasiai comprising the Apion collection umbrella during the sixth century. In Chapter 3 it was 
argued that that expansion was from wider ownership or a greater area of fiscal responsibility on 
the part of the Apions, or both.  If the Apion estate’s role in providing credit to the state was 
attendant upon its role in tax farming, then a rapid expansion of its area of fiscal responsibility 
might be explained.   
                                                
73 Similarities with the French revenue system further explain why the Apion estate did not distinguish between the 
collections it made from leases and those from taxes. Just as we would not expect a French revenue farmer to make 
careful distinctions between the money collected for tolls and the money collected for rent, so too we should not 
expect the Apions to separate lease revenue from taxes, which were just another revenue source associated with the 
land. One of the reasons little distinction was made between tax revenue and other kinds of revenue was that there 
was, in practice, little distinction between them once the contract for collection had been awarded. 
74 See Chapter 4, 95. Also Cameron 2000 (CAH 14), 84. 
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5.5.3 Managing Cash Flow on Multiple Tiers 
The French system used distinct apparatuses for the collection of direct and indirect taxes. 
For direct taxes, a two-tiered system was in place. The lower tier, called the Financial Receivers, 
retained a fixed proportion of collections, then passed the remainder to the upper tier, called the 
General Receivers, which in turn retained a fixed proportion before passing on the remainder to 
the state treasury.75 On its face, the collection of direct taxes was a share system on both tiers. But 
in order to ensure predictable and regular revenue the state initiated a rent system, with the 
General Receivers (the upper tier) advancing the anticipated tax revenue, less four to five percent, 
to the treasury. In effect, then, the upper tier operated on a rent system and the lower tier on a 
share system. It is significant that the upper tier of the French system was able to advance the state 
money in anticipation of the actual collection of the taxes by the lower tier. Tax anticipation 
depended on the General Receivers’ possession of sufficient capital and ability to obtain credit 
from others with capital. This is precisely the situation described for the two tiers of the Apion 
estate: the estate’s capital reserves, inflated by delaying payment of their own private debts, could 
bear payment of the bid price in anticipation of collection by the lower tier. That flexibility 
allowed the estate to profit from its arrangement with the state, potentially expand the area over 
which it had collection rights, and extract still further profit from the speculative activities of the 
pronoetai once collections were finally made. The problem for the upper Apion tier, just as it was 
for the French General Receivers, became one of managing cash flow. Once sufficient capital had 
been accumulated and credit ensured, the Apion estate could withstand the outlay of money to the 
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138 
state in anticipation of collection and in exchange see a return on such loans in the long term, 
generating further capital enabling the expansion of the entire enterprise.  
5.5.4 Lease Length 
 By the seventeenth century, the French system was characterized by the sale of heritable 
collection offices. In other words, leases had become perpetual. Matthews argues that this venality 
had a dual purpose. First, it was a way for the state to obtain money quickly. The fact that the 
collection rights were sold to different collectors for alternating years, so that more than one office 
could be sold to cover a particular tax in an area, illustrates this. But the sale of heritable collection 
offices also acted as a barrier to entry, ensuring that only those with sufficient wealth and credit of 
their own would be relied on by the state for the provision of credit. On the lower level, the 
payments required of the Apion pronoetai would have fulfilled the same purpose as the sale of 
offices, restricting the position of collector to those who could actually be made accountable for 
amounts in arrears. Absent this, the reallocation of risk would be a mirage.  
Long term leases of collection rights, similar to those which heritable venal offices brought 
about in France, are a strong likelihood on the upper tier of the Apion estate.  As noted above, the 
consistency of the epoikia for which the Apion estate had collection responsibilities in P.Oxy. 
16.1911 and 55.3804 indicates at least very long-term leases on the upper tier. P.Oxy. 16.1915 (557 
CE) shows that the Apions administered imperial land, making collections and expenditures 
according to their apaitesima. Many of the entries in that document are described as being done ἐξ 
ἀρχαιωθ(έντος) καὶ ἀµνηµονεύτου χρόνου, “according to the ancient way and from time 
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immemorial.”76 Moreover, as Hickey argues, the land classed as apotakton chorion was vineland 
owned by the church or the state, but administered by the Apions.77 Administration of this land 
would have involved collection of revenues including taxes. Based on P.Cair.Masp. 3.67299.39–40, 
Gascou identified apotakton with emphuteusis, a type of perpetual lease.78 Hickey argues, in contrast, 
that they are not identical, but the emphuteusis is a type of apotakton.79 In either case, the apotakton 
was a long term lease, sometimes even perpetual, in which the Apions were engaged for the 
collection of taxes. 
Because leases of tax farms were for large areas and long periods in France, determining 
their price by competitive auction became untenable.80 Instead, all major tax farms were “awarded 
as a result of direct secret negotiations between the financiers and the finance ministers.”81 This 
practice offers another possible scenario for the Apions who, like the French tax farmers, were 
engaged on long term or perpetual leases, so that competitive auctions were no longer possible as a 
means of setting the rent price. The closeness of the Apions to the imperial family in the fifth and 
sixth centuries also argues in favor of backroom dealings comparable to those of France. The 
objects of such direct negotiations would certainly have been money, but, again, the close relation 
of the Apions to the imperial family and their political prominence, culminating in the ordinary 
consulship of Apion II in 539, suggest official honors were on offer as well. 
The examples given so far offer two possible explanations for a shift toward longer term 
leases on tax farms in Byzantine Egypt. When the publicani were granted the right to collect on 
                                                
76 See Hickey 2012, 52–58 on the Apion administration of imperial land, especially apotakton chorion. On the date of 
P.Oxy. 16.1915, see Mazza 2001, 24 n. 73. 
77 Hickey 2012, 53–58. 
78 Gascou 1985, 7–8. See also p. 5 n. 21 supra. 
79 Hickey 2012, 53–58. 
80 Matthews 1958, 40–41. 
81 Matthews 1958, 40–41. 
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Asian taxes, leases were extended to five years in order to account for the difficulties of operating 
so far from Rome. That is, the publicani were compensated for assuming greater risk with greater 
security in their position and a longer period in which to deal with variance in collection.82 For the 
French tax farmers, longer leases were granted as a way for the state to borrow against its future 
revenues. Offering longer term contracts in both cases was a way for the state to use its future tax 
rights as negotiating leverage in the present. That the Apions came to enjoy very long term leases 
over tax rights indicates that the state was behaving in a similar way, and, absent any obvious 
assumption of additional risk by the Apions, the French example supplies credit provision to the 
state as a plausible reason. 
5.5.5 The Value of Tax Farmers Beyond Collection 
 In Ptolemaic Egypt, the non-collection related roles played by tax farmers, including their 
ability to provide credit to the state and act as clearinghouses, made them valuable even when 
circumstances made other systems preferable for tax collection. Matthews points out that in 
seventeenth century France, there were not barriers to eliminating tax farming as the means of 
collection, and indeed there were years when the tax farming leases were refused and salaried 
government officials took over administration of collections.83 But because the use of salaried 
government officials reduced the availability of tax anticipation through credit, the state 
consistently tried to return to the farming system. The French tax farming companies’ 
management of the collection bureaucracy, the service à la régie,  was subordinate to its financial 
role, or service du trésor. Matthews writes, therefore, “the raison d'être of the eighteenth-century 
                                                
82 On a short term lease, a poor year could be disastrous. On a longer-term lease, a poor year was more likely to be 
offset by a good year, thereby flattening the impact of variance. 
83 Matthews 1958, 18. 
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Company of General Farmers was its skill in manipulating the credit possibilities of a tax-farming 
lease…its service du trésor.”84  
 In the absence of central banking the services which groups of cash rich individuals could 
provide to the state through tax farming were, as the cases of Athens, Ptolemaic Egypt, Republican 
Rome, and early modern France have shown, too appealing to pass up when need for money 
arose. Providing those services to the state often proved highly lucrative. Since many of the same 
circumstances existed in Byzantine Egypt as existed in those other milieux, it is plausible that the 
Apions and their peers in Egypt also fulfilled a dual mandate: manage the collection of taxes and 
facilitate tax anticipation. In early modern France, the financial possibilities emerged from a 
simpler apparatus devoted primarily to facilitating tax collection, but as the apparatus became 
greater in scale and complexity, the collectors’ role in financing the state through credit also grew. 
In Egypt, it is possible to trace a very similar trajectory from collectors like Papnouthis and 
Dorotheos in the fourth century to the Apions in the sixth. Absent signs of productive surplus and 
extensive market engagement, the financial function of tax farming also offers an explanation for 
the Apions’ enrichment. 
5.5.6 The Coexistence of Tax Farm and State Collection Bureaucracy 
 The laws and the papyri give the impression of a dizzying array of minor officials working 
in the tax bureaucracy of the Byzantine Empire. Different taxes, regions, and time periods all saw 
different officials involved at some level of fiscal administration. Where the semi-public tax 
farming operations like the Apions’ might fit in with these government institutions can be difficult 
to envision. The French General Farms provide a picture of how the public and semi-public can 
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operate together. Matthews draws a distinction between the institution of the French General 
Farms—the tax rights and the bureaucracy—and the Company of General Farmers—financiers who 
assumed the dual role of managing the General Farms and financing the state. Of the former 
Matthews writes, “as a bureaucracy, the General Farms possessed the equipment, the personnel, 
and the procedural routines to perform this function without regard to the purely tax farming 
relation that existed between the government and the Company of General Farmers.”85 It 
consisted of “a considerable corpus of standing rules and regulations sanctioned by the king, and a 
huge body of personnel, the most important members of which were permanently employed royal 
officers, directly employed by the king.”86  
The French example and that of Ptolemaic Egypt both show that an extensive state 
bureaucracy and a private collection apparatus are not mutually exclusive. To a point, a similar 
coexistence might be posited for the Byzantine system of collection: the state retained a collection 
apparatus and the Apion estate managed and financed collection and tax anticipation. So, for 
example, the Apion pronoetai made their grain collections and handed over the embole to the 
embolator, a state bureaucrat. But for the Apions, the collection bureaucracy at the lowest levels was 
entirely within the estate’s control. Ptolemaic Egypt and Early Modern France demonstrate that 
even where there is plentiful state involvement in the collection of taxes, tax farmers can play an 
important or even predominant role in the collection, operating alongside and within the state 
bureaucracy.  
 Chapter 4 ended by characterizing the relationship between the state and the upper tier of 
the Apion estate as one of parties in a negotiation. Matthews describes the relationship between 
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the French monarchy and the tax farming companies similarly: “The royal controller-general did 
not, and could not, command the General Receivers and the General Farmers as subordinates. 
Rather he negotiated with them seeking not obedience but bargaining advantages.”87 In language 
reminiscent of Gascou’s description of the Apion estates, he continues, “the General Receivers 
and General Farmers were not modern civil servants, but chiefs of quasiprivate financial 
corporations.”88 The parallels between the Apions and the French system suggest that the Apion 
estates might too have been used “as instruments of financial manipulation…dedicated to the 
policy of tax anticipation,” and their main importance to the government was “not their 
managerial or administrative skill, but their financial strength and willingness to place at the king’s 
disposal their own private credit.”89 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
Highlighting the points of contact between the Apion estate’s tax and revenue collection 
apparatus and other historical instances of tax farming can help to fill in gaps in our 
understanding of estates in Byzantine Egypt. The Apion system of collection emerged from the 
consolidation of dispersed, small-scale, independent collectors like Papnouthis and Dorotheos into 
syndicates controlled by the wealthiest and most influential members of local society.90 After this 
consolidation, the Apion estate employed subcontractors, drawn from the bureaucratic apparatus 
already in place for the private functions associated with estate management and non-tax revenue 
farming, such as land leasing and equipment rental.  
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The Apions owned a large amount of land around Oxyrhynchus. A number of different 
valuable assets were associated with that land: the produce grown on it, mills and presses installed 
on it, and animals working it. The three systems of tax collection discussed in Chapter 4 are 
specific applications of systems of collection simpliciter, equally applicable to taxes, tolls, agricultural 
crops, and anything else producing valuables. The methods available to the Apions to exploit the 
land and other assets they controlled therefore track with those available to them for tax 
collection. They could hire workers to reap the produce and collect it directly, they could lease the 
land for a fixed amount based on the expected amount that the land would generate, or they could 
use sharecropping. Sarris argues that direct exploitation was the most significant means of revenue 
collection, and leasing was supplementary; but, as argued in Chapter 2, little evidence suggests that 
direct exploitation was more prevalent than leasing. The use of apaitesima and the handful of lease 
contracts indicate, at the very least, the existence of a bureaucratic apparatus for collections under 
a rent system.91 The state also possessed taxation rights over this same land and the people working 
it, and was faced with the same options for exploiting it. The state leased tax collection rights over 
much of the land around Oxyrhynchus—both Apion and non-Apion owned land—to the Apions 
according to some contractual arrangement.92 Once the tax rights came into possession of the 
Apion family, they were treated no differently from any of the other valuable assets associated with 
the estate. They were incorporated into the existing mechanisms of revenue collection, most 
prominently through tax farming. Much as there was an administrative layer determining where 
irrigation machinery, mills, and oil presses were to be installed, and how collections were to be 
                                                
91 P.Oxy. 16.2037 is an apaitesimon; P.Flor 3.325 and P.Oxy. 63.4390 (both Apion), and P.Oxy. 6.913 (non-Apion) are 
leases. 
92 E.g., P.Oxy. 16.1915. 
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made from them, there was an administrative tier above the rest of the revenue farming apparatus 
contracting with the state, securing the right of tax collection, and handling payments owed to the 
state. In other words, tax farming was a subset of the category of revenue farming.93  
Suggesting that a rent system of collection was adopted because of the credit it could 
provide would be to attribute more foresight and financial understanding to the Apions than is 
plausible. More probably, credit became available as a natural result of the rent system which was 
adopted for the reasons that Coşgel and Miceli lay out as discussed in Chapter 4. The French tax 
farming estates can provide particular insight into how Apion tax farming arrangements were used 
to finance the state through credit. The financial aspects of the Apion estate’s use of rent contracts 
for collection increased its influence especially in times of tumult and war, when the state had a 
pressing need for cash. The greater reliance of the state on large estates for financing afforded the 
Apions still greater bargaining power in determining the fees for collection of taxes (that is, they 
could lower the rent paid to the state for the right to collect). The increased leverage of collectors 
like the Apions also freed their hands to squeeze the rural population from which they collected, 
unchecked by the state whose interest in protecting the rural population from extortionate 
behavior was subordinate to its interest in keeping the flow of credit open. The French collection 
system, and specifically how credit was used in it, additionally offers possible explanations for the 
expansion of land over which the Apions had either ownership or the right of collection. The 
French and Ptolemaic examples also show how a state bureaucracy devoted to collection can exist 
alongside and symbiotically with a private tax farming system like the one described for Byzantine 
Egypt and likely at work on the Apion estate.
                                                
93 Matthews 1958, 4–6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Hickey’s work has shown that the revenues from leased land were insufficient to account 
for the wealth of the Apion family. Sarris’ contention that the autourgia, directly managed land, 
was the source of the family’s wealth is insufficiently supported by the evidence. The question 
asked at the outset of this dissertation was, therefore, what the source of Apion wealth was. The 
answer posited relates to the Apions’ role in tax collection. The core argument consisted of three 
steps. First was a critique of Sarris’ claims concerning the prominent role of the autourgia in the 
production of a marketable surplus. The conclusion reached here aligns with Hickey’s contention 
that there was little agricultural surplus available for sale on the open market and that the 
agricultural production of the estates was not managed in a profit seeking way. Second, it was 
established based on contracts and accounts that the pronoetai, the lower level collectors on the 
Apion estate, were required to pay the estate in cash and kind in excess of their collection 
requirements. This excess was shown to have come from speculation in transmuting billon and 
kind into gold, and from the extracurricular extractions that collectors made from the lessees and 
landowners for whom they were responsible. Third, the possible arrangements between the state 
and the estate for tax collection were outlined, and tax farming emerged as the likeliest of the 
possibilities. Circumstances which led to tax farming systems in a number of historically analogous 
situations were shown to be present also in Byzantine Egypt and on the Apion estate. Their 
presence strengthens the claim that the relationship between the state and the estate took the form 
of a tax-farming contract. 
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6.1 THE AUTOURGIA 
There are flaws in Sarris’ bipartite model and his description of the autourgia as the most 
important sector of the estates. Only a handful of documents explicitly mention the autourgia, and 
those are not dispositive in the way Sarris presents them.1 When the context can be determined, 
these documents all concern fodder.2 Sarris, however, expands the corpus of documents referring 
to the autourgia by connecting it with names of location markers (e.g., ἔξω τῆς πύλης). Wherever 
those names appear, Sarris infers that the autourgia is meant. It is on this land that Sarris finds the 
wide variety of crops he claims were cultivated on the estate and tracked in accounts which are no 
longer extant. If the identification of these location markers with the autourgia cannot be 
supported, as argued in Chapter 2, then the thesis about the role of the autourgia in generating 
wealth for the Apions is significantly undermined. The autourgia is clearly associated with fodder, a 
product the estate needed to purchase externally and therefore was unlikely to have been produced 
for a marketable surplus. The autourgia and its association with fodder, along with lease agreements 
and account entries in which estate owned animals are used by lessees, suggest instead that the 
estate and the lessees associated with the estate maintained animals centrally for transportation 
and agricultural uses.  
The case Sarris makes for the deliberate transfer of labor to the autourgia—indicating central 
direction and profit seeking behavior—is dubious as well. It is based entirely on the observation 
that some laborers are listed in accounts with a certain epoikion (or village) as their origo, and these 
                                                
1 Mazza 2008, 152. 
2 Documents connecting the autourgia with fodder listed by Mazza are P.Oxy.16.1913, lines 36–39; P.Oxy.16.1911, 
lines 178–80; P. Oxy.55.3804, lines 244–48; P.Oxy.18.2195, lines 132–33. Hickey (2001, 193) points out that the 
Apion oikos’ need to buy fodder and seed for fodder indicates that it would not or could not meet its own internal 
demand for fodder. Hence fodder as a source for profit is unlikely. 
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same laborers appear associated with another location. Sarris argues this implies that renters were 
deployed as laborers on a different part of the estate, presumably on the autourgia, from the one 
they rented. Mazza offers other equally, if not more, plausible explanations for a cultivator working 
land other than his origo: farmers might rent land in both their own epoikion and a neighboring 
one; or the physical location and the fiscal origo, for various possible reasons, might not be one and 
the same. In Chapter 2 it is also demonstrated that georgoi varied greatly in social status, with some 
owning land and others, perhaps family members of lessees and small landowners, not even leasing 
land of their own. The presence of georgoi who owned and leased land or worked land owned or 
leased by others provides an explanation hewing more closely to the evidence than Sarris’ 
contention that there were centrally directed transfers of labor to the scantily documented 
autourgia. 
 
6.2 COLLECTION ON TWO TIERS 
The estate accumulated wealth from the methods it used to collect taxes and other revenue 
from the rural peasantry in Oxyrhynchus.3 To make these collections the estate employed local 
agents who engaged in speculative trade in a gold market using the collections made in kind and 
billon from small-scale lessees and landowners as principal. The estate contractually obligated its 
collectors to pay the estate dues in exchange for the right to collect, thereby deriving benefits from 
their speculation. This lower tier system was made possible by the agreements between the upper 
tier and the state to secure tax collection rights. These agreements were tax-farming contracts 
wherein the Apion estate could collect more from the peasantry than it had to pay the state for the 
                                                
3 There is evidence that the Apions also engaged in urban leasing and farmed out its collection. The extent of this type 
of activity remains uncertain. See P.Oxy. 58.3958, a contract for collection on urban property using farming system. 
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collection rights. The activities of the estate on the upper tier are mostly inaccessible through 
papyrological or literary sources. Chapter 4 provides a means of evaluating the upper level activities 
of the Apion estate and their relationship to the more thoroughly documented lower tier activities 
by creating a theoretical framework based on historical methods of tax collection. From this 
examination of the upper tier, a secondary benefit to the Apions becomes apparent: as the state 
came to rely on funds being available before collection, a key aspect of the tax farming system 
posited, the Apions’ bargaining position with respect to the state was bettered. An improved 
bargaining position led to agreements for collection over larger areas and for longer terms, 
phenomena reflected in the better documented lower tier.  
In addition to the major conclusions about the sources of Apion wealth, this dissertation 
argues that a sixth century expansion of the area over which the estate was responsible for tax 
collection can be quantitatively demonstrated. The collection numbers on the prostasia-level 
accounts remain relatively constant, whereas the collections for estate-level accounts expand 
significantly. The expansion therefore is owed to an increase in the number of prostasiai on the 
estate rather than an increase in the level of taxation. Combined with Hickey’s arguments about 
the size of the Apion estate, the calculations further suggest that the expansion was not in the 
amount of land the Apions owned, but the amount of land on which they made collections. This 
strongly supports Gascou’s model and refutes Sarris’. Quantifying the prostasiai associated with the 
estate also permits a calculation of the benefits the estate derived directly from its contractual 
arrangements with collectors: on the order of 7% of their gross collections.  
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6.3 COMPARISONS 
The Athenian tax collection system shows the propensity of tax farming systems to 
concentrate into the hands of a wealthy elite. Collection under the Roman publicani concentrates 
in the same way, and also shows the possibilities a tax farming system offers to the state outside of 
collecting taxes. Especially significant among these possibilities are the extension of credit and 
facilitation of remote expenditures. The Ptolemaic tax system is an instance in which these 
possibilities were so valuable to the state that tax farming persisted even when conditions made 
other systems preferable purely in collection terms. Finally, the French tax collection system in 
place from the late Middle Ages to the eighteenth century shows how large scale tax farming 
systems could be highly lucrative for the collectors, especially from the extension of credit to the 
state, and highlights the connection of credit extension to expansion of the area and increasing 
terms for which collection rights were conferred. The French system therefore suggests an 
explanation for the expansion of the Apion collection area. The French example also shows how a 
private, multi-tiered collection system can exist alongside an elaborate state collection bureaucracy. 
 
6.4 LIMITATIONS AND HAZARDS 
When arguments and claims about the economy and society of late antique Egypt are 
made, it is important to keep in mind the precariousness of the evidence they rest upon. The 
evidence depends on chance survival and on often arbitrary decisions of many individuals on the 
long path from middle Egypt to editions on library shelves. Whether certain documents and types 
of documents ended up spending the centuries in drier or wetter locations, whether they were ever 
discovered and found their way to universities, museums, and libraries, whether they were selected 
 
 
151 
for edition and were edited well can all skew the perception of history extracted from them. 
Moreover, literally thousands of papyri sit unedited in museums and libraries (and indeed in 
desert sand), any one of which could utterly upend the way this place and time is understood. The 
evolving picture of Phoibammon in Aphrodito drawn in Keenan’s articles shows that this hazard is 
present even when a highly circumscribed “micro-history,” focused on a single person over a few 
years, is being written.4 So much greater the risk when broader conclusions—about an entire estate, 
or all of Oxyrhynchus, Egypt, the empire, or the age—are drawn from limited evidence. Confident 
assertions of fact, even about minor points, therefore are difficult to make in good conscience. 
Offered here is an attempt to create a coherent accounting of the evidence as it now stands, to 
supplement the limitations of the evidence with historical analogues, and to give a fair evaluation 
of the interpretations that have come before. Ideally it is a plausible theory awaiting and 
welcoming new evidence and new methods to test its validity.  
                                                
4 Keenan (2007, 235) writes of his 1980 article, “at the end of the article on Phoibammon I engage in a series of 
speculations, the riskiest of which was that Phoibammon may have had ‘little or no family, possibly therefore only his 
own mouth to feed.’ This was immediately proven wrong by the virtually simultaneous publication of a Phoibammon 
papyrus in the Vatican Library (P.Vat.Aphrod. 10) from which it was clear that Phoibammon had a wife…” 
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APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS 
 
⋅ Adaeratio  – The use of money for the payment of taxes owed in kind. 
 
⋅ Autourgia  – A category of land mostly associated with fodder. Sarris characterizes it as the 
economic engine of the estates, producing a large surplus sold at market. (See Figure 4) 
 
⋅ Edaphos  – A division of land. Sarris claims it is the standard division for autourgia, but the 
evidence is unclear. 
 
⋅ Emphuteusis  – A permanent lease of state or church land with an upfront payment and 
low annual payments. 
 
⋅ Epoikia  – Small settlements, often translated as hamlets, in which cultivators of land 
associated with the Apions lived. (See Figure 1, Appendix B) 
 
⋅ Ktema  – Land leased by inhabitants of epoikia. (See Figure 1, Appendix B) 
 
⋅ Pronoetes  – An employee of the estate responsible for the collection of taxes and other 
revenues from a prostasia. 
 
⋅ Prostasia  – An administrative division of the estate’s collection area comprising five to 
seven epoikia and the associated ktemata, overseen by a pronoetes. (See Figure 2, Appendix B) 
 
⋅ Synteleiai  – Collectives of estate owners responsible for tax collection in their areas. 
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APPENDIX B 
ESTATE STRUCTURE 
Figure 1: Epoikion and ktema 
 
Figure 2: Prostasia, area overseen by a pronoetes 
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Figure 3: Estate Structure Traditionally 
 
Figure 4: Estate Structure According to Sarris 
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APPENDIX C 
PAPYRI REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT 
 
CPR 19.44 (5th/6th) 
P.Amh. 2.79 (186/187) 
P.Bagnall 33.10 (496) 
P.Berl.Zill. 7 (574) 
P.Brit.Mus.1.10528 (291 BCE) 
P.Cair.Masp. 1.67057 
(551/552) 
P.Cair.Masp. 2.67170 (562-
564) 
P.Cair.Masp. 3.67299 (6th) 
P.Cair.Zen. 1.59004 (259 
BCE?) 
P.Col. 8.244 (5th/6th) 
P.Dubl. 32 (512) 
P.Dubl. 33 (513) 
P.Fay. 34 (161) 
P.Flor. 3.280 (514) 
P.Flor 3.325 (489) 
P.Iand. 4.63 (7th) 
P.Laur. 3.75 (574) 
P.Lond. 2.393 (6th/7th) 
P.Lond. 5.1689 (527) 
P.Lond. 5.1693 (523/524) 
P.Lond. 5.1770 (6th) 
P.Mert. 2.96 (6th) 
P.Mich.11.611 (412) 
P.Mich.14.680 (3rd/4th) 
P.Michael. 34 (6th) 
P.Oxy. 1.44 (1st) 
P.Oxy. 1.125 (560) 
P.Oxy. 1.126 (572) 
P.Oxy. 1.127 (6th) 
P.Oxy. 1.127.r (6th) 
P.Oxy. 1.130 (548/549) 
P.Oxy. 1.135 (579) 
P.Oxy. 1.136 (583) 
P.Oxy. 1.138 (610/611) 
P.Oxy. 1.144 (580) 
P.Oxy. 6.913 (443) 
P.Oxy. 8.1130 (484) 
P.Oxy. 14.1734 (2nd/3rd) 
P.Oxy. 16.1831 (5th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1866 (6th/7th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1867 (7th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1895 (554) 
P.Oxy. 16.1907 (6th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1908 (6th/7th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1909 (6th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1909.v (6th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1910 (6th/7th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1911 (557) 
P.Oxy. 16.1912 (566) 
P.Oxy. 16.1913 (555) 
P.Oxy. 16.1914 (557) 
P.Oxy. 16.1915 (557) 
P.Oxy. 16.1918 (542) 
P.Oxy. 16.1918.v (6th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1925 (7th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1939 (6th/7th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1940 (6th/7th) 
P.Oxy. 16.1952 (564) 
P.Oxy. 16.1968/SB 26.16722 
(6th) 
P.Oxy. 16.2012 (590) 
P.Oxy. 16.2020 (6th) 
P.Oxy. 16.2027 (6th) 
P.Oxy. 16.2032 (540/541) 
P.Oxy. 16.2033 (7th) 
P.Oxy. 16.2037 (6th) 
P.Oxy. 18.2195 (576/577) 
P.Oxy. 18.2195.v (6th) 
P.Oxy. 18.2196.v (6th) 
P.Oxy. 18.2204 (6th) 
P.Oxy. 19.2238 (551) 
P.Oxy. 19.2239 (598) 
P.Oxy. 19.2243a (590) 
P.Oxy. 27.2478 (595) 
P.Oxy. 27.2479 (6th) 
P.Oxy. 44.3204 (588) 
P.Oxy. 48.3387 (342) 
P.Oxy. 48.3388 (342) 
P.Oxy. 48.3393 (365) 
P.Oxy. 48.3394 (364-366) 
P.Oxy. 48.3400 (4th) 
P.Oxy. 48.3401 (355) 
P.Oxy. 48.3406 (4th) 
P.Oxy. 48.3407 (4th) 
P.Oxy. 48.3417 (4th) 
P.Oxy. 48.3419 (4th) 
P.Oxy. 50.3586 (5th) 
P.Oxy. 50.3584 (5th) 
P.Oxy. 50.3585 (5th) 
P.Oxy. 55.3803 (411) 
P.Oxy. 55.3804 (566) 
P.Oxy. 58.3955 (611) 
P.Oxy. 58.3958 (614) 
P.Oxy. 63.4390 (469) 
P.Oxy. 67.4615 (505) 
P.Oxy. 70.4790 (578) 
P.Oxy. 70.4791 (578) 
P.Oxy. 70.4794 (580) 
P.Oxy. 71.4831 (429) 
P.Oxy. 72.4922 (582) 
P.Oxy. 72.4926 (564) 
P.Oxy. 72.4927 (564) 
P.Oxy. 72.4928 (564) 
P.Oxy. 72.4929 (564) 
P.Rev. (259/258 BCE) 
P.Ross.Georg. 2.19 (141) 
P.Wash.Univ. 2.102 (5th/6th) 
P.Wisc. 2.66 (584) 
P.Yale 3.137 (216/217) 
PSI 3.193 (565) 
SPP 10.111 (5th/6th) 
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